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In early 2011, the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) 
Chair in Social Change at the University of Fort Hare and the Centre 
for Humanities Research (CHR) at the University of the Western Cape, 
now the home of the Department of Science and Technology and the 
National Research Foundation (DST-NRF) Flagship on Critical Thought 
in African Humanities, began a long-term collaboration, a research 
and pedagogical experiment that took the form of a Winter School 
for doctoral and master’s students. The chapters collected here have 
emerged largely out of this collaboration. Together, they constitute 
an  intervention into the concept of the social as such. There is much 
more to be said of this collaboration between two universities that were 
produced by apartheid thought and legislation as precisely not capable of 
such an intervention. We would, however, simply like to acknowledge 
these two projects – and there have been other important partners, most 
notably the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change 
at the University of Minnesota – for providing the space in which this 
intervention was able to take shape.
This volume would, of course, not have been possible without the 
investment and collaboration of all our contributors. Each one of the 
contributors has been, at some point in the past few years, a participant 
in the projects convened by the CHR and the SARChI Chair, whether 
as students, postdoctoral fellows, visiting faculty or participants in the 
various seminars and colloquiums that have taken place over the years. 
The contributors to the volume have been patient over a very long process, 
always responsive and positive, and have produced what are quite clearly 
in their own right outstanding interventions into the social.
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Remains of the Social is, as we note in our acknowledgements, a product 
of a critical engagement between the SARChI Chair in Social Change at 
the University of Fort Hare, the Centre for Humanities Research at the 
University of the Western Cape, and their respective research partners. As 
such, this volume, read as a coherent project in itself, might also be read 
alongside wider collaborations and developments, and in anticipation 
of subsequent volumes that broaden, deepen and extend the discussions 
around the social into areas that might seem absent from this volume.
Most studies on the social as it comes to bear on the postapartheid 
– and studies of social cohesion could be included here – take the social 
as an ideal that must either be vigorously defended or triumphantly 
declared. Remains of the Social offers another perspective. Pressuring 
assumptions of rational progress for society and the subject, we begin 
by putting the social into question, asking after the ways in which, and 
the ends to which, it is invoked and given its itineraries, attending to the 
epistemological grounds of the social. In doing so, the volume inquires 
into that which is remaindered in the production of the social. In other 
words, Remains treats the social as a problematic, one from which it is 
difficult to emerge unscarred.
The interventions collected here ask after what is rendered unliveable 
as a condition of possibility of the social. This unliveability most readily 
recalls Judith Butler’s concept of precarity – the ungrievability of certain 
lives that engenders their unliveablility, a theme taken up by several 
contributors here – but it recalls, also, and importantly, the rupture 
that, for Walter Benjamin, clears the ground for his critique of time and 
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progress in his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. Indeed, what is 
explored here, in various ways, is the notion that the very question of 
loss, as Zita Nunes has argued, might be read not only as constitutive 
of, or constituted by, the social – the social produced through loss, the 
grave as its first commemorative sign, or the social apportioning life and 
death and designating its grievability – but rather as a masking of that 
which enables the constitution of the social: the remainder, which we 
propose against conceptions of mourning and its failures, melancholia 
and nostalgia, which one finds more frequently in studies on the social.
There is an echo here, as we discuss in the introductory chapter, of 
Fanon’s critique in Black Skin, White Masks of the social as it is constituted 
through the concept of Man, an echo that brings with it not only the 
urgent task of posing questions of racial formations, but also a need to 
turn attentively to modes of narration that enable an encounter with 
these remainders as resistant: to read this resistance back into the social 
as a demand that orders a future which is, as Fanon puts it in his opening 
lines, always too soon and too late, out of time. Such a demand is what 
threads the ethical weight that the chapters in this volume bring to the 
question of the social.
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CHAPTER 1  
TRAVERSING THE SOCIAL
Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott,  Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu
What is South Africa? We have perhaps isolated whatever it is that has 
been concentrated in that enigma, but the outline of such analyses has 
neither dissolved nor dissipated it in the least. Precisely because of this 
concentration of world history, what resists analysis also calls for another 
mode of thinking. If we could forget about the suffering, the humiliation, 
the torture and the deaths, we might be tempted to look at this region of 
the world as a giant tableau or painting, the screen for some geopolitical 
computer. Europe, in the enigmatic process of its globalization and of 
its paradoxical disappearance, seems to project onto this screen, point by 
point, the silhouette of its internal war, the bottom line of its profits and 
losses, the double-bind logic of its national and multi-national interests 
(Derrida, ‘Racism’s Last Word’ 297–298).
The blackmail of whiteness
As Jacques Derrida reminds us, it is not possible to ‘forget about the 
suffering, the humiliation, the torture and the deaths’, in short, the 
weight of lived experience that was and is apartheid. At the same time, 
particularly when we consider apartheid as a question that extends 
beyond its own borders, it remains both necessary and urgent to distil 
the question of what he calls ‘South Africa’, to shape it and focus it as a 
problem for thought, so as to enable the possibilities of thinking what 
we in this volume call, without hyphenation, the postapartheid, neither 
a point in time nor a political dispensation, but rather a condition 
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that names the labour of coming to terms with and working through 
the desires, principles, critiques and modes of ordering that apartheid 
both enabled and foreclosed. One of the tasks that we set for ourselves 
in this introduction is to provide a sense of this terrain on which the 
postapartheid unfolds.
Let us begin, then, by turning to a recent intervention into the 
social. Introducing their edited volume, Re-Imagining the Social in South 
Africa: Critique, Theory and Post-Apartheid Society, Peter Vale and Heather 
Jacklin argue that ‘when apartheid ended, critical thinking ended’ (1). 
The conditions of this ‘shift from critique to subservience’ (2) are to be 
found, they argue, in ‘post-apartheid South Africa’s incorporation into 
the logic and exigencies of global neo-liberal capitalism’ (7). With this 
‘incorporation’, the value of humanities scholarship was reduced to its 
capacity to contribute to economic growth, always subject to tests – often 
in terms of ‘impact’, ‘efficacy’ and ‘efficiency’ – against the imperatives 
of the market. It is a counterintuitive claim – South Africa’s freedom has 
coincided with a constraint of thought – by the editors of Re-Imagining 
the Social, with which we are, to an extent, in agreement.
However, there is a jarring line in Vale and Jacklin’s introduction 
that makes this volume necessary. They write: ‘Even the most casual 
reading of these chapters will confirm that this collection, like most 
writing in critical social theory, is an exercise interested in promoting 
Enlightenment values’ (11). Precisely what values might this mean? As 
if to respond to the question, they refer, further on, to the ‘counter-
Enlightenment authoritarian tendencies’ (17) which the state assumed in 
South Africa during apartheid. So, in their construction of it, ‘promoting 
Enlightenment values’ is an antidote to apartheid as an ‘authoritarian’ 
impediment to the ‘Enlightenment’, leaving the postapartheid to come 
as the Enlightenment’s fulfilment. To point out the Eurocentrism of this 
view is hardly necessary.
As for the question of which Enlightenment they are ‘promoting’, 
we are left guessing, for the Enlightenment was not a unified project. 
Given their subtitle, and their leanings, it is likely a call for those forms 
of critique that take their point of departure from Immanuel Kant.1 If we 
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take Michel Foucault’s reading of Kant’s elaboration of the concept of the 
Enlightenment as a touchstone, the itinerary to which Vale and Jacklin 
commit the postapartheid must be read as a ‘way out’ of the ‘immaturity’ 
of humanity with respect to the proper use of reason, that is, reason’s 
autonomous use as ‘humanity’s passage to its adult status’ (‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ 308–309). This presents what Foucault famously called 
‘the “blackmail” of the Enlightenment’ (312), for the only way to counter 
the Enlightenment is on the very terrain of reason. That the game is 
rigged presents, in Foucault’s words, a ‘philosophical question that remains 
for us to consider’ (312–313, emphasis added). Rather than being for or 
against ‘Enlightenment values’, it is perhaps more apt to say that we are 
both constrained and enabled – conditioned – by this double bind, this 
false choice.
The question of Enlightenment – of the autonomous use of reason – is 
inseparable from questions of race. Kant’s Anthropology was, as Foucault 
argues in Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, central to his critiques, 
the two projects traversing each other. Both the philosophical and the 
political project produced race as a necessary function rather than as a 
timely accident, as Gayatri Spivak in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason and 
Tony Brown in The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage have argued. 
Apartheid here is not an impediment to but is, rather, coextensive with 
the Enlightenment, for apartheid is not purely an anomaly, a perversion 
of ‘Enlightenment values’, but their fulfilment.2 This is not a small issue, 
for it informs how we might clear the ground for the arrival of a sense of 
difference that will not be apartheid’s difference.
It is, arguably, in response to a version of this ‘blackmail’ that Steve 
Biko in ‘Black Souls in White Skins?’ offers a diagnosis of the problematic 
named by apartheid. On the apartheid policy of separate development, 
Biko states: ‘Everyone is quite content to point out that these people – 
meaning the blacks – will be free when they are ready to run their 
own affairs, in their own areas’ (20). His specific concern, however, is 
not this indefinitely deferred autonomy, but the tutelage under which 
liberals place blacks, treating them as children, ‘claiming a “monopoly 
on intelligence and moral judgment”’ (22–23). As he continues: ‘There 
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is nothing the matter with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM 
and it rests squarely on the laps of white society’ (25). Here, Biko takes a 
position ‘against integration’ if it means ‘an assimilation and acceptance 
of blacks into an already established set of norms’ that will keep in place 
‘the superior–inferior white–black stratification that makes the white a 
perpetual teacher and the black a perpetual pupil’ (26). While explicitly 
dealing with the relations between liberals and the black consciousness 
movement in apartheid South Africa, what Biko is drawing attention 
to in this formulation is the very question of racial formations as these 
structure the present in South Africa, both his and ours. If we consider 
the invisibility of whiteness, apart from accusation, in the framing of 
the postapartheid, the course opened by Biko’s intervention acquires a 
fresh and purposive urgency. To state this intervention more pointedly, 
liberals, rather than concerning themselves with ‘helping Blacks’, must 
rather ‘fight for their own freedom’ (27) through confronting ‘the real evil 
in our society’ (25). To grasp the force of this injunction we need to briefly 
invoke, as Biko does, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks.
Fanon similarly argues that ‘there is no black [noir] problem’ (13). 
Rather, he suggests that the problematic that structures the social derives 
from a deeper terrain. That Fanon refuses the definition of the problem 
as ‘black’ does not mean that he defines it as ‘white’, nor does it mean that 
he is dismissive of, or ignores, what he calls the ‘lived experience of the 
black man’ (89–119) – this in fact orders his intervention. For Fanon, 
however, the problem has to do with the ‘metaphysics’ of blackness and 
whiteness as these come to structure society in relation to the concept 
of Man. As he argues, Man is the concept on which both blackness and 
whiteness are articulated, as well as the function that ‘brings society into 
being’ (xv). It would, however, be too quick to focus only on dismantling 
Man and producing a new terrain for humanity (the focus of most 
critiques of Eurocentrism); the question of blackness is not so easily 
dismissed. For Fanon, Man as a concept does not designate an entity 
in itself; rather, Man is a becoming that in modern society is produced 
through the operation, the differential function, of whiteness/blackness. 
As he phrases it: ‘The black man wants to be white. The white man is 
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desperately trying to achieve the rank of man’ (xiii). This relationship, 
where black and white are both ‘locked’ in place (xiv), where ‘whites 
consider themselves superior to blacks’ and ‘blacks want to prove’ their 
equality with whites (xv), and where blackness is relegated to a position 
of ‘non-being’ (xii), has produced a ‘massive psycho-existential complex’ 
(xvi) which Fanon’s intervention attempts to destroy. In short, it is the 
conceptual terrain produced through the mechanism of blackness/
whiteness that leads Fanon to declare that ‘an individual who loves Blacks 
is as “sick” as someone who abhors them’ and that, conversely, the black 
man who strives to whiten his race is ‘as wretched as the one who preaches 
hatred of the white man’ (xii).
It is because whiteness and blackness constitute a mechanism in the 
project of Man which produces blackness as non-being and whiteness as 
the potentiality of man that any relation to whiteness or blackness as such 
is a sickness. Biko directs our attention to this structural formation when 
he invokes the ‘real evil’ in our society. What he names with the signifier 
‘evil’ is the mode by which the white man is produced as Man through the 
objectification of the black man. As an injunction that is laid in the laps 
of whites, this enables a reinscription of Biko’s formula that ‘the most 
potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ 
(74). While clearly dealing with the question of a mental attitude, this 
statement also indicates the process of objectification outlined by Fanon 
in which whiteness becomes mind and blackness becomes body. Here it 
is both the mental condition of viewing the self as white or non-white 
that is a potent weapon, and the existence of those who claim to be white 
as such.
Itinerary
In this volume we seek to address the problem of the social as it is 
diagnosed by Fanon and reoriented by Biko. In what follows, and as a way 
of anticipating the chapters in this volume, we turn to two interventions 
into the postapartheid social which we have found productive to think 
with and against, one by Mark Sanders, the other by Achille Mbembe. 
We select these two texts for the way their juxtaposition brings into 
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view the shifts in the social that are under way and the conceptual turns 
we seek to make. Despite our clear equivocation over their recourse 
to psychoanalysis, our initial invitation to contributors to write on the 
remains of the social was framed largely in psychoanalytic terms, and 
several of the contributions stage their chapters, at least in part, in or 
against psychoanalytic language. Thus, critically assessing these two texts 
is useful in underlining the wager of the volume itself.
We take the work of Sanders and Mbembe as an invitation to begin to 
elaborate what we call the remains of the social. Rather than advancing 
Kantian critique – and we cannot be sure that this is what was called for 
in Re-Imagining the Social – we turn, in framing this volume and as a point 
of departure, to an heir to the Kantian problematic: Sigmund Freud, to 
whom Fanon also turned.3 We do so not as a means of imposing a different 
Enlightenment figure – the best word to describe Freud’s relation to the 
Enlightenment is, perhaps, troublesome – on the social after apartheid, 
but as a means of making adequate what is immanent in the discourse 
on the social in South Africa; that is, there is already a form of austere 
psychoanalysis in the air, a weak psychoanalytic sensibility lodged in, 
and ordering, the social, largely as an effect of the work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the 1990s and, it has been argued, its 
most immediate precursor, the colonial Commission of Inquiry, which the 
TRC inherited and had to make function in a new way.4 Within this frame, 
we aim to traverse the social in the wake of apartheid.
Traversal, in the psychoanalytic sense, is an act of passing through 
repetition after repetition – acting out – until the signature of the 
unconscious has been written in the rhythm of a transferential relation, 
the production of a repetition without which no new configuration of 
desire would be possible.5 To traverse the social in the wake of apartheid, 
in this sense, is to attend to the repetitions that impede but also make 
possible another social beyond the horizon of apartheid, beyond 
apartheid’s ordering of extrinsic difference. And if traversal is a means of 
grasping the social as a series of repetitious acts, it is also an act through 
which the social is constituted.6 We are not ‘promoting’ psychoanalytic 
‘values’, then, nor do we wish to close off the potential of the psychoanalytic 
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as a discourse adequate to the question of the postapartheid social. We 
take a position neither pro nor contra psychoanalysis, but versus it, 
which suggests, for us, not only to turn against, but also to face, to turn 
towards, to return to, even (simply) to turn, to turn the soil of and, thus, 
to till, to renew, and – in its etymological link to the German werden – to 
turn it into what it might become, turning it away from its therapeutic, 
institutionalised uses so as to activate its critical potential. We abide by 
psychoanalysis, then, reading it for its productivity despite what we see 
as its several false turns.
If a crude form of psychoanalysis was set to work in and around 
the TRC, producing a form of mournful sociality that marked the end 
of apartheid, we want to turn the conception of mourning towards a 
wakefulness, not that of reason, but rather as a question of our present, a 
visceral articulation of a lived experience ordered by the undercurrents of 
apartheid. These undercurrents – and we discuss some of their symptoms 
below – persist in this time named by the adjective ‘postapartheid’ as a 
form of remainder: as the remains of apartheid, as those remains that 
apartheid produced and, indeed, continues to produce, as the very 
conditions through which the social coheres in this time and, as such, 
as that which produces this social as (perhaps) already out of time, even 
before it has properly begun. All of this, the contributions to this volume 
suggest, shape what is grasped as life, shaping life to such an extent that, 
now as a noun rather than only an adjective, the postapartheid operates 
as a signifier for a condition. The postapartheid, a condition of life, not 
only an adjectival signifier: this is one of the moves that this volume 
makes, a move that asks that we grasp difference as a marker of life that is, 
precisely – and, to repeat ourselves – not apartheid’s difference.
Following the next section, ‘The wake of apartheid’, we dwell on the 
concept of ‘global apartheid’, particularly as it is figured in the work of 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Empire and Multitude), as a means 
through which to rethink the category of difference as this operates in 
the social. The concept of global apartheid, we argue, asks that we rethink 
the social lived in the wake of apartheid, that we rethink apartheid itself 
and thus rethink what a postapartheid social will be.
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The wake of apartheid
The work of Sanders on the TRC serves as a useful starting point in 
conceptualising social acts and the remains of the social. In ‘Remembering 
Apartheid’, Sanders argues that apartheid was and continues to be an 
‘interdict against the development of a social formation’ (61), the essence 
of apartheid being the ‘foreclosure of the other, and thus of any historical 
possibility of another social formation’ (61). The question of a social to 
come is at the forefront of his concerns. Though the parameters of such 
a foreclosed social formation against which Sanders writes were never 
clearly stated by the theoreticians of apartheid, at the heart of apartheid’s 
discourse – Sanders argues – there is ‘a proscription on mourning, 
specifically of the other’ (60). For Sanders, ‘mourning, as the giving up 
of a loved object, presupposes desire for that object’ (65), and it is for 
this reason, he argues, that mourning the other was proscribed.7 The 
conclusion Sanders draws for a postapartheid social is that ‘apartheid 
would be undone through condolence’ (72).
Sanders turns to Freud’s ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego’, traditionally read in order to critique the psychology of Fascism and 
its persistence. For Freud, it is identification with the figure of the leader 
that produces secondary identifications between individuals who love the 
same object and are, thus, a part of the same social formation. Sanders 
makes two key moves. Firstly, he underscores the importance of Freud’s 
earlier ‘Totem and Taboo’ to ‘Group Psychology’ and its conception of 
the social. In ‘Totem and Taboo’, the revolt against, and the murder of, the 
primal father is the constitutive act through which the social emerges, an 
act recalled by the totem meal, re-enacting and forgetting the murder, 
the meal as a sacrament through which reconciliation with the father 
is brought about. Secondly, Sanders highlights the point that mourning 
(the pain of relinquishing the lost object) and melancholia (the pain of 
that loss lived as a part of oneself through identification with the lost 
object as a means of refusing the loss), while often opposed to each other, 
are for Freud inseparable. There is no mourning without a structurally 
anterior, constitutive melancholia: it is loss that inaugurates the subject, a 
subject that, paradoxically, does not pre-exist the losses it is to bear. Loss 
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hollows out the subject, as it were, engenders the very psychic interiority 
within which the lost object is incorporated. In sum, loss conditions 
not only sociality but subjectivity, a theme elaborated upon by several 
contributions here.8
By discerning the centrality of mourning to Freud’s group psychology, 
and the inseparability of mourning and melancholia, Sanders argues that 
we have here a means to grapple not only with authoritarianism but 
also ‘the social formation in general and its lines of fissure’ (75–76), a 
social formation, that is, produced through identification with the dead. 
As Sanders argues, ‘The dead one – not necessarily the “father” – can 
occupy the place of the ego ideal’ (76). The object mourned, identified 
with, could well be a slain activist. What is intriguing here is the 
constitutive function of remains to this formulation of the social, as well 
as the constructedness of the social, a social produced through acts of 
mourning, the social as an assemblage of egos bound together through a 
common introjection of an object.
Sanders also draws attention to the wager of mourning as a social act, 
most notably the rivalry that attends mournful sociality, an inevitable 
rather than exceptional eventuality. To mourn is not only to have loved, 
to have desired, it also, as an identificatory act, sets in play ‘lines of fissure’ 
over the parameters of who may mourn and, thereby, be a part of the 
social thus constituted.9 As he suggests, the person refused the right to 
mourn is effectively barred from the social. Refracted through Sanders’s 
argument if read at the limit of what is for us its productivity, the title of 
this volume would set out to abide, in some way, with those who have 
been excluded in the production of the social under apartheid and who, 
to the extent that the difference that constituted that social is still the 
grammar of the social that is ostensibly ours, remain still excluded: those 
policed by apartheid’s difference, who refuse to inhabit that difference, 
persist as the remaindered in this social as well as perhaps the markers of 
its death.
The lens of mourning offers one way to think the remainder. This 
volume, however, articulates a hesitancy around such an argument’s 
figuration of difference, which we can begin to sound out through 
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a discussion of Mbembe’s ‘The State of South African Political Life’. 
Mbembe argues that postapartheid South Africa is facing ‘a crucial 
moment in the redefinition of what counts as “social protagonism” in this 
country’.10 While Sanders is, in his own terms, interested in ‘the makings 
of a minor group psychology or general psychoanalytic theory of social 
formation’ (76), Mbembe’s widening and deepening of the problem of 
the social after apartheid suggests that the terms for such a social are, in 
themselves, in flux.
Mbembe begins by drawing attention to the protests that erupted and 
reverberated across South African university campuses in 2015–16. The 
problem to which these events were a reaction is, however, both wider 
and deeper than the immediate framing assumes. The ‘winds blowing 
from our campuses’, Mbembe states, ‘can be felt afar, in a different idiom, 
in those territories of abandonment where the violence of poverty 
and demoralization hav[e] become the norm’. We have here, then, a 
somewhat different articulation of social acts, ‘lines of fissure’ and, as we 
will see, of remains of the social. The state of which Mbembe writes is 
being called in different quarters, as he notes, ‘decolonisation’. It is, as he 
puts it, ‘a psychic state more than a political project in the strict sense of 
the term’ (original emphasis), and he marks three shifts that characterise 
this ‘cultural temperament’ (each of which entails the elements of time, 
affect and value or, rather, libidinal economy): a politics of waiting has 
been supplanted by one of impatience, for people can no longer wait; an 
identity politics of pain, suffering and anger has replaced the affirmation 
of blackness, worldliness and cosmopolitanism, which characterised 
the early 1990s; and the ideal of reconciliation, through which the 
postapartheid nation was constituted, has been dislodged in favour of the 
settling of accounts.
Referring to this, as Mbembe does, as an ‘age of fantasy and hysteria’, 
suggestive of acting out rather than social acts, might be said to echo 
Jacques Lacan’s observation in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan that student 
protesters in May 1968 risked, in their ostensibly hysterical revolt, 
reinstalling a new master. Mbembe is clear, though, that this is a new 
threshold even as it recalls the past. Nor is South Africa on the same brink 
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of revolution that Fanon wrote of in The Wretched of the Earth, however 
much those vaunting ‘decolonisation’ invoke it.11 The tensions across the 
country, of which campus protests are one manifestation, are reactions to 
a problem at once old and new. They are, as Mbembe puts it, ‘structural 
repetitions of past sufferings in the present’, a repetition, a stumbling, 
produced by an apartheid past not adequately worked through.
It is worth pausing over the difficulty of diagnosing the condition of 
anticipating a postapartheid social. ‘If we cannot find a proper name for 
what we are actually facing,’ Mbembe writes, ‘then rather than simply 
borrowing one from a different time, we should keep searching.’ Caught 
beneath the gaze of authoritarian images from the colonial and apartheid 
pasts, words ready to hand are grasped for: ‘They speak in allegories and 
analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field 
Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and 
spaces, at the risk of anachronism.’ As we argue in this volume, rather 
than rushing to name that around which or through which the social 
might cohere, it is necessary to undertake the slow work of reading, of 
marking limits, abiding by their motile edges, and constructing concepts 
that might be adequate to their demand.
Among those names given to the problem within this discourse 
of ‘decolonisation’ is whiteness. Mbembe seeks to listen, attentively, 
to the indictments of white privilege and the structures that uphold 
it. With the subtlety of an analyst he attends to the more symptomatic 
iterations of the problem, to the address of bodies tense with revolt and 
to the language of the wounds of bodies occupying university spaces, to 
the hieroglyphics, as one might say, of excrement-covered statues. At the 
same time, however, he issues a caution over whiteness being installed as 
an ‘erotogenic object’, keeping the problem firmly in place. To name the 
problem as one of whiteness, he argues, will not offer an easy exit to the 
script that has produced a politics of impatience, which is also a politics 
of pain and anger; at least, it may keep those who rail furiously against 
whiteness libidinally cathected to it, continuing to orient and shape life 
in the wake of apartheid. This is certainly one problematic that several 
contributions in this volume explore.
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Rather than disagreeing with whiteness as the problem, Mbembe 
offers a more rigorous definition. For him, the problem of whiteness 
has a South African particularity, though it cannot be confined to South 
Africa. The problem is at once local and global, whiteness understood as 
‘a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of 
unequal redistribution of life chances’. The crux of Mbembe’s argument 
comes when he speculates on whether cathexes of whiteness, pain and 
suffering are ‘typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this 
neoliberal age’. Therein lies the wager, not only of a repetition of the past 
in the very attempt to move beyond it, of remaining passionately attached 
to whiteness, even if in hatred, but also the possibility that what is being 
called ‘decolonisation’ shares certain traits with whiteness itself, a politics 
of pain, upon which identitarian claims are increasingly staked, leading 
to ‘self-enclaving’, finding its reflection in a form of whiteness that has 
sought to ‘fence itself off, to re-maximize its privileges’ – two markedly 
different and, at the same time, isomorphic symptoms of ‘an astonishing 
age of solipsism and narcissism’.
Mbembe’s diagnosis of the present is not without hope. If, as he puts 
it, ‘the capacity to resume a human life in the aftermath of irreparable 
loss’ – a task as urgent as it is difficult and slow – is to be nurtured, it 
will be necessary to abide by an ‘ethics of becoming-with-others’ (original 
emphasis).12 He states: ‘The self is made at the point of encounter with an 
Other. There is no self that is limited to itself. The Other is our origin by 
definition. What makes us human is our capacity to share our condition – 
including our wounds and injuries – with others.’ Mbembe situates a hope 
for a future social adequate to the postapartheid in the realm of ethics, in 
the encounter with the other as such, conjuring most immediately the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas, for whom the encounter with the other 
always confronts the self with an excess of the idea of the other in the 
self – the Other is not simply another ‘I’ like me – a confrontation with 
what he calls ‘infinity’ that always puts the consciousness of the self into 
question.13 The key point here, given this Levinasian current in Mbembe’s 




Mbembe’s intervention calls for new kinds of social acts, beginning 
with a deconstructive reading of the myths of whiteness as well as the 
snares of its libidinal economy. ‘There will be no plausible critique of 
whiteness, white privilege, white monopoly capitalism,’ Mbembe argues – 
and this is where we circle back to our opening comments about the 
neoliberal university – ‘that does not start from the assumption that 
whiteness has become this accursed part of ourselves we are deeply 
attached to, in spite of it threatening our own very future well-being.’ 
Moreover – and this is the crucial point – the repetitions of which 
Mbembe writes are not produced by repression of desire or a failure of 
mourning; rather, they have to do with the production of desire, which 
employs such repression and mourning as its mask.
It is here that we mark a departure, through our reading of Mbembe, 
from the concept of remains in the work of Sanders, which is also an attempt 
to clear the ground to affirm the possibility of a social different from the 
one he was reading over a decade ago. What Sanders calls a proscription 
on mourning the other, and thus on desiring the other, takes the other as 
already constituted as such.14 This field of extrinsic difference – what we 
have been calling apartheid’s difference – determines the terrain in such 
a way that critique often results in amplification. Addressing apartheid 
within the terms of its expression, it seems to us, can only return that 
expression to itself. This, we might say, is what remains apartheid’s trap.
Contrary to this, the work of traversing the social is what enables, in 
the Fanonian language that Gilles Deleuze uses in his reading of Freud 
in Difference and Repetition, a ‘primary sense of repetition’ (25) that 
posits a difference altogether more common. The primary repetition 
invoked here is articulated by Deleuze through the language of masks. 
It is not that a mask covers over an original or primary substance held 
in common. Rather, what exists is always a multiplicity of masks whose 
existence as such is repressed in the selection of particular masks. 
As Fanon makes clear both in his Black Skin, White Masks and The 
Wretched of the Earth, ‘the native’ is produced through the thingification 
of colonialism as the damned of the earth, as less than human, and as 
sliding into the category of ‘the animal’ due to an apparent ‘insensibility 
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to ethics’ that the European is said to embody (The Wretched of the Earth 
32). For Fanon, while violence enables a certain ‘taking of place’ (47) in 
the moment of decolonisation, it is not able to deal with the ‘Manichean 
problem’ (31) of Man as the conceptual terrain that produces the native 
as such – it maintains the binary, the mask of whiteness, even if it shifts 
positions within it. More urgent is what might come after the moment 
of decolonisation: the project of ‘working out new concepts, setting 
afoot a new man’ (255). Such a construction requires the production of a 
difference that is not apartheid’s difference. This difference can be neither 
ontological nor extrinsic; it amounts to an affirmation of becoming at the 
limit. Such a difference is not accessible, or rather available, in the field 
of mourning, where mourning parries a loss. It is produced on the screen 
of transference as an encounter in which such a selection takes place. At 
stake in its articulation is the very understanding of difference on which 
a postapartheid might be constructed, a difference, to use Deleuze’s term, 
resistant to the ‘deafness’ (217) that characterises repetition as it takes 
place within the mask of resemblance.15
After global apartheid
Central to the task of thinking the social in the postapartheid is, we have 
suggested, grasping precisely what this social might come after. The 
concept of global apartheid, first coined by Gernot Köhler, has recently 
gained critical currency as a way to critique neoliberal politics (see, for 
instance, Bond; Dalby; Fregoso; Loyd; Žižek), resulting in race being 
foregrounded where other approaches may leave it in the background.16 
Within most deployments of the concept, global apartheid functions as 
an analogy that enables the global West and North to hold up a mirror 
to itself in a gesture towards self-critique.17 For many, the corollary is 
hope for a different world, for if apartheid has been dismantled in South 
Africa, the logic goes, it can be dismantled globally. Not simply the 
analogue of the world, the story of apartheid functions as an allegory, 
a tale of an unjust order rehearsed to give to the structure of an unfair, 
rapidly changing world a face or, at least, a familiar name, as well as the 
possibility of a resolution.
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Along this line of thinking – which, admittedly, we reduce to some 
of its bare turns – the path that global apartheid leads down, hopeful as 
it seems, is circular, for the end of apartheid in South Africa coincides 
precisely with the country’s entry into the neoliberal order of global 
apartheid; the ending, upon which hope hinges, leads back to the very 
problem it is supposed to lead out of. It is this version of global apartheid 
we would want most rigorously to resist – yet another symptom, perhaps, 
of the ‘age of solipsism and narcissism’, the Eurocentrism of the world 
staring into the screen of South Africa, projecting, as Derrida puts it, ‘the 
silhouette of its internal war, the bottom line of its profits and losses, the 
double-bind logic of its national and multi-national interests’ (‘Racism’s 
Last Word’ 298). There is, however, another line, which is discernible from 
the first elaboration of the concept of global apartheid, but which has 
in most cases dropped out, wherein the genealogy of apartheid stretches 
back to the dawn of modernity and to the beginnings of European 
colonialism. Although it is given almost no sustained attention (cf. Dalby; 
Köhler, ‘The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid’), it is this that we find 
most productive and attempt to draw out here, the idea that apartheid 
was always already global or, rather, is lodged within a genealogy of the 
modern world system.
Among the various renderings of global apartheid, Hardt and Negri’s 
Multitude is, for our purposes, the most provocative:
We are living in a system of global apartheid. We should be clear, however, 
that apartheid is not simply a system of exclusion, as if subordinated 
populations were simply cut off, worthless, and disposable. In the global 
Empire today, as it was before in South Africa, apartheid is a productive 
system of hierarchical inclusion that perpetuates the wealth of the few 
through the labor and poverty of the many. The global political body is in 
this way also an economic body defined by the global divisions of labor 
and power (166–167, emphasis added).
In a shift from the analogous to the emblematic, apartheid here is one 
name for what Hardt and Negri call Empire, apartheid exemplifying its 
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logic of ‘hierarchical inclusion’. This system is different, they insist, from 
the logic of colonialism, which includes in so far as it can exploit but, 
failing this, exterminates the ‘worthless, and disposable’. For Hardt and 
Negri, the world we currently inhabit is no longer colonial; it has been 
superseded, they argue, by a new global order. And they are emphatic 
on the point: ‘Empire is not a weak echo of modern imperialisms but a 
fundamentally new form of rule’ (Empire 146).
In Empire, Hardt and Negri’s previous book, it is interesting to note 
the different figuring of apartheid as ‘one form, perhaps the emblematic 
form, of the compartmentalization of the colonial world’ (125). Apartheid 
is, on the one hand, the emblem of the modern world, the world where 
European nations extended their borders through colonisation, and, on 
the other hand, one name for the current state of a postmodern world, a 
fundamentally new world of global Empire.
Given their insistence on the paradigmatic difference between 
Empire and colonialism, on their incommensurability, this is not a small 
contradiction.18 Nevertheless, the key point is that apartheid is utilised 
to name systems of exploitation and inequality. It is, however, not only 
the structure of apartheid’s violent inclusions that repeats in our global 
present, but also the modes of resistance that it elicits, a point to which 
Mbembe also draws attention. Resistance operates, for Hardt and Negri, 
along an axis of tension between centralism and network, between 
guerrilla war and people’s army, a tension that they suggest has continued 
into the postapartheid present. The terrain for the emergence of a subject 
that might exceed Empire is found in what they call Multitude. Quite 
simply, if modernity required the emergence of a subject coterminous 
with its socioeconomic and political moment, then they suggest this new 
moment, which is shot through with ‘immaterial labour’ (109), produces 
a subject adequate to it, expressed in a class of the ‘properly alienated’ 
(as labour is not only productive, but is now also affective, immaterial) – 
articulated in the South African protest slogan ‘we are the poors’ (152).
Thus, their formulation – ‘Empire today, as it was before in South 
Africa’, echoing earlier formulations like ‘apartheid, as formerly practiced 
in South Africa’ (Dalby 137, emphasis added), ‘as is South African apartheid’ 
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(Köhler, ‘Global Apartheid’ 266, emphasis added) – uses apartheid in 
order to ‘remember that another world is possible’, apartheid standing 
between ‘our desire for a better, more democratic world’ (Hardt & 
Negri, Multitude 227) and its arrival. That is, they are interested in the 
productivity of Multitude, the image of which is flesh: ‘This common 
social being is the powerful matrix that is central in the production and 
reproduction of contemporary society and has the potential to create a 
new, alternative society. We should regard this common social being as 
a new flesh, amorphous flesh that as yet forms no body’ (159). Hardt and 
Negri invoke here modern political philosophy and its body politic – a 
body with various heads, arms and organs – but also Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s body without organs. Thus, Empire not only includes and 
exploits, but also, recalling Empire as a ‘global political body’, organises 
the flesh of the Multitude into a body, ‘transforming its singularities into 
divisions and hierarchies’ (212). In short, the flesh of the Multitude is 
constantly being organised; in turn, it resists, organising itself in ways 
that allow singularities to encounter one another, enabling networks of 
communication, new habits to form, new performativities to emerge, 
which break down hierarchies and call into question sovereignty, all 
of which might be called ‘symptoms of the common dreams, common 
desires, common ways of life, and common potential that are mobilized 
in a movement’ (213).
Hardt and Negri use flesh in two senses that they claim are derived 
from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On the one hand, ‘flesh’ is understood as 
‘elemental’ and shared; on the other hand, it is taken as ‘singular’ (193–194). 
In this way, Multitude allows differences, and does not reduce difference 
to any single category, whether nation, class or race. As they phrase it, ‘the 
multitude is the subjectivity that emerges from this dynamic of singularity 
and commonality’ (198). It seems to us, however, that the concept of the 
flesh might be pushed further in their argument, towards the constitution 
of new senses of difference and desire, which can be outlined through a 
brief consideration of how Merleau-Ponty comes to flesh.
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is not simply a physical thing (meat and 
bones) that can be located inside a field of extrinsic difference; rather, 
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it is an ‘intertwining of vision and movement’ (‘Eye and Mind’ 353). 
Stated differently, it is a place of the intertwining of senses so as to leave 
them with no strict division. As such, the body would be considered 
as a quilting point with sense. Within this understanding, which goes 
against the dominant understanding of the subject since, at least, René 
Descartes, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is in fact perception which is 
primary, not thought.19 In positing the ‘flesh’ as primary, Merleau-Ponty 
displaces the possibility of a self that can know its existence internally 
(cogito ergo sum); instead, the self exists always already in relation to 
other existents, different from them owing to a matter of style. The 
emphasis on style is important as in it is maintained an element of an ‘I’ 
that is unique to itself due to its particularity as a peculiar kind of object 
in perception.
The swerve from the Cartesian subject that Merleau-Ponty enables is 
crucial. For Hardt and Negri, the genealogy of apartheid can be traced 
to the early modern world, which for them emerges with a new and 
radical concern with immanence and its possibilities in terms of desire, 
democracy and freedom, among other things. The foreclosure of desire, 
the reinstallation of a transcendental principle and, thus, sovereignty – 
largely, national sovereignty – is one of the tragedies of the crisis of 
modernity, the crisis through which modernity has been revealed. What 
we know of modernity, they argue, is in fact a reaction, a second phase 
coextensive with the first, a foreclosure of this radical potential that took 
place first in Europe and then in the colonies.20 The key philosophical 
figures in Hardt and Negri’s itinerary of modernity are Baruch Spinoza 
and Descartes, the latter’s significance being that he reinstates a 
transcendental principle against the insurrectionary potential of a field 
of immanence: God is the guarantor of knowledge, as it is God who laid 
down the law of nature. To trace apartheid’s genealogy, and thus to track 
what the social was and is under apartheid, it is necessary to read not 
only widely, across the globe, but back to at least Descartes: the thinking 
upon which apartheid is grounded finds one of its beginnings there, in 
the division, the separation, the apartness of mind and body, and the 
subjection of body to mind he inaugurates.21
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In contrast with the positing of an understanding of subjectivity open 
to learning from the other, which, as we saw in our reading of Mbembe, 
is central to the constitution of a social to come, here in the Cartesian 
itinerary, through the insistence on an always already individuated 
subjectivity endowed in itself with the sovereign properties of knowledge 
and freedom, the subject which holds the social field is endowed with 
what we might figure as the obligation to instruct the other – to reduce 
the other to the self. Without even the preliminary uncertainty of the 
Hegelian subject, whose movement towards Spirit is necessitated by its 
internal contradiction between the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’ (Hegel 
104), the subject here stands forth, already self-recognising, ordering a 
field to its own predetermined measure.22
It is in the haunting of language, brought about through intercorporeality, 
that Merleau-Ponty locates the social field as something that comes after 
and is ‘held’ by the ‘flesh’ (‘The Intertwining’ 411), and it is this sense 
that is taken up by Hardt and Negri in their concept of Multitude.23 For 
Merleau-Ponty, however, language haunts the flesh, language touches and 
is touched in the intertwining of the flesh, which is primary. In language, 
the ‘I’ recognises the other, which is held in the world in the same manner 
as it is. As such, the other in language is for the ‘I’, not one of its phenomena; 
it ‘imposes itself not as true for every intellect [ideal], but as real for every 
subject who shares my situation’ (94).24 This social world is neither ‘personal’ 
nor ‘ideal’; the subject is lodged in it through its interactions with others 
only, as Merleau-Ponty phrases it: ‘History is others, it is the relationships 
we establish with them, outside of which the realm of the ideal appears as 
an alibi’ (‘The Primacy of Perception’ 101). This understanding of flesh 
would enable a very different reading of both Multitude and the concept 
of global apartheid that Hardt and Negri develop in relation to it. Here 
the subject is outside itself, a constellation of singularities resistant to its 
ordering within subjective certainty. Global apartheid is, then, an ordering 
of desire and not only its structuring, an ordering from which Multitude 
might try to escape.
The Multitude is described by Hardt and Negri in two ways, as an 
ontological and as a historical conception of insurrection. There  has 
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always been, through the ages, a Multitude in revolt and yet there 
is still a Multitude to come, which is latent within contemporary 
political praxis: ‘The multitude, then, when we put these two together, 
has a strange, double temporality: always-already and not-yet’ (222) – 
resonant with Fanon’s formulation in Black Skin, White Masks.25 But 
contrary to Hardt and Negri’s casual dismissal of the necessity of the 
subaltern in the political constitution of the Multitude, we suggest that 
it matters from where and in what articulation difference is broached. 
Anticipating the deconstructionist critique, Hardt and Negri state: 
‘Every identity, such critics say, even the multitude, must be defined by 
its remainder, those outside of it, call them the excluded, the abject, or 
the subaltern’ (225). To which they reply: ‘Its boundaries are indefinite 
and open. Furthermore, we should remember that the multitude is a 
project of political organisation and thus can be achieved only through 
political practices. No one is necessarily excluded but their inclusion is 
not guaranteed: the expansion of the common is a practical, political 
matter’ (226). This practical political resolution of the question of the 
Multitude that finds it palatable to make the ‘inclusion’ of the ‘subaltern’ 
‘non-necessary’ (226) misses in our view both how the destruction of 
the world produced through global apartheid is ordered precisely 
through the lived experience of that subaltern, and how it is that lived 
experience which guards against, which orders, the arrival of a future 
which might produce a difference that is not apartheid’s difference. In 
other words, ‘the poors’ are not only a local articulation of an abstract 
category; the poors live. As Deleuze phrases it in his discussion of the 
Hegelian dialectic, this is the difference between ‘the point of view of 
the slave who draws from the “no” the phantom of an affirmation, and 
the point of view of the “master” who draws from “yes” a consequence 
of negation and destruction’ (54). The resonance in this statement of a 
project such as negritude is unmistakeable.26 This is, however, not an 
argument for a repetition of extrinsic difference from the perspective 
of the subaltern. Such an expression would amount to a conservation of 
‘old values’, what we have termed the remains of apartheid. Rather, we 
need a sense of difference that might enable ‘the creation of new values’ 
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(54), a difference that carries, in an echo of Aimé Césaire, a ‘freedom for 
the end of the world’ (293).
If the only way that Hardt and Negri can render apartheid as 
emblematic of paradigmatically different systems of exploitation is 
through taking apartheid as a concept of world history, it repays the 
effort to turn to Derrida’s ‘Racism’s Last Word’, where apartheid is 
the name of a worldly racism, ‘the unique appellation for the ultimate 
racism in the world, the last of many’ (291).27 Here, apartheid ‘exists 
within a worldwide network’ (292) and is, echoing the terms of Hardt 
and Negri’s Multitude, ‘a sinister swelling on the body of the world’ (294). 
That is, rather than an analogy, apartheid is a ‘concentration of world 
history’ (297), unthinkable without the armature of a Western concept 
of Man.28 Yet, as Derrida notes, despite its worldliness, apartheid is an 
‘untranslatable idiom’ – or, rather, an untranslated idiom – ‘as if all 
the languages of the world were defending themselves, shutting their 
mouths against a sinister incorporation of the thing by means of the 
word’ (292). Thus, if the cardinal feature of apartheid is its obsessional 
logic, if its primary objective is to differentiate and to keep apart, as 
Derrida puts it, a ‘compulsive terror, which above all forbids contact’, 
then worldwide denunciations of apartheid enact the same logic, the 
denunciators ‘refusing to let themselves be contaminated’ (292), keeping 
such a heinous crime against humanity over there, in South Africa, 
repeating the obsessional logic railed against.29 In this sense, to speak of 
global apartheid allows the delocalisation of the problem of apartheid’s 
persistence after the demise of official apartheid, but the concept 
performs a double move: on the one hand, it recalls the worldliness of 
apartheid, its place in a long genealogy of modern colonialism, but, on 
the other, the detachment of apartheid from its South African inscription 
is effectively crossed out by leaving apartheid untranslated, marking it 
as South African. Indeed, there is something irreducibly South African 
about apartheid, which is perhaps why it is left untranslated even as it 
is used to speculate on the world’s future. The knot in the concept of 
global apartheid is that apartheid both must and yet cannot be detached 
from South Africa. It is necessary that apartheid be detached from 
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South Africa and, at the same time, impossible to fully detach it, leaving 
an untranslatable remainder.
Interventions
In arranging the chapters, we have not set up ‘reserved domains’ for 
disciplines (Derrida, ‘But Beyond, … ’ 170).30 Nor have we created 
designated areas for the separate development of themes, those concerned 
with mourning, precarity, futurity in their allocated neighbourhoods, 
those explicitly focused on South Africa over here, those on pure theory 
over there, in their respective homelands. This was advised, and the 
temptation to go that route was great, not just to organise the body of 
the text more rigidly but to follow through this obsessional impulse so 
thoroughly to its conclusion that its logic is laid bare. This is not the line 
we have taken. Rather, we have sought to arrange the chapters in a way 
that sets in play their multiple currents, so that they might encounter and 
run up against, interrupt and lean on each other.
Opening the volume is Derek Hook’s chapter, ‘The Mandela 
Imaginary: Reflections on Post-Reconciliation Libidinal Economy’, which 
engages several themes discussed thus far, most notably mourning and 
the constitution of the social around a totemic father figure, namely, 
Nelson Mandela. Hook considers the notable anxiety expressed around 
Mandela’s ailing health in 2013 and the tendency towards hagiographic 
memorialisation. Not only does such idealisation run contrary to 
Mandela’s own political thought, Hook argues, but it also bears the marks 
of the mortifying repetitiousness of obsessional neurosis. This is another 
familiar theme, though Hook gives obsession a specifically Lacanian 
gloss, considering Mandela as a master signifier that stabilises multiple 
libidinal investments in the postapartheid social, traversing Mandela as 
a ‘shared social fantasy’ (53). Hook concludes his deft analysis with the 
suggestion that if the primary role delegated to Mandela since the 1990s 
has been to make possible the bridging of inherited social divisions, if the 
name ‘Mandela’ has had the function of sheltering within its associative 
field various meanings of the social after apartheid, then the task of 
producing common grounds that do not homogenise the social, that 
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allow the coexistence of multiple singularities, will in his absence have 
to be assumed, identified with; but, consonant with Mbembe, this is a 
caution against narcissistic identification.
Ross Truscott’s chapter stays within the psychoanalytic in order to 
think through some of the predicaments of postapartheid psychosocial 
transformation. While attentive to what Foucault called in The Order of 
Things the ‘calm violence’ (376) of the psychoanalytic transference, this 
chapter also poses the question of what a postcolonial psychoanalysis 
would entail, doing so through a reading of the ambiguous place of 
empathy within psychoanalytic discourse. The significance of this chapter 
to the themes of the volume is underlined by the fact that the concept of 
empathy has been set to work, across a range of fields, to mark a break 
with the relational patterns of apartheid, frequently in the language of 
psychoanalysis. Similarly, empathy has been identified historically as 
that which, within apartheid and colonial rule more generally, exceeded 
or escaped relations of domination, a relation to be recuperated and 
enabled.31 Taking empathy as a concept embedded in colonial thinking, 
Truscott focuses on the incorporation of empathy in Freud’s work, 
specifically in Dora’s case and his analysis of Michelangelo’s Moses, 
which are read alongside the images and installations of contemporary 
South African artist, Nandipha Mntambo. Three scenes are conjured 
wherein empathy confronts its own violence. But rather than foreclose 
on empathy, it is through the disclosure of the irresolvable contradictions 
of empathy, Truscott suggests, that it might be brought into the realm of 
the ethical through a practice of reinscription and through the figure of 
Echo that attends the narcissism and penetrative violence of empathy. It 
is thus, despite all, a defence of empathy as an impossible social act.
Mari Ruti’s chapter, ‘The Ethics of Precarity: Judith Butler’s Reluctant 
Universalism’, carefully outlines and ultimately – although within certain 
limits and with a good deal of caution – affirms the potential of Butler’s 
Levinasian ethics of precarity, an ethics that has much in common 
with many of the contributions to this volume, as well as the position 
advanced by Mbembe. It is an ethics, as Ruti reads Butler, that, in seeking 
to respond to the other within a global context of uneven distributions 
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of precarity, forgoes universals in favour of a relational ontology. Such 
an ethics turns on a shared condition of human vulnerability – shared, 
however, in different ways; in Butler’s terms, not all lives are equally 
grievable and, thus, liveable. Ruti then locates a difficulty with this as a 
terrain for ethical action. The care that Levinas takes in structuring the 
encounter of the face-to-face through the realm of the third, justice, is 
absent in Butler’s ethics of precarity. As Ruti notes, for Levinas ‘justice 
places limits on our ethical accountability’, whereas Butler ‘for the most 
part ignores the distinction between ethics and justice, attempting, as it 
were, to apply Levinasian ethics to questions of global justice’ (104). This 
absence, in turn, is accounted for through an implicit turn to the a priori 
norms of the Enlightenment in Butler’s pronouncements on political 
questions, a scenario that, Ruti argues, might in fact unravel the very 
force of Butler’s own critique of such norms. This is not to suggest that 
precarity is something to be rejected. Instead, the task is to find a mode 
through which the critique expressed in precarity can be performed while 
holding onto the capacity to order the social that might arrive in its wake. 
What Ruti’s chapter does so powerfully for the volume is draw out how 
this same tension runs through the analogy of global apartheid.
Jaco Barnard-Naudé’s chapter, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Work of Mourning: 
The Politics of Loss, “the Rise of the Social” and the Ends of Apartheid’, 
can be read as giving Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude a serious 
precursor in Arendt’s writings. It is a figuring of Multitude – as plurality, 
freedom and acting in concert – that is quite different from what we find 
in Hardt and Negri. Arendt, as Barnard-Naudé points out, is frequently 
read as yearning for a form of politics, in the classical Greek sense of the 
term, lost with the modern rise of the social question as a concern with 
poverty. As Barnard-Naudé argues, Arendt conceives the mourning of 
this loss of politics as a form of political action in and of itself that can and 
does abide by the other, that can and does concern itself, politically, with 
poverty. Mourning, as it is understood here, drawing on the Derridean 
reworking of the distinction between mourning and melancholia, 
enables Barnard-Naudé to offer an alternative sense of a social act or, 
rather, political act in the wake of apartheid.  While recalling Arendt’s 
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ontological distinction between the social as necessity and politics as 
freedom, Barnard-Naudé suggests a reading of Arendt that inaugurates 
a ‘politics of the social’ (117) by force of the very mourning for politics 
that animates her work. Political acts, he suggests, occur in the remains 
of a loss of politics (Arendt’s social) that stands to be mourned and yet 
can never fully be mourned, this failure being the condition (and here he 
follows Derrida) of all political responsibility and action. At stake here 
for Barnard-Naudé is a relation to the other, fidelity to the otherness 
of the other that can only be carried out through a form of mourning 
which, of necessity, as a matter of ethics, must fail. Thus, Barnard-Naudé, 
following Arendt, traces Multitude back further than Hardt and Negri, to 
antiquity and, unlike them, perhaps because of this different genealogy, 
he affirms coming to terms with this loss as, paradoxically, the only 
grounds upon which to act in accordance with what has been lost. To 
mourn politics is precisely, and paradoxically, a form of fealty towards its 
lost possibilities. Barnard-Naudé’s notion of mourning as the condition 
of the postapartheid social is resonant with, but also calls into question, 
Sanders’s mournful sociality. If there is a concept of remains mobilised 
here, it is as an encounter, through Arendt, with the ancient Greek 
concept of political action that, in being mourned, that mourning always 
failing, is also, as Barnard-Naudé argues, narcissistically appropriated. 
While Sanders designates apartheid as a proscription on mourning the 
other, Barnard-Naudé offers a somewhat different reading of apartheid 
(140): ‘What is it if not a homogenising logic that attempted to deny at all 
cost the plurality of the human condition?’ It is precisely this plurality as 
politics that we might mourn, that we will always fail to mourn, and that 
we might abide by.
Annemarie Lawless’s chapter can be placed in relation to a mode 
of the postapartheid social outlined by Truscott’s chapter, a social 
that has congealed around calls for empathy between those apartheid 
divided – empathy as the supposed threshold of a postapartheid social – 
a figuring that, like the mourning discussed above, entails desire for 
the other. It is precisely such a capacity for empathy that is at stake 
in Lawless’s chapter, ‘Souvenir’, which begins from a consideration of 
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the uncomfortable performance of an encounter with the other located 
in the work of Alphonso Lingis, asking what that discomfort might 
express and how it might be read as a haunting placed under the name 
of ‘love’. Lawless, however, offers a call for an encounter of empathy that 
is starkly different from those made around the TRC, and that is also 
quite unlike those forms of anthropological empathy that critics take 
as predatory, penetrative and grounded on a colonial temporality and 
spatiality. In particular, Lawless asks ‘what it is for one thinking, feeling, 
breathing body to encounter another thinking, feeling, breathing body 
– not a subject-to-subject encounter, still less a human-to-human one, 
but rather a creaturely one, epidermis to epidermis’ (147). And through 
her lucid reading of the touches between the texts of Walter Benjamin, 
Roland Barthes, Spinoza and Deleuze, Lawless conjures what apartheid, 
from the seventeenth century, foreclosed. (Recall that the philosophical 
figures in Hardt and Negri’s itinerary of modernity are Spinoza and 
Descartes.)32
Aidan Erasmus, in his chapter, ‘Re-Cover: Afrikaans Rock, Apartheid’s 
Children and the Work of the Cover’, considers the articulation of 
whiteness in the postapartheid as a question of inheritance through 
reading it as a script that is worked through the ‘angst of a community’ 
(182). In Erasmus’s reading, whiteness – in the epistemic project of 
apartheid as this came to be expressed in popular culture, particularly 
music – was always already a question of repetition, of what comes 
after. This futurity is what he suggests the rock group Van Coke Kartel 
(VCK) trouble in their repetitions of traditional Afrikaner singer Carike 
Keuzenkamp’s utopic misrepresentations of the 1980s in South Africa. 
Through the lack of a sense of futurity, this repetition marks VCK as 
the passive inheritors of an anxiety that the apartheid regime struggled 
to repress. The epistemic structure of apartheid is maintained in this 
repetition: there is no new sense of the social affirmed in VCK’s music. 
And, by implication, this anxiety might still order the present named by 
the postapartheid.
If the concept of global apartheid has turned on the notion that global 
geopolitics find their analogue in the relation between the South African 
TRAVERSING THE SOCIAL
27
state and its homelands, then the reading offered in Gary Minkley 
and Helena Pohlandt-McCormick’s chapter, ‘The Graves of Dimbaza: 
Temporal Remains’, has direct bearing on how we think global apartheid. 
They attempt, as they put it, to ‘refigure the South African bantustan as 
constitutive of a South African “empire”’ (196), elaborating a concept of 
what they call an ‘empire of liberation’. It is anything but a recapitulation 
of Hardt and Negri’s ‘Empire’. Minkley and Pohlandt-McCormick attend 
to the ways in which race is embedded, archaeologically as it were, in the 
overdetermined discourse of liberation, a global discourse to which the 
postapartheid has adhered. In short, that race haunts the postapartheid 
is not, in their montaged reading of the archive of Dimbaza, a failure 
to have delivered on liberation. Rather, the spectre of race has been 
internal to the promises and premises of liberation as such, an ‘empire 
of liberation’. Minkley and Pohlandt-McCormick find one opening onto 
this predicament through Foucault’s 1975–1976 lectures at the Collège 
de France, Society Must Be Defended. The genealogy Foucault sketches 
begins with ‘race war’, an insurrection at the end of the Middle Ages when 
the concept of history became not simply the praise of kings or the re-
establishment of mythical ties with Rome, but a form of counter-history 
from the perspective of those subject to the violence of the sovereign’s 
rule, a history that was for the first time prospective, offering ‘prophecies 
of emancipation’ (80). Foucault distinguishes, but discerns a filiation 
between, the discourse of ‘race war’ and its transmutation into modern 
racism, ‘born at that point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of 
race struggle’ (81) – totalitarian politics and the bureaucracy of Fascism 
bearing a distant echo of a liberatory discourse. With this genealogy, 
recast as an ‘empire of liberation’, Minkley and Pohlandt-McCormick 
abide by the figure of the ‘native’ subject, reading for what they term (via 
Arendt) social acts, ‘the act’ as that which articulates the subject and the 
social as co-constitutive expressions. Acts, as formulated by Minkley and 
Pohlandt-McCormick, are neither about arriving at nor about fleeing 
a scene but rather about engaging in its creation. In an echo of Louis 
Althusser’s aleatory materialism, social acts have a virtual existence that 
may be actualised under certain conditions and, in that actualisation, 
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produce a potential rupture along which a newly constituted expression 
of the subject might become possible.
It is precisely the potential for such an opening, produced in the 
fragility of the touch of writing, that is constructed in Maurits van 
Bever Donker’s chapter, ‘The Principle of Insufficiency: Ethics and 
Community at the Edge of the Social’. Beginning from a consideration 
of Maurice Blanchot’s troubling of the concept of community in The 
Unavowable Community, Van Bever Donker suggests that being adequate 
to the postapartheid requires the ethical task of thinking the social in a 
more conceptual and yet rigorously lived sense. A key element in this is 
what he calls ‘the principle of insufficiency’ as a condition with which to 
abide, rather than from which to depart, in the becoming expressive of 
community. As such, he suggests that the task is not to recover, to redeem 
or to rediscover community, but to abide by the edge of its concept so as 
to open the possibility of the new. Community, in the formulation against 
which his chapter works, is an integral element in what we have termed 
‘global apartheid’, both in respect of the subject that it encloses and the 
social that it envisages. The ethical weight of unsettling this terrain of 
community through abiding by the principle of insufficiency is brought 
into focus through a brief consideration of the character of Antigone 
in the Oedipus myth. In Van Bever Donker’s reading, the character of 
Antigone works to maintain the disjuncture between autochthony and 
copulation, between the fixing of the human through either the land 
or the state, so as to open the potential of a sense of the subject, and 
hence of the social, that might be resistant to such a closure. It is in 
Phaswane Mpe’s reworking of the principle of insufficiency in relation 
to the weight of lived experience in postapartheid South Africa that the 
ordering potential of this opening is perhaps most clearly worked out. 
Reading Mpe’s novel, Welcome to Our Hillbrow, as an intervention into 
the social, Van Bever Donker argues that the tensions of autochthony, 
copulation, community, nation and race are all dislocated and reworked 
in the ethical potential of a community of the touch constructed through 
the ‘unworking labour’ of writing. This, he suggests, constitutes an 
opening that presses beyond the figuring of the principle of insufficiency 
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in Blanchot, or the mediating role of Antigone, precisely to the extent 
that it is ordered by the weight of lived experience, the ethical burden of 
‘not owning life’.
If Van Bever Donker situates this opening as a possible site through 
which to rethink the postapartheid, Premesh Lalu, in his chapter, ‘The 
Trojan Horse and the “Becoming Technical of the Human”’, similarly 
begins to ask what duration is necessary for the thinking of life now. 
Proceeding on the philosophical terrain opened up by Bernard Stiegler 
and Gilbert Simondon, Lalu intervenes in the relation between 
technicity and a condition of life that he designates as a ‘memory of 
the future’ (250). Lalu asks after the work of naming as this has been 
brought to bear both on the student movement of the 1980s and on 
the acts of violence against these movements and their subsequent 
memorialisation. Dwelling on the ‘movement’ at work in ‘student 
movements’, Lalu asks after a rhythmic potential he locates in ‘the 
cinematic notion of interval’, not merely a break between two films 
but ‘the interval as an opportunity to change directions’ (263). While 
the ways in which the ‘student movement’ sought to change the course 
of schooling cannot be reduced to the filmic apparatus that provided 
the basis for an aesthetic education in Athlone, Cape Town, Lalu’s 
intervention suggests that ‘student movement’ marshalled the force 
of the interval and its capacity to effect the movement of a swerve, 
a potential that was foreclosed in the 1985 Trojan Horse massacre. 
It is the double articulation of ‘schooling’ and ‘bioscope’ that lends a 
grammar to the work of remaining with the ‘memory of the future’ 
that, Lalu suggests, the ‘movement’ sought to make possible. This is a 
grammar of the interval, of a Bergsonian dilation of time that might 
enable an alternate trajectory, one resistant to the closure of the interval 
by the naming of this movement as ‘violence’ and as ‘anti-school’. As a 
desire for a return to the interval, Lalu brings his argument to bear on 
the ‘condition of the human as undulating sadness’ in which the human 
has already folded into the ‘industrialisation of memory’ (269). For a 
social to come, Lalu argues, it is this folding – a fold against the fold of 
duration – that must be resisted.
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NOTES
1. We assume that this amounts to an affirmation, following Martha Nussbaum, 
that ‘Kant more than any other Enlightenment thinker, defended a politics 
based upon reason rather than patriotism or group sentiment, a politics that 
was truly universal rather than communitarian, a politics that was active, 
reformist and optimistic, rather than given to contemplating the horrors, or 
waiting for the call of Being’ (3). Of course, we may fall into a trap here of 
making Kant’s ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ stand in for an entire heterogeneous 
field of thought.
2. If, however, by ‘promoting Enlightenment values’ Vale and Jacklin mean 
taking it to its deconstructive limits, we are in sympathy. In different terms, 
there is a tendency to auto-destruction in the Enlightenment that Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno discern in Dialectic of Enlightenment: ‘The 
curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression’ (28). While freedom, 
for Horkheimer and Adorno, is dependent on Enlightenment thinking, all 
the cautions against totalitarianism sounded out in their opening chapter are 
directed not at ‘counter-Enlightenment’ forces but at those forces within the 
Enlightenment itself.
3. Put in the barest possible terms – Freud’s own – Kant’s categorical imperative 
finds its cognate in the Oedipus complex. Here, the superego, as the agent 
and enforcer of morality, provides a portion of the very enjoyment it forbids; 
the superego begins to sweat with the forbidden wishes it supposedly keeps 
in check, Enlightenment accruing, on Freud’s reading, a sadistic element.
4. On the talking cure elements of the TRC, see Ross Truscott’s chapter in this 
volume. On the relation between the TRC and the colonial Commission of 
Inquiry, and their mutual reliance on a psychotherapeutic discourse, see 
Adam Sitze.
5. On the psychoanalytic conception of traversal, see also Derek Hook’s chapter 
in this volume.
6. To traverse also retains an archaic meaning of opposition. Thus, the 
traversal of the social is an act that forms the social by questioning it, 
interrogating it; a social act, then, of abiding by and inhabiting repetition 
whose wager is precisely antisociality, a wager shared by movements that, 
more recently, have gathered under the banner of ‘decolonisation’ – though 
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this is not what we are calling for, even if it is a call we hear and to which 
we respond.
7. It is possible to read in Sanders’s formulation an unstated resonance with 
Fanon’s formulation of racism in Black Skin, White Masks as a defence against 
desire for the other.
8. That is to say, psychoanalysis works against any notion of a unified, 
preconstituted subject. However, it presents the same ‘blackmail’ to the 
subject: one is never at home, always split, doubled, alienated; indeed 
knowledge of the world, of others and self-knowledge is torn from certitude, 
but that impossibility of certitude remains within the psychoanalytic frame, 
about which there is limited doubt. Anticipating this, Freud produces the 
concept of epistemophilic pleasure, within which he counts psychoanalysis.
9. Sanders implicitly operates in a Derridean mode of reading Freud as a proto-
deconstructionist, as a dismantler of accepted binaries: if there is sociality on 
the one hand and antisocial violence on the other, Freud shows, for example 
in ‘Totem and Taboo’, that violence, murder, is inherent, indeed constitutive 
of, the social; similarly, if narcissism, as an immature stage of development, 
is opposed to the maturity of social bonds, Freud refuses this opposition, in 
this particular instance as melancholia, as a form of narcissism, is inseparable 
from, even making possible, the mourning of the social bond.
10. Mbembe’s article was published online in the forum Africa Is a Country. It 
is, nevertheless, an exceptionally concise, accessible and clear statement on 
the social in South Africa today. The forum does not define the weight of its 
intervention.
11. Mbembe himself uses the Fanonian language of bodily tension that anticipates 
the explosion of anticolonial revolution.
12. This understanding of ‘becoming-with-others’ is explored in Chapter 9 in 
this volume.
13. For Levinas, who sets his philosophy against that of René Descartes, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Martin Heidegger, the central problem is 
resisting ‘the transformation of the other into the same’ (‘The Trace of the 
Other’ 348). As he continues: ‘The I loses its sovereign coincidence with itself, 
its identification, in which consciousness returned triumphantly to itself and 
rested on itself. Before the exigency of the other, the I is expelled from this 
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rest’ (353). This loss of identity in the self situates the self as an ‘I’ that is not 
its own adequate cause. While the self is still ‘riveted to itself’ (On Escape 66), 
is still absolutely responsible, it is no longer at rest in this responsibility as 
though it emanates from its own goodwill (Otherwise than Being 114).
14. There is additionally a nagging sense that Sanders’s formulation may confuse 
an effect, a proscription on mourning, for a cause, apartheid; that is, it sets to 
work on the very terrain that, in our reading, apartheid sought to produce in 
the first place.
15. As Deleuze phrases it: ‘The mask, the costume, the covered is everywhere the 
truth of the uncovered. The mask is the true subject of repetition. Because 
repetition differs in kind from representation, the repeated cannot be 
represented: rather, it must always be signified, masked by what signifies 
it, itself masking what it signifies … I do not repeat because I repress. 
I repress because I repeat, I forget because I repeat’ (18). This truth of 
repetition is what Deleuze locates in his reading of Freud’s positing of the 
death instinct. On the proximity of this understanding of the construction 
of the subject to Fanon’s discussion of the mask as a fixing in place, as a 
covering over of repetition so as to locate the subject within the realm of 
representation constituted through the figure of Man, see Black Skin, White 
Masks, particularly the Introduction as well as the fifth chapter, ‘The Lived 
Experience of the Black Man’.
16. The term that recurs through Köhler’s initial formulation, and several after 
it, including his own subsequent essay, is structure, the idea being that ‘the 
structure of the world is very similar to the structure of South Africa’ (‘Global 
Apartheid’ 266). This is, as we saw above, similarly Mbembe’s reading of the 
postapartheid as the manifestation of a structural repetition.
17. Köhler argues that, from a statistical point of view, ‘the income inequality of 
the world is even worse than that of South Africa’ (‘Global Apartheid’ 268).
18. Invoking the language of Thomas Kuhn, Hardt and Negri call the shift from 
imperialism to Empire a ‘paradigm shift’; the emergence of modernity, itself a 
revolutionary discovery of the plane of immanence, was a ‘paradigmatic and 
irreversible change’ (Empire 14, 74).
19. An integral element in the development of this idea of the body is the concept 
of the gaze. For Merleau-Ponty perception, or what he later terms the gaze, 
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envelops and palpates things: ‘It is not simply a thing seen in fact (I do not 
see my back), it is visible in principle, it falls under a vision that is both 
ineluctable and deferred’ (‘The Intertwining’ 398). In order to understand 
the gaze in this way, it is necessary to ‘emigrate’ into the outside, into what 
he terms ‘flesh’. In other words, being is moved outside of the self or, rather, 
the self is located on the other side of the body. The gaze emanates from 
the intertwining of the flesh which leaves no self-sufficient ego; rather, 
there is only an ‘I’ due to touching, to the palpation of the gaze. It is in this 
formulation of the ‘flesh’ that Merleau-Ponty situates his concept of a pre-
individual field, a field of singularity that might be available to the repetition 
of difference as such. This ‘I’, which exists due to being entwined with other 
‘I’s’ in ‘flesh’, leads to a notion of ‘inter-corporeal being, a presumptive 
domain of the visible and the tangible which extends further than the things 
I touch and see at present’ (403).
20. Hardt and Negri are of course alert to the violence of colonialism, though they 
are at pains to recall ‘the utopian tendencies that have always accompanied the 
progression toward globalization’ (Empire 115), a utopian tendency shared by 
Vale and Jacklin, an idea that will surely be met with resistance from those 
whose thought is routinely bracketed as ‘postcolonial’.
21. See, for example, Meditations on First Philosophy in which Descartes enables 
a relation to the world and the other taken as fact on the subject’s own 
terms and in relation to a subject that is always already there – there is no 
world apart from his thinking. This basic assertion of subjective certainty 
structures the terrain on which the modern concept of the subject, and the 
social that follows, are lodged, even if the particularities of its expression 
differ in meaningful ways across this itinerary. This is evident in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, written a decade after the publication of Descartes’s Meditations 
and critical to Kant’s understanding of the movement of reason across the 
world as set out in his Perpetual Peace. For Hobbes, as for Descartes, the 
subject is taken as primary; in fact, it is through an understanding of ‘man’ 
that you come to the necessity of the ‘common-wealth’. Understanding, 
‘being nothing else but conception caused by speech’ (25), is derived from 
sensory encounters which are then held in thought and placed into a form of 
causal relation (deduction, science) – the subject applies itself to the sensory. 
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It is this aptitude to apply itself so as to deduce the cause of things which 
characterises the subject, in Hobbes’s formulation, as human and which 
produces the subject as a capable agent with an independently active will that 
it applies to the world so as to make sense of it. See also John Locke’s Second 
Treatise on Government and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty for two iterations 
of this itinerary that take the separation between mind and body, and the 
subordination of the latter to the former, as constitutive assumptions in the 
construction of their respective socials.
22. Of course, as Hobbes declares toward the end of his section on the common-
wealth, causing this ordering to take hold is the problem – that is, unlike Vale 
and Jacklin, he anticipates the failure of what he sees as the Enlightenment’s 
productivity.
23. The potential of this concept, however, can be located in Lacan’s reading of 
Merleau-Ponty in relation to the Real and desire. He suggests that his concept 
of the Real should be thought in relation to the concept of the ‘flesh’ (The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 68). More particularly, it is in his 
discussion of the gaze, as a non-total ontology, that Lacan draws on Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of the ‘flesh’ as the locus both of perception and language. 
For Lacan, we are ‘beings who are looked at’; in other words, we are located 
as patients within perception, we are ‘in the spectacle of the world’ (75). This 
necessitates that Lacan formulate a distinction between the Sartrean gaze 
and the gaze in psychoanalysis. Principally, the Sartrean gaze emanates in the 
realm of Others, from Others as subjects. It is thus always locatable, even if it 
carries an ethical imperative that is not easily answered. On the other hand, 
the gaze for Lacan is more primordial, ‘presented to us only in the form of a 
strange contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust 
of our experience, namely, the lack that constitutes castration anxiety’ (72–
73). In other words, the psychoanalytic gaze is that of the Real from which ‘I’ 
am extracted as ‘eye’ (84); this extraction, this emergence of a subject, situates 
it within the realm of resemblance and representation, as a field for a certain 
rendition of desire. The gaze in which the subject occurs, which is located in 
the Real (flesh), is the ‘underside of consciousness’ (83) in which Lacan locates 
the lack by which the subject emerges as fixed to itself. As he later asserts, ‘the 
objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze’ (105).
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24. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘flesh’ is near to Levinas’s encounter 
with the other, though, of course, not reducible to it. Although Levinas 
in Otherwise than Being very quickly shifts this relation to the other into 
the realm of language, and particularly that of discourse (spoken language 
for Levinas), it is important to note that it is first a relation that occurs 
in sense – on the surface of the body, being in one’s ‘own skin’ (110). In 
his discussion of this being at the edge of oneself, in one’s ‘skin’, Levinas 
suggests that his understanding of ‘skin’ is akin to that of the ‘oneself ’ 
which he posits in discourse (195, n. 11). His shift to language from sense 
seems to indicate that, for Levinas, sense is always already foreclosed in 
language.
25. ‘The explosion will not happen today,’ Fanon states, ‘it is too soon, or too late’ 
(Black Skin, White Masks 7).
26. For a reading of negritude that resonates with the reading of the postapartheid 
social that we develop here, see Souleymane Bachir Diagne, African Art as 
Philosophy.
27. ‘Racism’s Last Word’ was first published in the catalogue to Art contre/against 
Apartheid, assembled by the Association of Artists of the World Against 
Apartheid.
28. Derrida goes as far as to suggest, ‘The survival of Western Europe depends on 
it’ (‘Racism’s Last Word’ 295).
29. It is not that Derrida’s essay is without hope; not only is apartheid ‘the most 
racist of racisms’, but it is also the name for what, in the future perfect, ‘will 
have been abolished’ (‘Racism’s Last Word’ 291). The problem Derrida allows 
us to isolate in formulations of global apartheid, however, is that South African 
apartheid is known in advance, whereas, with Derrida, we might ask, ‘But 
hasn’t apartheid always been the archival record of the unnameable?’ (291). 
This point in particular was objected to by Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon, 
to which Derrida responded in an open letter (‘But Beyond, … ’ 155–179).
30. Derrida accuses his interlocutors, McClintock and Nixon, of a form of 
apartheid logic, in what he reads as their adherence to strict academic 
disciplines, chiding them that they are arguing for ‘reserved domains, the 
separate development of each community in the zone assigned to it’; in short, 
that ‘apartheid remain or become the law of the land in the academy’ (170).
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31. One frequently reads of new empathic relations since the end of apartheid or 
of the presence of empathy despite apartheid rule.
32. Lawless’s chapter offers one response to the question an anonymous reader 
asked about the significance of Deleuze to the volume. Deleuze is the best of 
Spinoza’s readers. And grasping Spinoza’s thought is central to thinking the 
postapartheid.
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THE MANDELA IMAGINARY:  
REFLECTIONS ON POST-RECONCILIATION 
LIBIDINAL ECONOMY
Derek Hook
Throughout June, July and August 2013, much of South Africa’s news 
media was preoccupied with the question of Nelson Mandela’s ailing 
health. Leaving aside for the time being the question of South Africa’s 
tendency to exhibit a type of media fixation on a single iconic person – 
the cases of Oscar Pistorius and Julius Malema are clear examples – my 
objective here will be to offer some speculative comments on the social and 
psychical significance of this period of uncertainty leading to Mandela’s 
death in late 2013. Considering the meaning of Mandela in this period – 
as opposed to the period immediately after his death – represents a very 
different line of inquiry from any ostensibly objective assessment of 
Mandela’s political or symbolic legacy. The reason for this is that I broach 
the topic of Mandela’s role in the what, following Jean-François Lyotard, 
can be called the libidinal economy of the South African nation, that is, in 
terms of the various clusters of affect and unconscious ideation that his 
role represented at the time and beyond.
Societal hagiography
I begin by asking: how might one approach the obsessive media 
speculation concerning Mandela’s declining health prior to his eventual 
death? Popular media commentaries on Mandela during the middle 
of 2013 as a rule wavered between requests that the public honour 
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appropriate cultural customs – to respect the privacy of Mandela and his 
family – and an unrelenting thirst for ever more details pertaining to the 
former South African president and his feuding family. The obvious point 
to note here is that each such impulse effectively undoes the other, in a 
to-and-fro, self-perpetuating fashion.
A related tension was also at play. A variety of political personalities 
and media pundits made the call – presumably preparing us all for the 
inevitable – that the public needed to ‘let Mandela go’. Verne Harris of 
the Nelson Mandela Foundation made such a request as early as 2011: 
‘He is already gone – as an active voice who offers us a last resort. He is 
no longer with us. He has been frustrated by our dependence on him. He 
wants to see us walking without him. We must allow him to go’ (Nuttall 
& Mbembe 283). Given Mandela’s advanced age in the months before his 
death, and the various ordeals he had lived through, this call to relinquish 
our hold on Mandela seemed wholly reasonable. The problem was that, 
once voiced, such sentiments were almost immediately paired with the 
contrary demand, to the effect that we – as it was then stated – ‘can’t let 
him go’ (see Dawes).
The commemoration industry that has been built up around Mandela 
gives one reason to wonder if the country has become vaguely fearful of its 
many other struggle heroes. None of these men and women even vaguely 
approaches the quasi-mythical status attained by the name of Mandela. It 
is an odd quirk of human psychology and, indeed, of human sociality more 
generally that societies so often feel it necessary to predicate an entire social 
or political order on the image or the legacy of a single person (Adorno; 
Freud, Mass Psychology). In view of the history of fascist, totalitarian and 
dictatorial regimes of the past century, regimes which unfailingly relied on 
elevating the figure of a single totemic leader to the place of the sublime 
Thing of the nation, it is understandable that there are many who feel 
discomfort at the impulse to thus embody the nation in the figure of a 
single leader. This gives rise to our first question: Despite Mandela being 
a hero, a champion not only of the Left but of the struggle against global 
forms of apartheid, is it not worrying that he has been elevated so far 
above the many other political actors, past and present, who have posed 
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forms of resistance to inequality and injustice? Differently put: What are 
the shortcomings of seeing Mandela as the encapsulation of all that is good 
in South Africa’s history, as the sublime embodiment of the nation? Are we 
not in danger of a form of societal hagiography?
What might a psychoanalyst make of a patient who spends time on 
the couch directing adoring praise towards a single heroic figure? In such 
a situation, one would be forced to question the function of such praise, 
and to locate it in reference to a broader array of affects. That is to say, 
when one views idealisation of this magnitude one can only suspect that 
it is proportionately related to – and maybe even works to conceal – a 
considerable quantity of negative emotion, guilt perhaps or a sense of 
inadequacy. If one adopts such a psychoanalytic view, then the amount 
of celebration and love directed at Mandela seems less than innocent. We 
can take the argument further: such levels of idealisation could be seen as 
an indication of shame, certainly so inasmuch as they possibly function as 
the necessary counterbalance to a history that cannot – even now, after 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission – be fully admitted.
Mandela against Mandela
I would not be the first person to make the argument that a politics of 
lionisation stands diametrically opposed to Mandela’s own emancipatory 
struggle. Truly progressive political revolutions arguably share this as 
their aim: not so much to celebrate the icons of the struggle, but to serve 
the people. Mandela’s struggle as outlined in his autobiography Long 
Walk to Freedom was, to risk a simplification, that of attaining a non-
racist and democratic state in which the equality and rights of millions 
of ordinary men and women were protected. It was not – at least in 
my view – to set up a moneyed political elite or to enshrine the image 
of a single faultless revolutionary hero. Nic Dawes has essentially the 
same point in mind when he notes that Mandela’s leadership style was 
instructive in sending the message that South Africa must be a nation 
of laws and of institutions, not of single lauded men and women, and 
certainly not of one man. In his biography of Mandela, Tom Lodge makes 
much the same point: ‘Neither before nor during his presidency, Mandela 
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neither demanded nor received an entirely unconditional devotion; in 
power he expected his compatriots to behave as assertive citizens not as 
genuflecting disciples’ (225).
Lodge goes on in fact to credit this as Mandela’s single overriding 
achievement: to prioritise the workings of democratic political processes 
and institutions – essentially, types of participatory democracy – over 
the authority of any one totemic leader. With this in mind, we may 
go so far as to say that to idolise Mandela is also, in a very significant 
sense, to undermine him. If a radical and emancipatory politics is about 
calling attention to those forms of oppression that have been ignored and 
unchallenged, then the glare of celebratory Mandela fanfare cannot but 
be seen as diverting attention from forms of human subjugation that are 
far less edifying to contemplate. This provides us with a case of Mandela 
against Mandela, of celebratory image trumping emancipatory values. 
The role of political hagiography in undermining the political agency of 
the people is nowhere better made than by the radical historian Howard 
Zinn, who decries
the mountain of history books under which we stand … so tremblingly 
respectful of states and statesmen … All those histories … centred on 
founding fathers and presidents weigh oppressively on the capacity of 
ordinary citizens to act. They suggest that in times of crisis we must look 
to someone to save us … They teach us that the supreme act of citizenship 
is to choose between saviours by going into a voting booth … The idea 
of saviours has been built into the entire culture … We learn to look to 
stars, leaders … thus surrendering our own strength, demeaning our own 
ability (143–414).
We can extend this argument by referring to Jacob Dlamini, who, more 
bluntly yet, enables us to understand how the Mandela imaginary 
functions in a disempowering way:
Mandela is the hero whose presence allows us not to be heroes in our 
own lives … He is the big man in whose shadow we can walk, convinced 
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that we cannot emulate his example … [A]ll this evasion does is to … 
dehistoricise him and make him larger than life while absolving us of the 
moral responsibility to become better people.
Perhaps more cuttingly yet, Malaika wa Azania argues that the danger of 
the deification of Mandela
is that it distorts history. When Mandela is posited as the liberator, 
something atrocious happens: the people of South Africa are reduced 
to mere decorations in our liberation history … While Mandela was 
languishing in prison, ordinary citizens intensified the Struggle … The 
reality is that ordinary South Africans liberated Mandela in more ways 
than Mandela liberated them … [Mandela] became a symbol of our 
struggle – by deliberate design. But he is not a liberator of black people. It 
is both ahistoric and apolitical to appropriate the liberation of millions of 
people to a single individual, especially one who spent most of his activist 
years incarcerated as ordinary people were continuing the Struggle and 
resisting their own oppression.
Overlapping the arguments of Zinn, Dlamini and wa Azania helps us 
make a broader point about the role of Mandela internationally and about 
global forms of apartheid. Wherever Mandela is venerated as a political 
celebratory there is the chance that the discourse of the saviour comes 
to eclipse an effective belief in the agency and role of single political 
subjects. One can even imagine, disconcertingly, that as apartheid was 
being dismantled in South Africa, the historical glamour of this event – 
piloted by no one other than Mandela – distracted attentions from a 
global array of various ‘new apartheids’.
Neurotic vacillation
Let us return, though, to the contrary impulses displayed in public 
discussions of Mandela’s ailing health in mid-2013. How are we to 
understand this double-step oscillation whereby an instance of action 
or assertion is immediately paired with its negation (letting Mandela 
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go/refusing to do so, respecting and then undermining his privacy)? 
Psychoanalytically, one cannot deny the obsessional quality to this 
self-cancelling set of actions, which clearly represents an impacted 
ambivalence, a clear ‘stuckness’, an unwillingness to proceed. This is not, 
for the most part, an encouraging sign, because it so strongly resembles, 
as in the case of the classical psychoanalytic model of obsessional 
neurosis (Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’), a form 
of paralysis.1 When it is extrapolated to the social sphere, we have a 
mode of societal stasis in which ambivalence becomes entrenched, 
where opposing movements perennially counterbalance one another. 
We have something akin to the dynamic of a perpetual motion machine, 
continually moving, but never progressing beyond the site to which 
it is affixed. It is in this way that the obsessional subject avoids the 
new, forestalls the possibility of making significant choices, and thus, 
in effect, annuls life. Hence the Lacanian idea of the obsessional as 
constantly marking time, effecting a kind of deadness-in-life (Fink, The 
Lacanian Subject; Melman).
Such a deadening of life is typically characterised by ritualisation, by 
structured patterns of living or compulsive behavioural tics (radicalised 
in the case of obsessive compulsive acts) that ensure that nothing new 
can ever emerge. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that, classically, such 
a psychic structure or disposition to life often takes the form of the 
son or daughter chronically overshadowed by a larger-than-life father 
figure. Such a symbolic figure – not necessarily, of course, one’s actual 
father, a man or even biologically a father at all – is one whose influence 
cannot be metabolised and who thus remains a model of ambivalent 
affective responses, typically disguised by processes of idealisation. 
Here another motif of Lacanian psychoanalysis comes to the fore: that 
of the obsessional patient who, despite protestations to the contrary, is 
essentially waiting for the father to die so that he or she can start to live. 
What this obsessional (and typically unconscious) aspiration overlooks is 
the fact that the influence of such a father will only grow and attain an 
ever greater status after his demise – when, by virtue of ascending to a 
wholly symbolic existence, he becomes in effect immortal.
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Many questions arise here, not the least of which is whether a society 
or the ‘affective economy’ of a nation’s investment in a given figure 
could exemplify a type of obsessional neurosis. Speculation of the sort 
I have offered can of course be accused of a type of overextension, of 
generalising the observations of the clinic to the political sphere (Fink, 
Against Understanding; Hook). One should also point out that there is 
nothing extraordinary about a temporary period of suspension directly 
preceding or following the death of a national leader. Indecision and 
prevarication regarding the future would be unremarkable under 
such circumstances. Nonetheless, this much can confidently be said: 
the broader pattern of obsessional neurosis, if we are to accept for 
the moment such an extrapolation from psyche to society, would be 
ill suited to a nation for which ongoing transformation remains such 
an urgent injunction. For a country still battling to attain the social 
equilibrium of a genuinely postapartheid era, the prevarications, 
hidden resentments and repressed ambivalences of the obsessional 
would prove an immobilising force. The stultifying mode of life 
lived-as-death is not one that the postapartheid nation can afford. 
Indeed, if Mandela’s symbolic and psychical legacy becomes to the 
nation akin to that of the overbearing father to the obsessional 
neurotic, then it would be difficult to see how the nation might move 
‘beyond Mandela’ rather than obsessively repeating gestures of his 
commemoration.
Mandela, metonymy and enchantment
Importantly, it would be wrong to dismiss the quasi-hysterical nature of 
the South African public’s concerns over Mandela’s failing health in 2013 
as an excessive or over-the-top response. To the contrary, this wave of 
anxiety was deeply significant, although perhaps not in the way it may 
have appeared. It was a token of a more far-reaching and less easily 
communicable form of social unease than could have been explained 
simply by reference to the advancing death of a former president. This 
behaviour can, in other words, be read symptomatically, as a crisis of 
concern that condenses within itself a series of fundamental anxieties 
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underlying the postapartheid condition as such. Before elaborating upon 
this idea any further, we need to consider the unique status that Mandela’s 
name and legacy have come to acquire in the psyche of South African 
and global culture alike. Deborah Posel’s astute sociological analysis of 
‘Madiba magic’ proves an invaluable resource in this respect. Mandela’s 
stepping out of prison after 27 years to negotiate with his oppressors, 
says Posel,
became a metonym of the wider national ‘miracle’ of a peaceful transition 
to democracy … He rapidly came to personify the ‘new’ South Africa 
in ways that made the project not merely plausible, but persuasive. He 
also made it appear proximate, even intimate. Affectionately embraced 
as Madiba, his clan name, connoting simultaneously his elevated station 
and popular accessibility, he was the avuncular elder whose appeal 
breached the sedimented South African divisions of race, class, gender 
and ethnicity (71).
The politics of enchantment engendered by Mandela’s image entailed 
not only an astonishing symbolic reversal – the refiguring of white South 
Africa’s ‘iconic terrorist, public enemy number one, as … exemplary 
human being’ (75) – but, moreover, his metonymic power to stand in for 
and enact this ‘new’ inclusive idea of South Africa. South Africans after 
1994 were, as Posel puts it, ‘a people in his image’ (87).
Posel’s engagement with the Mandela imaginary anticipates a series of 
affective features that I will soon stress from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
The effects of enchantment, she says, include
a feeling of being in the midst of truth, but one that is revelatory rather 
than discursive, blindingly evident rather than produced on the strength 
of rationally assembled evidence … we are enchanted, in part, by the 
absence of any need for further explication, as if the occurrence that 
produces our feelings of conviction is self-explanatory, tautologically 
obvious through the sheer fact of what occurs, even if it is impossible to 
fathom fully how and why it occurred (84).
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‘Mandela’ as transcendent signifier
Let us now take up a more overtly psychoanalytic perspective. A name 
starts to function as a ‘master signifier’ when, despite the predominance 
of a general ‘preferred meaning’, it comes to signify a great many different 
things to a great many different people. Moreover, despite the diversity 
of such personal investments, all related parties – the public as a whole, 
we might say – remain identified with the name in question. They have, 
in other words, taken it on as a crucial element of who they are or who 
they would like to be. The emotive signifier in question – it is always an 
emotive signifier – be it ‘England’, ‘the new South Africa’, ‘God’, ‘die volk’ 
or, indeed, ‘Mandela’, makes a type of subjectivity possible and anchors an 
array of beliefs. This constitutive function of the master signifier is often 
remarked upon in Lacanian discourse theory: in the absence of such a 
master signifier, there is no committed or believing subject, no subject of 
the group – indeed, no viable group or constituency at all (see Bracher; 
Stavrakakis; Verhaeghe).
What this means is that the name ‘Mandela’ represents a point of 
hegemonic convergence at which a variety of incompatible values and 
identifications overlap. George Frederickson’s comment that Mandela 
succeeded in fulfilling a symbolic role as the ‘embodiment of the nation 
that transcends ideology, party, or group’ (28) has by now become a 
political commonplace. Lodge similarly suggests that the moral prestige 
embodied by Mandela enabled him ‘to bring coherence to previously 
disparate social forces, and in doing so extend [an] exemplary influence 
across a range of political constituencies’ (224). For some, Mandela is 
the benign, forgiving father of the nation, the embodiment of hope and 
reconciliation; for others, Mandela is the radical protagonist of the armed 
struggle, the African National Congress (ANC) icon who played his part 
in establishing the Youth League and Umkhonto we Sizwe alike; for yet 
others, he is an emblem of integrity, a touchstone of moral capital, a figure 
of global renown who transcended the particularity of his political cause 
to stand for the goals of a universal emancipatory politics.
The ability of ‘Mandela’ to function as an encapsulating signifier 
that brings together a series of ostensibly incompatible values has its 
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own history. Historically, ‘Mandela’ stood for: proponent of African 
nationalism, representative of African culture and advocate for the 
sovereignty of African peoples; democrat and student of the values of 
Western parliamentary democracy; terrorist, communist, anticapitalist 
and treasonous enemy of the South African state; ANC leader and 
representative of the universal ends of justice, non-racialism, equality 
and freedom. This cross-section of themes is perhaps nowhere better 
embodied that in Mandela’s speech from the dock in the 1964 Rivonia 
Trial. The event of the trial no doubt proved crucial in transforming 
Mandela the man into ‘Mandela’ as master signifier, and it is worth 
examining again sections of his speech in this light:
I am one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe … I 
have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my 
people, because of my experience in South Africa, and my own proudly 
felt African background … In my youth … I listened to the elders of my 
tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me 
were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland 
(Mandela 349–350).
Mandela likewise proved adept at placing himself in relation to – yet 
not beholden to – communist allies, from whose ideology he carefully 
distanced himself. Furthermore, even while espousing fidelity to the 
African people, he described himself as a man respectful of Western 
political institutions:
The ANC[’s] … chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity 
and full political rights. The Communist Party’s main aim … was to 
remove capitalists and replace them with a working-class government. 
The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst 
the ANC seeks to harmonize them. It is true that there has often been 
close cooperation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But 
cooperation is merely proof of a common goal – in this case the removal 
of white supremacy – and is not proof of a complete community of 
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interests … From my reading of Marxist literature … I have gained the 
impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West 
as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer 
of such a system … I have great respect for British political institutions, 
and for the country’s system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as 
the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and 
impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration (352–353).
The ‘magic’ of the master signifier – which the rhetorical performance 
above goes some way to embodying – is that it is able to knit together 
different constituencies, appealing equally, albeit in very different ways, to 
a variety of classes who are otherwise opposed in their political agendas. 
Although in different ways, the signifier ‘Mandela’ was able to perform 
something of this task, both in 1964 and – in a more encompassing 
fashion – in the postapartheid years. A master signifier, we can thus say, 
makes a version of society, a crucial type of social bond, possible. Manqoba 
Nxumalo’s commentary on the different legacies Mandela embodies for 
whites and blacks seems at first to dispute this idea:
Mandela of the black community is and will be different to the Mandela of 
white society. To the black majority, he is a fighter and a radical militant 
who refused to be broken down even by jail. To them he is a reminder that 
in order to get justice you must fight because there is honour in struggle. 
To the white liberal community, he represents reconciliation, forgiveness 
and peaceful coexistence … There is a fundamental departure between 
blacks and whites on what takes precedence in all the things that make up 
this icon called Mandela.
What these words suggest is that Mandela is a mediator between racial and 
class groups whose political ideals are not only very different but are at 
times diametrically opposed. In this respect, the master signifier achieves 
what seems impossible: it engenders a type of hegemonic appeal whereby 
various social antagonisms may (however temporarily) be overcome. A 
further implication can be read out of Nxumalo’s observations: part of 
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what was anxiety-provoking about Mandela’s declining health was that 
South Africa would soon lack a crucial ‘class mediator’, that is, a political 
figure who not only spoke powerfully to black and white groupings but 
who also enabled them to speak and engage with one another.
Political theorists such as Ernesto Laclau, also in collaboration with 
Chantal Mouffe, tend to prefer the notion of an empty as opposed to a 
master signifier, even though the concept in question is much the same. 
The benefit of referring to the master signifier as ‘empty’ is that it draws 
attention to the fact that it maintains no intrinsic or essential meaning, 
and also that it permits an endless succession of varying applications and 
uses. A master signifier, that is to say, can never be totalised; it remains 
always empty, able to accommodate fresh articulations. This is so 
obviously the case in respect of Mandela’s name – various applications of 
which are, today in South Africa, seemingly never-ending – that it barely 
warrants mentioning. Whether in the material form of commemorative 
architecture or place names; institutions, charities, endowments; 
commemorative commodities; and even rival political party interests,2 
‘Mandela’ is a signifier that can be appended to an endless stream of 
postapartheid objects and aspirations.
Although I have cited mainly commemorative and commodity objects 
above, the true measure of a master signifier’s strength has more to do 
with the social bonds and subjective investments that it underpins, that is, 
with its role in consolidating a social mass. Having said that, one should 
not neglect the symbolic paraphernalia noted above: the symbolic density 
connoted by such activities and representations is a clear signal that a 
society is fortifying a mode of belief, concretising a cherished set of ideals 
and subjective or societal investments. In short, we don’t erect monuments 
simply to celebrate and affirm what we already know; we build and 
sustain monuments so that we will continue to know and believe what 
may otherwise be erased through time, various forms of uncertainty or 
doubt. So, contrary to assuming that the endless proliferation of Mandela 
signifiers speaks simply to the historical objectivity, to the security, of 
the Mandela legacy, we might ask whether this activity is fuelled rather 
by a need to believe. Moreover, we might ask whether it is propelled by 
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the imminent failure of, or disbelief in, the vision of an integrated South 
African nation that Mandela championed and, furthermore, whether this 
multitude of symbolic gestures attempts – desperately perhaps – to affirm 
such a unified social reality, despite the mounting evidence of growing 
social and political divisions.
To extend this point, it is worth briefly remarking upon a change that 
has occurred in South Africa’s relationship to Mandela. Writing in 2006, 
Lodge commented: ‘Surprisingly … there is little evidence of a cult of 
personality. The only public statue of Mandela is located in Sandton … 
His image does not appear on banknotes, or postage stamps, and the 
museum at his birthplace is low key’ (223). All of this, it is safe to say, has 
changed, and radically so. Mandela’s image now adorns South African 
banknotes; there are a number of museums dedicated to Mandela (at 
Umtata, Mvezo and Qunu); statues of Mandela in Sandton, Bloemfontein 
(Naval Hill) and Paarl (Groot Drakenstein) – not neglecting, of course, 
the Mandela monument in Howick – have now been outstripped by the 
nine-metre statue at the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Why is it then, we 
might ask, that we need to celebrate and memorialise Mandela now in 
the immediate aftermath of his death more than ever before? Might it be 
because now, as we advance into a post-postapartheid era, we are in a time 
when the exuberance and enthusiasm of the Mandela-led government of 
1994–99 already seem to be dated historical phenomena?3 To reiterate 
the point made above, we could say that this surge of commemorative 
practices and signifiers occurs because we need to believe the Mandela 
myth now more than ever. Such signifiers indicate less the absolute 
truth of the political changes Mandela helped bring about than the fact 
that without the constant activity of Mandela signification, we might 
fail to believe in such changes – promised or otherwise – and begin to 
fear that many of the country’s divisions of old could resurface in novel 
postapartheid forms.
Lionel Bailly adds an important qualification to the notion of the 
master signifier which seems crucial here: ‘master signifiers usually 
mask their opposites … they exist in a polarised form’ (63). The openly 
expressed aspect of the master signifier props up an ego – that is, the 
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imagined identity of a subject or community – while the unenunciated 
aspect remains ‘buried in the unconscious … constantly pushing up its 
opposite number’ (63). The function of the master signifier is thus to 
redirect potentially painful or anxiety-provoking signifiers, and to do 
so in such a way ‘that a signifying chain with the opposite, bearable, or 
even comforting meaning emerges’ (63). Following the argument already 
developed, there could barely be a more apt description of how the 
signifier ‘Mandela’ is utilised in the postapartheid context.
The bonds of fantasy
Evident in the elevation of Mandela to the realm of ‘pure symbol’ is the role 
of a type of mythologisation. A master signifier is never merely objective 
in its meaning and value but is animated rather by subjective belief, by 
the imagination of those who have invested in it. This is to say that the 
signifier ‘Mandela’ is today always in part a projection of those who have 
taken pride in, and identified with, the man and his legacy. There is thus 
some truth, despite the apparent cynicism, in political evaluations that 
suggest that Mandela’s greatness ‘is mainly a creation of the collective 
imagination’ (see Beresford). In speaking of Mandela, we have in mind not 
just the man or Mandela as historical event, but Mandela as focal point 
of multiple subjective investments and identifications – Mandela, that is, 
as shared social fantasy. To make such an observation is by no means to 
depart from pressing ‘real world’ political concerns. ‘Mandela’ has served 
as a stabilising signifier, a signifier more able than any other to lend moral 
purpose and meaning to the social contradictions of the contemporary 
South African era. Indeed, ‘Mandela’ enables us to knit together the 
otherwise discontinuous elements of postapartheid experience into a 
narrative of progress.
A crucial qualification should be made here: in psychoanalytic terms, 
‘fantasy’ is not akin to an imaginary flight of fancy, an idle illusion, 
something that should be rejected in favour of careful consideration 
of the objective facts of reality. Fantasy is rather what underlies and 
mediates what we experience as reality; it is what makes reality as such 
possible. Fantasy is thus indispensable; it provides the lens through 
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which  the chaotic and fragmentary nature of subjective and societal 
reality is afforded a rudimentary narrative coherence. Although not 
working from a psychoanalytic perspective, Sarah Nuttall and Achille 
Mbembe’s comments on Mandela’s death point to precisely such a 
fantasmatic function:
Mandela’s death might reveal a void at the heart of a country that has 
always struggled to mask such an emptiness at its centre: a country 
that has struggled to define itself as a nation and to draw together its 
many fragments into a sustained sense of commonality in the wake of a 
long racist past. More than anybody else, Mandela embodied this sense 
of commonality, and his passing is likely to reignite the metaphysical 
anxiety that South Africa is neither a concept nor an idea – just a place, a 
geographical accident (268).
It was in this respect that the demise of Mandela seemed so anxiety-
provoking for the country. It heralded the prospect of a crisis of 
redefinition and, more than that, of the divergent strands of postapartheid 
society simply failing to cohere. Or, more dramatically yet – extrapolating 
a somewhat bleak vision from Nuttall and Mbembe’s comments – 
Mandela’s decline may be thought to represent the end of the fantasy, 
the point at which the concept of South Africa ceases to work in any 
other way than as a geographical designation. Perhaps it is the case – easy 
enough to imagine if Mandela’s legacy was erased from history – that 
‘South Africa’ is no more than the name for a set of historical events to 
which no special status, no historical essence, no grand march of progress 
can rightly be said to apply.4
As sombre as such an eventuality might seem, it is nonetheless one 
worth contemplating; it may have ‘therapeutic’ benefits. How, for 
instance, might South Africans see themselves differently; what social, 
civic and political responsibilities come to the fore once complacent 
stories of ‘democracy achieved’ are interrupted? What possibilities 
for self-interrogation emerge once we suspend the narratives of an 
extraordinary history and nation that our proximity to the greatness of 
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Mandela has for so long allowed us to maintain? Despite fantasy making a 
non-psychotic reality possible, it is also necessary, so psychoanalysis tells 
us, to work through those fantasies upon which we have become overly 
reliant. This gives us a different relation to those fantasies which have 
come to function as a protective shell; those fantasies which routinely 
obscure disturbing or traumatic conditions that we would prefer to 
remain concealed.5
The ways of love
The question of how – or why – we love Mandela is also crucial. We 
may distinguish between several different modalities of love. There 
is a type of love that is largely narcissistic in nature and that operates 
most fundamentally to facilitate self-love. We love those who enable 
us to maintain an idealised image of ourselves, to bolster and extend 
the positive qualities of our own self-image. The loved person here 
is essentially a prop for our own self-regard, a mirror reflecting what 
(we believe) is best about ourselves and screening out less admirable 
qualities. Given the function of this type of love, one appreciates both 
the importance that the figure of Mandela plays in the libidinal economy 
of the nation and, once again, why his prospective demise occasioned so 
much anxiety. The death of Mandela means – at least in part – the loss of 
what South Africans feel makes them an exceptional nation, remarkable 
in the eyes of the world.
There is also the more abstract love of shared social and historical 
ideals. This type of love concerns those beliefs – what we might call ‘to 
live and die for’ values – that not only ground a society, but also link 
it to its history and set out the ideals that it will continue to strive for. 
Such a constellation of social and symbolic ideals necessarily exceeds the 
role of any one person. These comments put us in a position to respond 
to the question – painful for many – of how, and in what capacity, to 
let Mandela go. Now that Mandela has died, this may seem a merely 
academic question; yet his image of course remains, and we should not 
be too quick to assume that we have in fact relinquished our hold upon 
him. If it is then the first of the two types of love that underscores our 
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reticence to give Mandela up, if we love Mandela chiefly as a means of 
loving ourselves, then, surely, it must by now be time to cut the cord, 
to bid him a final farewell. We can extend this argument. If we love the 
image of Mandela in ways that enable us to conceal the injustices and 
inequalities of the postapartheid condition and thus idealise the current 
social conditions of the country, then it would seem necessary that we 
leave him behind. More succinctly put: we need to forgo the comforting 
illusions that the imaginary figure of Mandela allows us to maintain.
However, inasmuch as Mandela encapsulated a vision of social bonds 
traversing apartheid’s structural divisions, a vision which made the 
(imperfect) transition from apartheid possible, then it is appropriate that 
we cherish the unfinished legacy he has left. For, after all, this set of ideals 
is bigger than any one figure, even if Mandela did more than most to 
bring these values to life and lend them a recognisable human face. Dawes 
makes much the same point, reflecting hopefully on the course that such 
a permeation of values might take:
Mandela’s long goodbye takes on the form of a return, not as a statue, or as a 
caricature, but as living potential. That potential is around us in democratic 
institutions and traditions that, if young, or threatened, are also resilient 
and powerful … It is visible in the agonisingly slow, but vital change in the 
shape of our cities, and the refusal of South Africans to be content with 
half-a-life, or with the outer forms of freedom, absent its content.
Then, again, anxiety may emerge here also, even in respect of Mandela’s 
symbolic legacy. If Mandela made possible ‘the postapartheid’, as both 
political era and mode of subjectivity, then his death cannot but imply 
the question: What comes after the postapartheid era, an era which has 
been synonymous precisely with the figure of Mandela? Furthermore, if 
we are to credit the notion that Mandela made a version of South African 
subjectivity possible, then what types of South African subjectivity will be 
possible in a future where he no longer exists?
Having intimated that love and idealisation are rarely innocent, we 
may now turn to a facet of the public obsession with Mandela that few 
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have remarked upon. The universal outpouring of love and idealisation 
for Mandela in the immediate aftermath of his death has been 
accompanied by a period of intense vilification directed at his successor 
as leader of both the ANC and the country, namely Jacob Zuma. Lize 
van Robbroeck’s analysis of ‘the visual Mandela’ is particularly helpful 
in this respect, drawing attention, as it does, to the strikingly different 
portrayals of Mandela and Zuma in contemporary South African popular 
culture. Zuma, she remarks, has been subject to scathing iconoclasm (the 
cartoonist Zapiro’s showerhead caricature being a case in point), while 
the figure of Mandela remains the embodiment of good citizenship:
Zuma … has managed to rekindle white anxieties and shatter much of 
the strategic harmony Mandela managed to effect between Africanist 
symbolic power and the demands of global neoliberal realpolitik. The 
media’s open hostility toward Zuma … has opened up deep … fault lines in 
the South African political and cultural sphere … Mandela’s painstaking 
stitching together of African traditional values, Western democratic 
liberal structures, global capitalism, and pan-African communitarianism 
is in the process of being unravelled. The harmonious multivocality of 
Mandela … has now deteriorated into a cacophony of incoherent voices: 
the tenuous centre established by Mandela is not holding and things are 
beginning to fall apart (263).
We might add to this commentary by stressing how these respective 
modes of depiction – idealisation and vilification – are connected. 
Psychoanalytically, we would be remiss if we did not note how they are 
linked; indeed, are part of one and the same dynamic. The more Mandela 
is progressively idealised, the more Zuma’s (not inconsiderable) faults are 
magnified. Mandela is lionised; Zuma is lampooned, reduced to caricature 
and stereotype, lambasted as the embodiment of everything wrong with 
South Africa.
This dynamic reflects something of the country’s self-ruminations. 
More to the point yet, it represents the country’s inability to bring together 
what is best and worst, what is most inspiring and most shameful, in its 
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history. One is reminded of the resentful words that the director Oliver 
Stone puts into Richard Nixon’s mouth in a fictitious scene from his 1995 
film Nixon. Staring with bitterness at a portrait of John F. Kennedy and 
wondering why the American people loved the younger man so much, he 
laments: ‘When they look at him, they see themselves as they want to be; 
when they look at me, they see themselves as they are.’ It perhaps goes 
without saying that this perfectly illustrates the libidinal dynamism that 
Jacques Lacan outlines in his notion of the mirror stage. We have thus on 
a national level the continual interplay between the loved, narcissistically 
affirming image on the one hand (Mandela)6 and the associated rival 
and much reviled image (Zuma) – both of course reflecting the same 
subject (the South African nation) – that threatens this idealising self-
representation. Resistant as many may be to this conclusion, we should 
insist: both images stem from the same self-conflicted, narcissistic and 
yet also self-hating source, namely, the image South Africans have of 
themselves.
Suffering idealisation
We are all familiar with the figure of the tragic hero, the gallant character 
who is willing to sacrifice himself or herself for the good of a cause. 
Importantly, however, the sacrifice in question may not always be the 
hero’s life; it may be of a symbolic sort. That is to say, as in Lacan’s notion 
of being ‘between the two deaths’, one can die symbolically before one 
is in fact physically dead. Let us consider a figure – rare at the best of 
times – that is willing to take on the hate of a community or nation, to 
assume the role of the villain if this is ultimately what serves the greater 
public good. One is reminded of the role the psychoanalyst is forced to 
endure during the travails of negative transference, in which the patient 
comes – quite unjustifiably – to see in the analyst everything that she or 
he, the patient, most detests and resents. Or, to provide a more dramatic 
example from within the domain of popular culture, we might follow the 
argument Slavoj Žižek makes in The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology in respect 
of the character of Batman in The Dark Knight Returns. In order to allow 
the public to continue to believe in the figure of Harvey Dent, a public 
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prosecutor who is seen as pursuing the ends of justice even in the face 
of insurmountable odds, Batman assumes the role of the criminal ‘public 
enemy number one’ which in fact really belongs to Dent. The heroic here 
has to do not only with the fact of self-sacrifice, but with the fact that this 
heroism, this very fact of self-sacrifice, may never be acknowledged as 
such.
It is not hard to find historical examples of leaders who have had 
to endure such a treatment, who have been vilified beyond what seems 
reasonable. Both of Mandela’s successors as president – Thabo Mbeki 
and Jacob Zuma – might be considered cases in point. There is a sense of 
ethical grandeur that, retrospectively, attaches to such a position, even if 
it is perhaps not, in the final analysis, fully justified. Hated as one might 
be in present circumstances, there is always the possibility that what one 
has done, what one has sacrificed one’s self for, will one day by recognised 
by a future generation.
Lonely as it may be to find one’s self in such a position, there is another 
situation which is potentially even more debilitating. Consider the case of 
the hero who, rather than being sacrificed for or by the people, is lauded, 
granted every conceivable honour for qualities and actions that are (at 
least in part) projections, misrepresentations of who they are. A different 
type of falsity is involved here – not the falsity of the negative transference 
(when one is not as bad as has been imagined) but the falsity of the positive 
transference (when one is not as good as has been imagined). Here too, 
as in the case of the tragic hero, a type of sacrifice is involved, not the 
sacrifice of one’s life, but a sacrifice of what one might privately be, or 
believe in, for the sake of what people need to see in you. This is part of 
what Mandela had to undergo: he needed to put himself in the service of 
the image that others had of him.
Being sublimated in such a way, elevated into the position of ‘the most 
admired person on earth … a secular saint, an embodiment of greatness 
and an icon of peace and wisdom’ (Stengel), is a necessarily violent process. 
Such a process would entail the exclusion of many of one’s own political 
values, some of which would have to be silenced so as not to undermine 
the mythical image one has come to embody. Not all of what one ideally 
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represents, believes or strives for can be shown under such circumstances, 
particularly in respect of more radical views. This, for a man like 
Mandela, who was so famously prepared to die for what he believed 
in, was perhaps more difficult than we at first imagine. Moreover, it 
was not as if Mandela did not hold controversial views. One only 
needs to consult one of the many muckraking websites established 
after his death to see such controversial facts listed: Mandela stood 
alongside ANC comrades singing ‘death to the whites’; Mandela was 
for many years secretly a member of the South African Communist 
Party; Mandela was unapologetic about his longstanding friendship 
with Muammar Gaddafi; Mandela condemned the Iraq War and was an 
ardent opponent of America’s aggressive foreign policy, and so on and 
so on (see also Malan).
Of course, it can be said that it is better to be loved rather than hated 
for what one is not (that is, for what others have projected upon you). This, 
surely, is a far more rewarding – even ennobling – form of sacrifice. The 
rapturous attention of so many might be thought to offset the alienating 
effects of adopting a persona never quite commensurate with one’s own 
beliefs. Then again, the experience of needing to suffer idealisation, to 
stifle the radical political instincts that had been his lifeblood, cannot 
have been easy for Mandela.
The death of the father
The death of an important father figure – particularly one of the stature 
of Mandela – can represent a great many things symbolically. It can, of 
course, result in an ugly series of skirmishes in which various family 
members and stakeholders struggle for their share of the man’s legacy 
and wealth. This often seems, and has sadly proved, unavoidable. This is 
not the only outcome that may be predicted of such an event. The death 
of an esteemed father may represent just as much an auspicious beginning 
as an inauspicious end. This is in fact a well-known literary trope: a grand 
family story – or historical epic – only in effect really begins following 
the death of a great patriarch. As US soap operas like Six Feet Under, Dallas 
and Brothers and Sisters demonstrate, little else provides as much by way 
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of interesting new plot developments as does the demise of a powerful 
and revered father figure.7
What most certainly is signalled by such an event is that the father’s 
descendants need to assume responsibility for what had hitherto been 
his perceived duty. One of Mandela’s tasks – perhaps his overriding 
achievement – was to pull together a radically divided and diverse 
society, to enable a postapartheid imaginary that the entire nation 
could, in very different ways, believe in and identify with. The signifier 
‘Mandela’ provided the basis – historically unimaginable until that 
point – for a type of social consensus that made the postapartheid 
public sphere viable. It is this perceived ability to transcend apartheid’s 
lingering culture of hate and separatism, to foster ties of allegiance 
that cross the boundaries of race, ethnicity and political allegiance, 
that characterises Mandela’s lasting greatness. What the demise of 
the ‘father of the nation’ throws into perspective is the fact that we, as 
individual citizens, will no longer be able to delegate this task to him. 
This responsibility, the labour of developing a viable postapartheid 
consensus and, indeed, of supporting a shared public sphere will now 
fall to those on whom Mandela placed his trust: the people of the 
country of South Africa.
NOTES
1. The canonical example of obsessional neurosis in the history of psychoanalysis 
being, of course, Freud’s case study of Ernst Lanzer, the ‘Rat man’, in ‘Notes 
upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’.
2. As in the 2013 attempt of South Africa’s Democratic Alliance to appropriate 
Mandela’s image in its own campaigning materials.
3. See Dennis Walder for an argument that 2009 represented a turning point 
in South Africa’s recent history. That year saw Jacob Zuma become the 
country’s third democratically elected president; the country was plunged 
into recession; the HIV and Aids pandemic soared to new levels; new crises 
of unemployment, crime and corruption came to the fore; and xenophobic 
attacks and service delivery protests swept through the country.
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4. We can elaborate upon this idea of Mandela as fantasy that makes the notion 
of the South African nation viable by referring to Posel, who in turn cites 
Ivor Chipkin’s analysis of the post-1994 South African people who, Chipkin 
claims, lacked any distinguishing national marks, had no common culture or 
race, and had only really an idea of what they were not, namely South Africans 
of old. Posel adds to this (a nice case in point of the anticipatory mode of 
temporality often stressed in Lacanian psychoanalysis): ‘Mandela’s metonymic 
power – to stand in for and enact this “new” people as if it had already come 
into being – provided a resolution to the paradox: South Africans were now a 
people in his image and what it stood for, made anew’ (87).
5. The notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’ sometimes taken as a precondition 
for a successful psychoanalytic treatment entails such a trajectory, namely, 
a crossing through the multiple layers of a given fantasy which shields the 
subject from disconcerting ‘reals’, revealing thus the radical contingency of 
both their given circumstances and their own status as subject. Importantly, to 
‘traverse the fantasy’ does not imply that the fantasy be completely dissipated 
or destroyed, but rather that it be ‘passed through’, resituated.
6. Van Robbroeck makes this point wonderfully. The many photographs of 
Mandela ‘sporting his approving, avuncular smile … serve to affirm the 
nation’s grandiose narcissism by feeding our sense of specialness’ (252).
7. In these TV shows, the ‘founding father’, that is, the man who has made the 
wealth and established the name of the family – akin in some ways to the 
Freudian primal father – dies abruptly within the first few episodes.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RETURN OF EMPATHY:  
POSTAPARTHEID FELLOW FEELING
Ross Truscott
Empathy between those whom apartheid inscribed as different is widely 
and confidently posited as a threshold of postapartheid transformation; 
it is said to mark, if not the arrival of a postapartheid psychosocial 
condition, then at least the assurance that things are on the right track. At a 
moment when student movements are coalescing around ‘black pain’ and 
‘black anger’, it seems worthwhile pausing to consider what has become 
an assumed good, an ethical response affirmed without question. The 
assertion of empathy as a postapartheid condition, however, is not new. 
Around the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa 
it was argued, largely in the language of psychoanalysis, that empathy 
stands as a break with patterns of colonial and apartheid domination, 
the most well-known case being A Human Being Died That Night. In it 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela gives an account of her interviews with 
Eugene de Kock, commanding officer of apartheid’s counterinsurgency 
police unit based at the notorious Vlakplaas farm, with whom she came 
to identify and empathise, their encounter awakening his ‘human’ 
capacity for empathy. It is this particular kind of argument that I want to 
pressure here.
The aim of this chapter is not to foreclose on empathy as a 
postapartheid condition but, rather, to offer a critique that might make 
the concept of empathy adequate to the present historical moment in 
which South African psychosocial transformation has shuddered and 
stalled. In staging my concerns, I take the work of South African artist 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
66
Nandipha Mntambo, specifically her collection of installations and 
images in The Encounter, as a provocation that asks us to think again 
about empathy. I regard Mntambo here as a philosophical accomplice 
rather than an analysand. In short, I want to think with Mntambo’s The 
Encounter rather than about her artwork.
It has been suggested that Mntambo’s work, like that of photographer 
Zanele Muholi, elicits empathy from the viewer that their work calls for 
empathy.1 It is worth briefly following the contours of this claim. Regarding 
Muholi’s work, Tamar Garb, for instance, argues that ‘photographic history 
provides a resource, not only of critique but of play. Deadly serious about 
the visual clichés of an oppressive iconographic tradition, she, like the 
people she portrays, feels free to use them as she likes, exposing their ethnic 
essentialism while queering their modes of address’ (17). Underscoring the 
stakes of such an appropriative approach, Garb states:
Photography provided an efficient means through which the unfamiliar 
inhabitants of the colonized world could be organized into apparently 
coherent entities and groups for scrutiny, study and delectation by 
outsiders. In fact it often provided the ground of their intelligibility, 
and the generic took precedence over the particular. But sometimes the 
photographs captured distinctive and unique physiognomies and features, 
and it is possible that empathy was also in place, despite the display of 
difference and the play of power that exposure to the camera entailed (21).
In so many readings of Muholi’s images, empathy appears, as it does for 
Garb, as a possibility that exceeds the colonial visual codes that Muholi 
reworks. Like Muholi, Mntambo works within and against a tradition of 
imaging, but what Mntambo queers is precisely the empathic gaze. This, 
at least, is the argument towards which I am heading. If empathy has been 
identified, historically, as that which, within apartheid and colonial rule 
more generally, exceeded or escaped relations of domination, this chapter 
approaches the discourse of empathy from a different angle, taking 
empathy as a concept embedded in colonial thinking, which requires the 
work of reinscription.
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A part of The Encounter consists of installations made of cowhides, moulded 
on the female body, both the artist’s body and her mother’s (Figure 3.1). If 
empathy, as Clifford Geertz puts it in his article ‘From the Native’s Point 
of View’, discussing the scandal of Bronisław Malinowski’s A Diary in the 
Strict Sense of the Term, is ‘a task at least as delicate, if a bit less magical, as 
putting oneself into someone else’s skin’ (29), then Mntambo ‘invites the 
viewer to take her place, to step into the outline of her body, the moulded 
cowhide’ (May 2010). While these installations provide a comment on 
empathy, it is in her image ‘The Rape of Europa’ (Figure 3.2) that, I think, 
empathy’s latent libidinal economy is best grasped and it is to this image 
that I return below.
In what follows I offer a reading of empathy as it appears in Sigmund 
Freud’s writings, the reason being that if so many calls for empathy have 
drawn on psychoanalysis, a close reading of Freud will allow us to think 
through the undisclosed itineraries of subjectivity to which the concept 
of empathy commits postapartheid transformation.2 I focus here on two 
texts: ‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’, or Dora’s case, 
Figure 3.1. ‘Emabutfo’ © Nandipha Mntambo, courtesy STEVENSON Cape Town and 
Johannesburg
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which opens onto the long and complex tangle between hysteria, art and 
empathy, and ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’.
The impression in the anglophone world that Freud was simply 
against empathy is, as George Pigman suggests, largely an effect of the 
Standard Edition translation of Freud; it was not Freud but James and 
Alix Strachey, the editors and translators, who were against the term. As 
Pigman argues, Einfühlung, the German term of which ‘empathy’ is an 
early twentieth-century translation, is ‘an essential component of Freud’s 
technique, a prerequisite for interpretation’ (246). It is not, however, 
only a matter of translation – the Stracheys searching for English words 
Figure 3.2. ‘The Rape of Europa’ © Nandipha Mntambo, courtesy STEVENSON 
Cape Town and Johannesburg
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with which to conceal a term they abhorred. For Freud, ‘the process which 
psychology calls “empathy” [Einfühlung] … plays the largest part in our 
understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people [das 
Ichfremde anderer Personen]’ (‘Group Psychology’ 108). Crucial though it 
is to psychoanalysis, Einfühlung is not, strictly speaking, a psychoanalytic 
concept; it predates the emergence of psychoanalysis and was taken 
into psychoanalysis from elsewhere. Thus, just as psychoanalysis posits 
a subject that has, at its core, a foreign object, an other, we find this 
doubled at the level of psychoanalytic discourse: ‘empathy’ – for Freud, a 
concept transposed from psychology, his quotation marks telling of this 
transposition – is essential to psychoanalytic practice and is, at the same 
time, a concept foreign to the discourse of psychoanalysis.3
Let me now turn to Dora’s case and, following that, to Freud’s reading 
of Michelangelo’s Moses, from which point I will return more closely to 
The Encounter. My aim in juxtaposing Mntambo and Freud is to conjure 
three scenes in which empathy confronts its own undoing: its enjoyment, 
its violence and its narcissism, each of which is commonly taken to be 
antithetical to the cultivated feeling and refined imagination of empathy.
Dora’s predator
Dora presented with various symptoms, among them coughing, aphasia, 
dyspnoea, stomach pains and catarrh. She was brought to Freud by her 
father, Phillip Bauer, after he and Dora’s mother discovered a suicide 
letter. She had accused her father of having an affair with Frau K, a family 
friend. Two years before, she had also accused Herr K of making sexual 
advances towards her, indeed of pursuing her since she was 14. Though 
worried about Dora, her father took these accusations as the fancies of a 
young girl and asked Freud to bring her to her senses. For her part, Dora 
was furious. She suspected that she had been handed over to Herr K as the 
price her father was paying for his ongoing affair. And now she had been 
handed over, once more, to Freud.
While taking Dora’s accusations seriously, Freud interprets them. On the 
one hand, Dora behaved ‘like a jealous wife’ protesting against a husband’s 
infidelity, ‘clearly putting herself in her mother’s place’ (‘Fragment of an 
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Analysis’ 56). The woman her father loved was, however, not her mother 
and she must also, Freud hypothesises, ‘have been putting herself in Frau 
K’s place’ (56). Dora was thus, as Freud states, ‘identifying herself both with 
the woman her father had once loved and with the woman he loved now’ 
(56). Extending these lines of Dora’s identifications, Freud suggests that her 
symptoms concealed a secret love for Herr K, behind which was an Oedipal 
wish. Thus, she was not simply afraid of Herr K: she was afraid of her 
desire for him, her symptoms providing a means of refusing his advances, 
of getting him off her path, as it were, but also a means of disguising her 
desire. Freud’s formulation is then given a further twist, which he elaborates 
for the most part in his footnotes. Dora was not only jealous of Frau K 
(and her mother), in love with Herr K (and her father); she was also, Freud 
suggests, in love with Frau K. Indeed, Freud writes of ‘Dora’s deep-rooted 
homosexual love for Frau K’ (105, n2), a love that was at the heart of her 
hysteria and that he failed to discern in time.
Freud is frequently charged with a ‘lack of empathy with Dora’ (Decker 
107), ‘a lack of empathy with a suffering adolescent girl being victimized 
by egoistic adults’ (Gay 173). Registering the possibility of such a charge, 
Freud states in his preface that ‘the exacting demands which hysteria makes 
upon a physician and investigator can be met only by the most sympathetic 
spirit of inquiry [liebevollste Vertiefung] and not by an attitude of superiority 
and contempt’ (‘Fragment of an Analysis’ 15–16). Taking Freud at his word, 
some commentators have also persuasively argued that he did in fact put 
himself into Dora’s psychic world, that he did empathise with her, and that 
it is this, rather than his lack of empathy, that is so disquieting about the 
case. Clare Kahane suggests that, ‘as brilliant as Freud was in constructing a 
narrative of Dora’s desire, he essentially represented his own’ (20). Stephen 
Marcus, too, asserts, ‘The case history belongs progressively less to her than 
it does to him’ (85). Suzanne Gearhart writes of Freud’s ‘identification with 
Dora’ (122), a part of his countertransference. And Neil Hertz inquires into 
Freud’s ‘unrecognized – or refused – identification’ with Dora; indeed, the 
ways in which ‘he “was” Dora’ (67).
Freud’s letters certainly suggest that he had something like the pitfalls 
of empathy in mind – ‘that the “reader of thoughts” perceives nothing in 
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the “other”, but merely projects his own thoughts’ (The Complete Letters 
450) – while writing up the case. We might say that Freud does empathise 
with Dora but that, in doing so, he situates himself, as Jacques Lacan 
argues, in the position of Herr K. He assumes or, rather, is cast, through 
the transference that ensues, in the role of Dora’s sexual predator. The 
transference – as the impression an unremembered experience will 
have left in the interaction between doctor and patient, organising their 
relationship – puts Freud in Dora’s tracks, as it were.
In Freud’s case study of Dora, there are two figures of empathy. The 
first is Freud; the second is Dora herself. Dora’s symptoms allow her 
to put herself into the place of others. Dora’s cough, a copy of Frau K’s 
cough, allowed her to be like the lover of her father, assuming also the 
place of Herr K’s wife. Her cough, which caused her to lose her voice at 
times, was, however, overdetermined, carrying several wishes. It was also, 
Freud states, ‘an imitation of her father’, which enabled Dora to occupy 
his place and simultaneously express ‘sympathy [Mitleid] and concern for 
him’ (‘Fragment of an Analysis’ 82), for his ill health, on account of which 
he would leave home to carry out his affair, an affair she lived, if only 
through her affliction, through her suffering. Her suicidal ideation, too, 
the very reason she was brought to Freud, declared her identification with 
her father, as on being discovered with Frau K he had conjured a story of 
wanting to take his life, from which Frau K had saved him. Dora’s suicide 
note is a love letter symptomatically addressed to Frau K, but, like her 
cough, it was overdetermined. It was also, Freud argues, the double of a 
letter written by a ‘maidservant’ with whom Herr K had conducted a brief 
affair. Indeed, it is in the role of the ‘maidservant’ that the transference 
between doctor and patient is acted out, for Dora finally broke with 
the treatment with Freud by giving him a ‘fortnight’s warning, just like 
a governess’, and in this way she assumed the fate of the ‘maidservant’ 
whom Herr K had taken and then cast aside (107).4
Whereas the first figure of empathy in Dora’s case – Freud himself – is 
predatory in kind, the second – Dora – is in flight. Within more orthodox 
psychoanalytic theory, this pursuit would be taken as the acting out, 
between analyst and analysand, of her traumatic experience, a repetition of 
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her experience of pursuit in the transference, the transference being both 
the obstacle to and the condition of possibility for her cure. In this reading, 
it is a transference that merely happens to entail a pursuit. In its rhythms 
are the traces of her trauma, the key to her haunting memories, which can 
then be recalled, worked through: Dora’s experience of being prey to Herr 
K, compounded by her parents’ complicity. But is this pursuit not, perhaps, 
an effect of empathy, empathy as an act that is of necessity predatory, an 
acting out not of her repressed memories but of the roles that empathy 
offers up? Reconciling these two hypotheses, we might say that it is both: 
the predation she experienced – which was repressed but echoed through 
her symptoms, organising the transference  – already entailed empathy. 
That is, if Freud is cast into the role of Herr K, Herr K was not without 
empathy. At least, my reading of Mntambo’s ‘The Rape of Europa’, when 
placed alongside Dora’s case, leads towards this formulation.
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which is usually taken as the literary source of 
the visual depictions of Europa’s rape, Europa is the Phoenician princess 
whom Jupiter falls in love with. He changes himself into a white bull and 
descends to earth. On the seashore where Europa and her friends are 
playing, Jupiter seduces her, offers himself gently, coaxing her playfully. 
After placing flowers around his horns, Europa mounts him, at which 
point Jupiter suddenly bolts, heads into the sea and swims with her 
on his back to Crete. While the Metamorphoses and the many paintings 
and sketches that depict Europa’s rape only gesture towards the rape to 
come, Mntambo actually depicts the scene of rape, interpreting Europa’s 
rape through Pablo Picasso’s etching ‘Minotaur Caressing the Hand of a 
Sleeping Girl with His Face’. Indeed, Mntambo’s image is, in terms of its 
composition, a quotation of Picasso.
If Mntambo’s images offer a comment on postapartheid empathy, 
it is perhaps because empathy is already written into the Ovidian 
narrative she interprets, at least into its secondary literature. It has been 
suggested that the frequency with which Ovid wrote about rape – the 
Metamorphoses contains more than fifty tales of rape – and the intense 
fear in the women raped are evidence of a kind of empathy on Ovid’s 
part. Leo Curran argues that ‘flight was for Ovid the consummate 
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means for the expression of the terror of the rape victim, the predatory 
appetite of the rapist, and the dehumanizing reduction of a woman to 
the level of a hunted animal’ (280). From this, Curran concludes that 
the hunt is ‘an excellent poetic method for putting the reader into the 
position of the victim, since we have all experienced similar dread in 
our nightmares and there is a distinctly nightmarish quality in the flight 
scenes of the Metamorphoses’. In short, Ovid asks his reader to empathise 
(see also Richlin). Although care should be taken wherever rape comes 
to stand in metaphorically for something else,5 this is precisely what 
is at stake in empathy as an ethical act whose form is by definition 
analogical.
It is the associative drift between empathy and sexual predation that 
Mntambo conjures through ‘The Rape of Europa’. Though Picasso’s 
‘Minotaur’ provides the compositional reference point, what is conjured 
up in the image, through the title, is the island of Crete, where Jupiter 
took Europa, some interior part, an enclosure in the trees. This enclosure 
finds a miniaturised double in the enclosures of the installations, made of 
cowhides, moulded on the artist’s body: a hollow in the trees, on the one 
hand, and the cavities of the hides, on the other. If the viewer is invited 
to imaginatively inhabit the moulded hides, the skin of an other, the 
image asks the viewer to identify with the Minotaur straddling Europa, 
put oneself into the enclosure, into the place of this figure in the act of 
rape. The viewer’s gaze is made complicit through empathy from the 
start; your eyes are drawn to the Minotaur’s eyes, where the light strikes 
Europa directly, as if from your eyes; the passage of light moves from 
the place of your gaze to the Minotaur’s eyes, and from there to Europa, 
rebounding back to her hand, where  – as if to give your gaze back to 
you, the viewer, return your empathic look – the circuit ends and begins 
again. ‘The Rape of Europa’, alongside Mntambo’s cowhide installations, 
does not merely invite empathy; it solicits it, and then holds up a mirror 
to it: see yourself in this scene, it says, imaginatively project yourself into 
the scene, and this will have been an image of your predatory look, erotic 
and violent. The circuit of light, repeated for as long as one stares at the 
image, becomes the thrusting of an empathic gaze.
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Certainly one can no longer read Dora’s case the same way after 
Mntambo’s ‘The Rape of Europa’. One cannot but see Freud putting 
himself into Dora’s psychic world, making ‘multiple analytic thrusts into 
her unconscious’ (Rieff xvii).6 If Freud is thrown off by Dora, if his empathy 
is troubled, it is because he encounters in her an almost absolute, unstable 
empathy, confronting him with the difficulty of inhabiting the place of an 
other who intensely enjoys putting herself in the place of others. Just as 
Mntambo places the empathic gaze within her frame and makes it glare 
back, in the hysteric (the second figure of empathy) the first figure (the 
‘physician and investigator’) encounters a disturbing reflection of his 
own enjoyment. Rather than a mere object to be cured or understood, 
Freud confronts in Dora a figure who has taken to its breaking point the 
injunction – of which Percy Bysshe Shelley’s ‘A Defence of Poetry’ is merely 
the nineteenth-century emblem – to ‘imagine intensely’, to make ‘the pains 
and pleasure’ of ‘many others’ one’s own (‘Fragment of an Analysis’ 6).
A fingerprint of fury
Einfühlung was a concept formed initially in the field of aesthetics and 
only later posited as an intersubjective condition. It is thus worth turning 
to a text in which Freud is explicitly concerned with a work of art, ‘The 
Moses of Michelangelo’, which will lead us further into the predatory 
elements of empathy.
Michelangelo’s Moses, Freud tells his reader, had been interpreted as 
a ‘calm before the storm’. As this interpretation goes, ‘in the next instant 
Moses will spring to his feet – his left foot is already raised from the 
ground – dash the Tables to the earth, and let loose his rage upon his 
faithless people’ (‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ 216). Projecting himself 
into the movement of the statue, specifically the movement of Moses’ 
index finger caught in his beard, Freud produces a different hypothesis:
In imagination we complete the scene of which this movement, 
established by the evidence of the beard, is a part; and we are brought 
back quite naturally to the hypothesis according to which the resting 
Moses is startled by the clamour of the people and the spectacle of the 
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Golden Calf. He was sitting there calmly, we will suppose, his head with 
its flowing beard facing forward, and his hand in all probability not near 
it at all. Suddenly the clamour strikes his ear; he turns his head and eyes in 
the direction from which the disturbance comes, sees the scene and takes 
it in. Now wrath and indignation lay hold of him; and he would leap up 
and punish the wrongdoers, annihilate them. His rage, distant as yet from 
its object, is meanwhile directed in a gesture against his own body (224).
Freud sees in this ‘despotic finger’ not the leader’s rage to come, but ‘the 
remains of a movement that has already taken place’ (223), a sculpture of 
‘frozen wrath’ (229), a hypothesis to which he is brought by imaginatively 
recreating the history of a gesture, putting himself into the scene of 
Michelangelo’s Moses along three lines. Firstly, he identifies with 
Michelangelo, an identification recruited by the artist, who, as Freud 
suggests, ‘aims … to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same 
mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create’ 
(212). Secondly, he identifies with ‘the angry scorn of the hero’s glance’ 
(213). An editorial footnote draws attention to Ernest Jones’s speculation 
that Freud’s interpretation of the sculpture as a departure from scripture – 
the scriptural Moses destroyed the Tables of the Law while Michelangelo’s 
Moses, in Freud’s analysis, preserves them, relinquishes the grasp of his 
beard, which was the displacement of fury at his rebellious followers – 
may have been influenced by his own fury at Carl Jung and Alfred Adler.7 
That is to say, Freud was moved by Moses, he identified with him as 
leader with a group in revolt, ‘struggling successfully against an inward 
passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself’ (233). And 
thirdly, telling of his many trips to see the statue of Moses, Freud states, 
‘sometimes I have crept cautiously out of the half-gloom of the interior as 
though I myself belonged to the mob upon whom his eye is turned’ (213). 
That is, Freud locates himself in the scene as the object of this leader’s 
fury, as part of a rebellious group.
In his interpretation, Freud draws on a technique of connoisseurship 
proposed by Giovanni Morelli, an Italian physician and art critic. Morelli’s 
method, concerned with distinguishing copies from originals, considers, 
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as Freud puts it, ‘the significance of minor details’ as a kind of fingerprint 
of the artist left in ‘unconsidered trifles which the copyist neglects to 
imitate’ (222). Morelli’s approach is a ‘method of inquiry’, as Freud states, 
‘closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis’ (222). Indeed, Freud 
notes the similarity between this method, his own and detective work. 
Following this ‘minor detail’, Carlo Ginzburg argues that what unites 
Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes is a common relation to medicine, 
more specifically ‘the model of medical semiotics, or symptomatology’ (12). 
Ginzburg suggests that lurking behind these three forms of ‘conjectural 
knowledge’ is a common originary figure, ‘the hunter crouched in the 
mud, examining a quarry’s tracks’ (14). The hunter, as Ginzburg states, is 
‘the hypothetical origin of the conjectural model’ (22).
Morelli wrote under a Russian pseudonym, Ivan Lermolieff, and 
Freud first published ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ anonymously. If this 
common concealment of identity recalls two hunters silently tracking 
their prey, there is nothing necessarily sinister about this for Ginzburg. 
Indeed, hunting, Ginzburg speculates, may have given rise to writing, 
the hunter perhaps ‘the first “to tell a story” because only hunters knew 
how to read a coherent sequence of events from the silent (though not 
imperceptible) signs left by their prey’ (13). Ginzburg does, however, 
note that this mode of knowledge would come into play in colonial 
governmentality in the nineteenth century through an appropriation of 
the ‘conjectural knowledge’ of colonised people, which was then used 
against them: ‘The problem of identifying previous offenders, which 
developed in these years, was the bridgehead of a more or less conscious 
project of keeping a complete and general check on the whole of society’ 
(25). Thus, the distance between the footprint of the prey in the mud, 
the fingerprint at the scene of the crime, and the photographic print 
in the identity document begins to narrow; all are traces that come to 
index knowledge of a subject that can be tracked, its history known, its 
predilections anticipated and controlled.
Buried in ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’, I want to suggest, is a 
dialectic  of rebellion (the disobedience of the people), retribution (the 
wrath of their leader) and the sublimation of aggression (the leader’s 
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restraint, which allows the Law to be preserved). Associatively read, it 
is the rebellion of Freud’s followers, who would be crushed for their 
disobedience were it not for the restraint of their magnanimous leader 
who brings himself under control. Latent, also, is Freud’s own rebellion 
against the scientific community. There is, however, another and, for 
my purposes, more important associative track to this trace that Freud 
reads – literally, a fingerprint of fury, a ‘violent gust of passion visible in 
the signs left behind it in the ensuing calm’ (‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ 
236) – and to this group in revolt, a people formerly enslaved: the revolt 
of colonised people and the question of vengeance, retribution and the 
preservation of the law that arises there.
Given that ‘primitive peoples’ and children are notoriously rendered 
by Freud as mutually narcissistic, commonly afflicted by megalomania, 
perversion and a predilection for Oedipal defiance, the quelling of 
insurrections against the colonial state is latent in an essay Freud wrote 
during the same period as his essay on Michelangelo’s Moses, published in 
the same volume of the Standard Edition. ‘Only someone who can feel his 
way into the minds of children’, Freud states, ‘can be capable of educating 
them; and we grown-up people cannot understand children because 
we no longer understand our own childhood’ (‘The Claims of Psycho-
Analysis’ 189). One cannot but ask whom else this statement might refer 
to, if not those ‘savages or half-savages’ who, Freud writes in the opening 
page of ‘Totem and Taboo’, represent a ‘well-preserved picture of an early 
stage of our own development’ (1). That is, ‘we no longer understand’ the 
children of man.8
Freud, like the colonial state, is concerned with revolt – with the 
followers of Moses rebelling against their leader, with rebellious or, at least, 
badly behaved children and, associatively, with insurrectionary ‘savages or 
half-savages’ – and the question of how to respond to it. There is, of course, 
a crucial difference between Freud and the discourse of the colonial state, 
as Freud insists that ‘forcibly suppressing such impulses’ is futile, that 
its results are no better than ‘giving free play to children’s naughtiness’ 
(‘The Claims of Psycho-Analysis’ 189–190). His response, as his analysis 
of Michelangelo’s Moses suggests, is education or, rather, leading by 
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example:  Moses quells his own fury, in the sculpture, ‘downwards from 
above’ (‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ 230) – his face already brought under 
control, his leg not yet subdued, still cutting a path towards the people he 
would crush, as he crushed his beard, a displacement of fury that, turning 
on itself, is dissipated.
Freud’s analysis of Michelangelo’s Moses has direct bearing on a 
history of psychoanalysis in South Africa, which it has been argued only 
re-emerged with, and in the wake of, the TRC.9 The most immediate 
precursor of the TRC, Adam Sitze argues in The Impossible Machine, was the 
colonial Commission of  Inquiry, specifically the ‘Tumult Commission’, a 
special category of inquiry whose primary function was to indemnify the 
colonial state’s violent suppression of revolt. Tumult Commission reports, 
Sitze notes, read like ‘a history and taxonomy of hatred’; they were ‘almost 
therapeutic in their intense interest in the gradations and thresholds 
internal to hatred’ (166). The Tumult Commission was concerned, no 
less than Freud, with fingerprints of fury, which it apprehended through 
an identificatory imagination that could know and thus domesticate it. 
Sitze’s key point is that the TRC is not a new deployment of psychoanalytic 
ideas, but that it ‘reactualizes the therapeutic discourse already at work in 
the apparatus of the Tumult Commission’; that before ‘any integration of 
psychoanalysis within the administrative apparatus of the TRC’, the Tumult 
Commission operated as a kind of wild psychoanalysis that ‘interpreted 
the etiology of political conflict within a manifestly therapeutic horizon, 
searching for the psychological antidotes that colonial administrators 
could apply to dissipate the “fevers” of hatred that always were at risk of 
swelling into open rebellion’ (206).
This is to suggest neither that Freud, with whom I am in sympathy, 
as it were, is an inadvertent theorist of colonial rule, nor that he can be 
held accountable for his bad readers. Rather, my interest here is, on the 
one hand, in the way Freud’s texts stage struggles that they cannot fully 
contain and, on the other, in that which is undisclosed in the apparatus 
used to mark a break with the apartheid past. A foreign concept at the 
heart of psychoanalysis, empathy was taken not simply from psychology, 
but also from ethnology and anthropology, with which Freud was well 
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acquainted. In approaching this incorporation, I take my critical bearing 
from Qadri Ismail’s reading of the concept of culture in the Anglo–US 
episteme, a concept produced mutually by the disciplines of literature and 
anthropology.
In Western understanding, the imagination, Ismail suggests, has 
functioned not as the magical difference of reason, but as reason’s 
supplement, as that which, together with reason, has come to mark the 
fully human subject. As Ismail reads it, Edward Tylor’s Anthropology (1881) 
– and I focus on Tylor because he is one of the anthropologists that Freud 
read – emplots the ‘lower races of men’ as helplessly violent towards 
others, ‘much as children are cruel to animals through not being able to 
imagine’ (408). Though seemingly in opposition to a ‘primitive’ incapacity 
to imagine the pain and pleasure of others, ‘auto-displacement’ – 
Ismail’s term for imagining the pain of others – though it appears at first 
‘an exemplary ethical position’, turns out to be violent, for it allows one 
to ‘“partake of” – share, participate in – and “enter” – pierce, penetrate, 
possess – another desire’ (100). Bringing ‘auto-displacement’ into 
disturbing proximity with rape, Ismail also, in his reading of Malinowski, 
the empathic anthropologist par excellence, renders the production of 
anthropological knowledge, in which anthropologists assume the native’s 
point of view, as a kind of hunting. Hence, if psychoanalysis has at its core 
a concept that is foreign to it, it is a concept doubly foreign to postcolonial 
psychoanalysis, one whose libidinal economy is both penetrative and 
predatory.
This is ground we have already covered with Dora and Mntambo, but 
it repays the effort to go over it again, this time with Grégoire Chamayou’s 
Manhunts: A Philosophical History. Chamayou traces the practice of 
hunting for men back to antiquity, but, rather than an archaic practice, he 
reads the manhunt as ‘the primal scene of conquest’ (9).10 Tracking down 
and exclusion, Chamayou argues, operate as distinct but complementary 
operations within the manhunt: technologies of predation on the one 
hand, but also, crucially, knowledge of the hunted, on the other, which 
‘explains why, by virtue of what difference, of what distinction, some 
men can be hunted and others not’ (2). Chamayou places empathy within 
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the realm of this ‘cynegetic power’, as ‘hunting presupposes’, he argues, ‘a 
form of empathy with the prey: to track prey effectively, one has to put 
oneself in its place’ (65).
Empathy, then, for Chamayou, is a technology of hunting, a necessary 
procedure, but one that confronts a contradiction at the heart of the 
manhunt. Empathy with the prey gives the hunt its ‘supreme excitement’, 
its pleasure: one is hunting not merely an animal, but an animalised human 
who is like the hunter. But this leads to ‘the denial of the absolute social 
distance between masters and their slaves that the hunting relationship 
sought precisely to reinstate’ (65). Empathy thus libidinalises and, at the 
same time, undoes the manhunt, erases the difference that allows the 
animalised human to be an object of hunting in the first place. ‘If the 
human prey is animalized, so is the hunter, insofar as he has very animal-
like feelings. Those who take pleasure in the cruel joys of manhunting are 
transformed and become savage’ (69). Staging the developmental maturity 
of the modern subject, as we might say with Ismail and Chamayou brought 
together, empathic predation unravels and fails at the very moment of 
its accomplishment, a predicament shared by the hunter-anthropologist, 
whose empathy is precisely what renders him as ‘primitive’ as the natives 
whose point of view he inhabits.
The predicament for the prey is different, at first anyway. The prey 
psychically inhabiting the perspective of the hunter is not empathy, 
Chamayou states, but the ‘mastery of cynegetic logic’. As he writes,
In order to anticipate the reactions of his pursuers, the hunted man has to 
learn to interpret his own actions from the point of view of his predator. 
This internalization of the perspective of the other makes him develop 
an extreme prudence that at first takes the form of a paralyzing anxiety 
of a paranoid type: seeing himself in the third person, considering with 
respect to each of his acts how they might be used against him (70–71).
This produces a form of thought, Chamayou argues, through which the 
runaway slave can not only evade his predator but also reverse the relation 
between prey and predator: ‘In doing so, the prey escapes the simple state 
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of objectification that constituted his point of departure. By including in 
his plan of action the logic of his predator, he envelops and internalizes it. 
Thus he acquires, at the end of this first dialectic of tracking, the mental 
abilities of a hunter, whereas he is still only a prey’ (70–71). The prey can 
empathise, but not as prey; this remains a form of learning that must pass 
through anxiety and paranoia to mastery. This is not a true escape but 
‘the tragic irony of the prey who escapes only by becoming what it sought 
to escape from’ (152). It is only as hunter, the roles reversed, that the 
prey can empathise. Thus, the prey’s predicament becomes, after all and 
through mastery, that of the predator. Indeed, in Mntambo’s ‘The Rape of 
Europa’, the artist assumes both roles, that of Europa and Jupiter, who is 
no longer a snow-white bull but has changed into a dark Minotaur. The 
Minotaur here is the predator, but the Minotaur, in the mythology and 
iconography that Mntambo draws on, is also the hunted, the bullfighting 
images in The Encounter recalling the labyrinth in which the Minotaur is 
killed by Theseus. Here again we have two figures of empathy, two figures 
that are really one, for the hunted is only empathic inasmuch as she can 
reverse the relation and become the hunter.
When it is declared that an apartheid-era police operative like Eugene 
de Kock needed to regain his capacity for empathy after apartheid, it is 
equally plausible that he already had empathy for his victims, in whose 
place he put himself, when tracking them down. It could be argued, too, that 
Gobodo-Madikizela’s empathy with De Kock entailed a kind of reversal 
of roles, the key point being that to stage postapartheid transformation 
in terms of the mere occurrence of empathy is severely limited, a point 
that A Human Being Died that Night confronts and that is the strength 
of Gobodo-Madikizela’s intervention (see Truscott 2014). But should 
instrumentalised forms of empathy – counterinsurgency operations, 
those staged in and around the TRC, the Tumult Commission, those in 
consulting rooms or in anthropological knowledge production – not be 
differentiated from more intimate scenes of care and concern, from more 
ordinary feelings of empathy?
There are strong arguments that empathy can be used for good or 
bad. However, what all forms of empathy share – from Johann Gottfried 
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Herder’s eighteenth-century formulations onwards – is a concept of 
History, of progressional time: no conception of empathy, in the modern 
sense of the word, is possible without History. Which is to say, at the risk 
of being schematic, the ‘target’ of empathy is always rendered ‘primitive’, 
the gradient of empathy runs downwards and backwards to states 
apprehended as less mature, less civilised; twisted, the empathic subject is 
always looking backwards at those before them. It is into this temporality 
of empathy that Mntambo’s ‘The Rape of Europa’ intervenes, particularly 
when read in relation to the image it appears alongside, ‘Narcissus’ (Figure 
3.3), which is also an imaging of an Ovidian narrative. If we have already 
passed through two scenes where empathy encounters its undoing, this is 
the third scene.
An echo of empathy
For Freud, narcissism is a halfway phase between ‘primitive’ autoeroticism 
and the maturity of object cathexes; it is a rehearsal of object love – Moses 
grasping and then relinquishing his own body, his beard – and also that 
developmental point to which one regresses from object love. Often taken 
to be the absence of empathy, the very opposite of empathy, narcissism 
confronts empathy with a paradox. In empathising with narcissism, one 
must project oneself into the psychic space of a subject who cannot do 
so, who has withdrawn all cathexes from the world; one must imagine 
the impossibility of imagining another’s experience. The place where 
empathy encounters narcissism is where it is cornered, trapped, as it 
were, in its own discourse. Yet, rather than simply the limit of knowledge 
of the other, narcissism turns out to be empathy’s difference and, at the 
same time, its disavowed animating kernel. The secret of empathy is that 
it is itself narcissistic. Empathising with narcissism, the empathic subject 
is face to face with its own narcissism: I can inhabit your narcissism, the 
empathic subject thinks, because I see in it the ‘primitivity’ from which 
my mature empathic position has developed; I see reflected in the mirror 
of your ‘primitive’ narcissism my own lived history (ontogenetic empathy) 
or that of my species (phylogenetic empathy). The racial undertones of 
this frame hardly require emphasis.
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Figure 3.3. ‘Narcissus’ © Nandipha Mntambo, courtesy STEVENSON Cape Town and 
Johannesburg
We are afforded a different, less teleological rendering of Narcissus 
by both  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in ‘Echo’ and Mntambo in The 
Encounter. In ‘Narcissus and Echo’, in Book III of the Metamorphoses, Echo 
had distracted Juno while Jupiter was with the nymphs. For this, Juno 
takes away Echo’s ability to speak for herself; she can only respond in 
the words of another she has just heard. Echo catches sight of Narcissus 
while he is out hunting deer, and falls in love with him. She cannot 
initiate a conversation and a strange exchange unfolds. Echo – burning 
with passion for Narcissus, her love unrequited – withers until only her 
voice remains. Narcissus, too, will disappear. His mother, Liriope, had 
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asked the seer, Tiresias, if Narcissus would live to an old age and she is 
told that he will, provided he never knows himself. In love with his own 
reflection  – this love, like Echo’s, unrequited – Narcissus longs for the 
death of this other he sees over there, and he too disappears, only a flower 
remaining.
There is a temptation to read Echo as a figure of empathy, imitative 
and resonant. For Spivak, however, Echo undoes Narcissus; she is not his 
mature counterpart, not narcissism surmounted, transcended; rather, she 
abides, critically, by Narcissus. ‘We must catch the undoing moment of 
Echo as she attends, at a distance, every act of cultural narcissism,’ Spivak 
states (27), to which we should add empathy as a form of narcissism. 
In their encounter in the Metamorphoses, Echo responds by repeating 
Narcissus’ words. Spivak’s argument hinges on the difference between 
Narcissus’ call to Echo and her response, covered over in Ovid. Narcissus 
asks Echo why she flies from him, and Ovid, instead of giving her words, 
reports that Narcissus hears his words given back to him. This holds the 
possibility, Spivak suggests, of his question becoming her order, ‘fly from 
me’. Rather than a telos – from narcissism to echoic empathy – Narcissus 
and Echo are a pair through which Spivak might be said to suggest: where 
narcissism is, there Echo will be as ‘the possibility of deconstruction’ or, 
simply, of an ‘“imperfect” repetition’ (37).
In Mntambo’s ‘Narcissus’, the artist is staring at herself in a pool. This 
narcissistic relation is mirrored in ‘The Rape of Europa’, where the artist 
plays both roles, and so, between ‘The Rape of Europa’ and ‘Narcissus’, 
there is a third doubling, the two images asymmetrical doubles of 
each other. The effect generated is of a reflection of the narcissism of 
the empathetic gaze itself, ‘The Rape of Europa’ as a mirror in which 
empathy’s penetrating gaze is offered its reflection, the narcissism of 
empathy its echo, the empathic gaze staring back at viewers who would 
put themselves into the enclosure of the trees, into the skin of an other. 
And it is this gaze that is returned to the viewer, given back, as Echo 
might, with a difference.
If there is something echoic to be read out of Mntambo’s work, it is 
because she inserts it into an already echoic chain, where the horizon 
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recedes towards an always already echoic beginning: from Albrecht 
Durer’s (1494–1495) drawing ‘Rape of Europa’; to Titian’s (1559–1562) 
‘Abduction of Europa’ painted for the king of Spain, Philip II; Peter Paul 
Rubens’s (1628–1629) copy of Titian’s painting; Rembrandt’s (1632) 
‘The Abduction of Europa’; Claude Lorrain’s (1634) etching, and then a 
later painting, ‘Coast Scene with the Rape of Europa’; and Guido Reni’s 
(1637–1639) more simply composed ‘The Rape of Europa’. Indeed, the 
Metamorphoses was from the start an echoic text: Ovid rewriting the rape 
of Europa into Book VI in the tapestries of Arachne, an archive of divine 
rape, which represents the event after it has been recounted at the end of 
Book III – an image within the story, a story repeated from the very first, 
in a text that is itself an unfaithful echo of Virgil.
Spivak notes that a part of the framing of the Narcissus myth often 
excluded is that Narcissus is born of rape. In The Encounter, then, we have, 
on the one hand, a scene of rape in ‘The Rape of Europa’ and, on the other, 
‘Narcissus’, the child of rape. In an interview, Spivak explains her interest 
in writing about children of rape and the postcolonial: ‘Rape is something 
about which nothing good can be said. It’s an act of violence. On the other 
hand, if there is a child, that child cannot be ostracized because it’s the 
child of rape. To an extent, the postcolonial is that’ (‘Bonding in Difference’ 
19, emphasis added). The rape of Europa is often depicted as Europe’s 
primal scene, its mythical origin, repetitively conjured: Europe born of 
a mythical rape, European colonialism as an act of rape, the postcolonial 
as the child of that repetitious scene acted out. Narcissus might be taken, 
then, as a figure of the postcolonial, at least inasmuch as he is accompanied 
by Echo.
Mntambo’s ‘The Rape of Europa’ condenses this genealogy within 
a single frame. The son of this union between Jupiter and Europa, 
Minos, will marry Pasiphae. Minos will receive a bull from Poseidon, 
which he will refuse to sacrifice, and Pasiphae and the bull will produce 
the Minotaur. The Minotaur in this scene of Mntambo’s image marks 
the vertical line of two generations of children to come (Minos and the 
Minotaur), produced from the horizontal lines of two unions (Europa 
and Jupiter, Pasiphae and Poseidon’s bull), forming what we can refer to 
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as the straight axis of reproductive futurity that orients the viewer to this 
image.11 It is this grandchild, the Minotaur – the future, already here – 
acting out that primal scene. The image is, however, supported by this 
genealogical axis only for it to confront the viewer with its impossibility: 
Jupiter is a woman, and so too is the Minotaur, from which we might 
conclude that, if Mntambo queers empathy, it is through a queer 
reproductivity, offering reproductions of classical images, placing herself, 
her own body, into an artistic genealogy to give birth to an impossible line 
of descent.
If empathy has been proclaimed as a threshold of psychosocial 
transformation, empathic identifications as the mark of colonial and 
apartheid relations having been transcended, the claim of this chapter 
is that, on the contrary, empathy is integral to the order we have still 
to work through, that such working through – if we are to abide by 
this psychoanalytic term – will consist in the reworking of the concept 
of empathy itself. It is this that Mntambo’s work makes available: a 
notion of reproduction through which we may not have to give up 
on empathy. It is, however, precisely in the disclosure of empathy’s 
dilemmas that the possibility of a postapartheid ethics of empathy 
might emerge: empathy as a repetition without guarantee, a discursive 
reinscription rather than a clean break with the past or a threshold to 
be triumphantly declared.
As is by now clear, my title invokes several senses of empathy’s return. 
In a first cluster of returns, empathy produces a return on libidinal 
investment, a yield of pleasure that Dora makes it impossible to deny, 
and a predatory, penetrating, narcissistic empathic gaze that Mntambo 
returns, gives back, but not without interest. In a second cluster, empathy 
is lodged in the colonial and apartheid relations that the postapartheid 
has sought to move beyond or work through. It is not a condition that 
emerged after apartheid; it returns, but what returns entails the potential 
of being turned around, not only victim and perpetrator becoming 
prey and predator or even an inversion of these roles, but an echo that 
reinscribes and reworks this colonial concept, which returns like a 
symptom that has lain latent for a time.
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NOTES
1. The literature on Mntambo’s and Muholi’s work, often discussed together, 
is mountainous and uneven. For reasons of space I do not cite all of it here. 
For an explicit invocation of empathy in relation to Mntambo, see Sanger. 
Ruth Lipschitz has written an excellent essay on Mntambo’s work and also 
suggests something like empathy. For a reading attentive to the reinscription 
of colonial visual codes as well as the wager of Muholi’s affective politics, see 
Van der Vlies.
2. Due to space constraints, I have not catalogued all psychoanalytic interventions 
that proffer empathy in South Africa.
3. Jacques Lacan comments in his reading of Dora’s case that what is constitutive 
of ‘psychoanalytic experience is that it proceeds entirely in a relationship of 
subject to subject’ (93). Considered alongside Freud’s assertion that empathy 
is ‘the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude 
at all towards another mental life’ (‘Group Psychology’ 110), one could say 
that ‘psychoanalytic experience’ comes to hinge on empathy, even though, 
and perhaps precisely because, it is an impossible relation.
4. Indeed, Dora, the pseudonym Freud gave Ida Bauer, is the name of his sister’s 
governess while he was a child, as Jacqueline Rose notes. Read through a 
postcolonial frame, the figure of the domestic worker gives the case a set of 
racial associations that are not there or only latent in Freud’s written text (see 
McClintock).
5. Amy Richlin is certainly more cautious here – indeed, her piece can be taken 
as a critique of this move – than Curran, whose claim is more than a little 
dubious.
6. Philip Rieff’s reading does discern something like empathy at work in Freud’s 
approach, which turns on him seeing in her anger a conflict that he has 
already worked through in his self-analysis.
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7. Jung and Adler were initially a part of Freud’s inner psychoanalytic circle 
and later rebelled against the ‘master’, particularly concerning sexuality as 
the source of neurosis.
8. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak notes in ‘Echo’, this isomorphic relation 
between children and ‘primitive peoples’ unravels with the figure of the 
‘primitive’ child. If such ‘primitive peoples’ have children, how can they be 
the children of man?
9. Re-emerge, that is, after its short-lived institutionalisation in the 1930s and 
1940s under the leadership of Lithuanian-born analyst Wulf Sachs, who, 
incidentally, was also interested in black anger.
10. Chamayou is concerned with three historically specific forms of manhunt 
that haunt the modern state: ‘The slave-master’s acquisition hunts, tyrannical 
sovereignty’s capture hunts, pastoral power’s exclusion hunts: thus, at the dawn 
of modernity there were three well-defined forms of cynegetic power’ (27).
11. I draw this notion of an axis of straight reproduction from Sarah Ahmed’s 
Queer Phenomenology.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ETHICS OF PRECARITY:  
JUDITH BUTLER’S RELUCTANT UNIVERSALISM
Mari Ruti
I want to argue that if we are to make broader social and political claims 
about rights of protection and entitlement to persistence and flourishing, 
we will have to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the 
rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, 
exposure, bodily belonging, desire, work and the claims of language and 
social belonging (Butler, Frames of War 2).
I
In her theorising from the last decade, Judith Butler combines Levinasian 
insights about the primacy of the other with psychoanalytic insights 
about the intersubjective formation of human beings to devise a post-
Enlightenment, postmetaphysical ethics that – as she explains in the 
epigraph above – is supported by ‘a new bodily ontology’ based on a 
rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency 
and exposure. If Emmanuel Levinas sought, as he put it, to break ‘the 
obstinacy of being’ (202) by showing that we owe our very existence to 
the other, and that we are therefore irrevocably responsible for the other 
as ‘face’, psychoanalysis reveals the ways in which our primary infantile 
relationships linger into adulthood, repeatedly derailing any sense of 
coherence we might attain. In other words, psychoanalysis reminds us 
that the other dwells within the self – through the unconscious, through 
the repetition compulsion and even through our bodily drives – in ways 
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that render us constitutionally incomplete, disoriented, out of joint 
and riven by alterity. Most importantly for Butler’s purposes, our early 
exposure to the other – what she describes, following Jean Laplanche, as 
our primordial impingement by the other – is involuntary and always 
potentially traumatising. Even when we are not treated badly, we are 
treated unilaterally, which means that we are completely at the mercy 
of others. And when we are treated badly, our masochism is inevitable in 
the sense that we are forced to cathect to those who harm us; our very 
survival depends on such wounded attachments, with the result that 
being injured – and injurable – becomes the status quo of our lives.
Butler thus replaces the metaphysical model of subjectivity as 
sovereign and self-sufficient with a Levinasian-psychoanalytic model of 
relational ontology. To ‘be’ a subject, for Butler, is to be ‘interrupted’ by 
otherness, by relationality, which is why her model asks (autonomous) 
‘being’ to yield to (intrinsically non-autonomous) relationality. As she 
explains:
If I am confounded by you, then you are already of me, and I am 
nowhere without you. I cannot muster the ‘we’ except by finding the 
way in which I am tied to ‘you,’ by trying to translate but finding that 
my own language must break up and yield if I am to know you. You are 
what I gain through this disorientation and loss. This is how the human 
comes into being, again and again, as that which we have yet to know  
(Precarious Life 49).
The ‘human’ here is the name for the disorientation and loss that result 
from being ‘broken’ by the other; I am, from the start, mired in otherness 
for the simple reason that my relation with the other is what ‘I’ am. 
Furthermore, I am interpellated into collective systems of normative 
meaning that form the outlines of my existence, even my bodily existence, 
in ways impossible to reverse. And because I can only persist, let alone 
flourish, in such contexts of social crafting, my attempts to claim a 
degree of sovereignty are always fantasmatic, unable to conjure away my 
constitutive passivity in relation to the surrounding world.
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Butler’s conceptualisation of our relational ontology is somewhat 
extreme in implying that there is nothing about our being that can be 
separated from the other, so that our experience of ourselves as quasi-
bounded entities is purely fictitious or, worse, arrogant and violent. Butler’s 
vision is also somewhat one-sided in assuming that we are invariably 
overwhelmed rather than, say, enabled by others. I will return to these 
objections below, but what is important at this juncture is to understand 
that our unwilled relationality becomes the underpinning of Butler’s ethics 
of precarity, an ethics that takes ‘the very unbearability of exposure as 
the sign, the reminder, of a common vulnerability, a common physicality 
and risk’ (Giving an Account 100). Butler thus asks us to recognise that 
our exposure to otherness – an exposure that can easily be exploited – is 
something we share with others, and that this shared vulnerability renders 
us ethically responsible for these others. That is, Butler accepts Levinas’s 
conclusion that our ontological condition of being bound to the other, and 
particularly our condition of being ‘interrupted’ by someone else’s longing 
and suffering, gives rise to the kind of accountability that cannot, under 
any circumstances, be conjured away.
One of the strengths of Butler’s ethics of precarity is its capacity to 
negotiate the relationship between the universal and the singular in ways 
that do justice to both. Simply put, precariousness is a universal condition 
of human life, yet we experience it in highly singular ways. Regarding the 
universal reach of her ethics, Butler states: ‘Precariousness has to be grasped 
not simply as a feature of this or that life, but as a generalized condition 
whose very generality can be denied only by denying precariousness 
itself  … The injunction to think precariousness in terms of equality … 
emerges precisely from the irrefutable generalizability of this condition’ 
(Frames of War 22). It is thus the generalisability of precariousness that 
makes it a suitable foundation for a universal ethics of equality.
At the same time, Butler takes pains to stress that she does not 
mean to ‘deny that vulnerability is differentiated, that it is allocated 
differentially across the globe’ (Precarious Life 31), which means that it 
may be difficult to draw an analogy between one experience of suffering 
and another. This is due not only to the difficulty of translating from 
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one context to another but also – and centrally – to the ways in which 
biopolitical and necropolitical forces distribute precariousness unevenly 
so that some individuals and populations are much more precarious than 
others. Such differentiation can take place within one society, so that it 
would, for instance, be difficult – even dangerous – to try to compare 
the precariousness of a white South African venture capitalist and that 
of the black woman who cleans his house. Butler’s focus, however, has 
been primarily on global inequalities – some racist, some capitalist, some 
nationalist – that have historically maximised the precariousness of some 
populations and minimised that of others. It is this unequal allocation of 
precarity that, for Butler, forms the point of departure ‘for progressive or 
left politics in ways that continue to exceed and traverse the categories of 
identity’ (Frames of War 3).
In the analysis that follows, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
Butler’s approach, eventually arriving at the concept of global apartheid 
that the editors of this volume have used to frame the constituent essays. 
We will discover that the tension between the universal and the singular 
that is so central to Butler’s work is equally central to recent discussions 
of global apartheid, which often revolve around the key question of 
whether globalising apartheid might rob it of its South African specificity 
or whether there might be real theoretical and political gains to be 
reaped from insisting that apartheid is not a uniquely South African 
phenomenon. I will lean towards the latter attitude without thereby 
wanting to discount the importance of the former. First, however, I 
want to offer an overview of Butler’s ethics of precarity, illustrating that 
while her early work on ethics stresses the generalisability of human 
vulnerability in ways that accord with my perspective, her recent work, 
particularly Parting Ways, insists on the particularity of experience to 
such a degree that it runs the risk of paralysing our ability to build 
analogies across different sites of oppression. I argue that this is an 
unfortunate development in so far as it implies that the concept of global 
apartheid has little theoretical or political purchase. Though I agree that 
caution is called for when leaping from one historical and sociopolitical 
location to another, I believe that even more damage is done by insisting 
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on segregation (which, not incidentally, was one of the main tropes of 
apartheid ideology).
II
In her early formulation of the ethics of precarity in Precarious Life, Butler 
goes a long way towards the universalisation of ethics. Because Butler’s 
social ontology asks us to take stock of our dependence on others, as well 
as of the interdependence of human beings on a global level, it urges us 
to object to violence aimed at others even when these others are far away 
from us or do not seem to share any of our values. Precariousness, as it 
were, offers a basis for identification, and identification, in turn, offers a 
basis for ethical indignation: I oppose injustice done to the other because, 
on a very basic level, I can place myself in the other’s position – because I 
see that, under different conditions, the injustice aimed at the other, or at 
least something akin to this injustice, could be aimed at me. As Butler asks, 
‘From where might a principle emerge by which we vow to protect others 
from the kinds of violence we have suffered, if not from an apprehension 
of a common human vulnerability?’ (Precarious Life 30) Speaking of the 
Vietnam War specifically, Butler notes that it was the apprehension 
of the precariousness of the lives that the United States army was 
destroying – particularly graphic pictures of children ‘burning and dying 
from napalm’ – ‘that brought the US public to a sense of shock, outrage, 
remorse, and grief’ (150), and that led to the widespread protests against 
the war. There is a great deal one could say here about the special status 
that the image of the innocent but suffering child holds in the American 
psyche (see Edelman), but Butler’s point is that the pictures – which the 
American public was not supposed to see yet came to see – reminded 
Americans of what geopolitical structures of power try to make them 
forget, namely that the other is just as woundable as they are; it reminded 
this public of the core of sameness that unites human beings despite their 
vast cultural, ethnic and religious differences.
One of the obvious risks in raising precariousness to a universal 
human condition – a risk Butler is clearly aware of – is that it could 
function as a way for relatively privileged Western intellectuals to imply 
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that we are all equally vulnerable, oppressed, deprived and harassed. 
Butler counters this risk with a sustained attention not only to the 
unequal distribution of precariousness but also to the global structures 
of power that make it difficult for us to acknowledge, let alone empathise 
with, the precariousness of those who do not inhabit our immediate, 
intimate lifeworld. The American public may have been outraged at 
the images from Vietnam in the same way that many were outraged at 
the images from Abu Ghraib, but this ethical response depended on a 
momentary failure of power: people saw pictures they were not meant to 
see. As Butler deftly demonstrates, one of the ruses of power is to delimit 
the domain of grievability so that – under normal circumstances  – we 
are prevented from mourning the suffering (or death) of those deemed 
different from, or inferior to, ourselves. According to Butler, it would be 
easy to enumerate ‘a hierarchy of grief’ (Precarious Life 32) that determines 
which lives count as mournable and which do not, and even – and perhaps 
most fundamentally – which lives are recognisable as human and which 
are not. This is why Butler’s ethics of precarity pivots on our ability to 
recognise the other as human, why, as she explains, it is ‘not a matter 
of a simple entry of the excluded into an established ontology, but an 
insurrection at the level of ontology, a critical opening up of the question, 
What is real? Whose lives are real?’ (33)
The derealisation (through dehumanisation) of the enemy is one of 
the basic strategies of warfare. It is easier to kill those we do not consider 
fully human or human in the same way as we are, and it is also easier to 
deny that the loss of such people is a real loss and therefore something 
that should be mourned. Violence against such people, Butler explains, 
‘leaves a mark that is no mark’ (36). This is a matter of the systematic 
erasure of those who do not qualify as fully human, an erasure which 
makes violence invisible to us, which convinces us that ‘there never 
was a human, there never was a life, and no murder has, therefore, ever 
taken place’ (147). In this sense, the prohibition on grieving prolongs the 
violence of killing, adding a new layer of brutality to the original brutality, 
so that we are caught up in a vicious cycle where some lives are deemed 
ungrievable because they are considered less than human and where, 
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conversely, some people are considered less than human because they are 
deemed ungrievable. On the one hand, the discourse of mourning ‘our’ 
losses can be exploited for nationalist purposes; on the other, the denial 
of ‘their’ losses aids in the dehumanisation of the other. The antidote to 
this is not just to shift our frames of perception so that we come to see 
those we do not usually see – and, then, perhaps, to mourn those we do 
not usually mourn – but also to alter the modalities of representation 
that portray some types of individuals (or groups) as inherently good and 
others as inherently evil. After all, when an individual is presented to us 
as a personification of evil, we find it difficult to identify with him or her, 
let alone recognise any trace of precariousness in him or her, which is 
why Butler argues that no understanding of humanisation can take place 
‘without a consideration of the conditions and meanings of identification 
and disidentification’ (145).
III
Basing an ethics on our capacity to identify with the suffering of 
others rather than, say, on a priori principles of human rights, carries 
some risks, the first of which is that the failings of identification are so 
endemic that such an ethics might end up being unacceptably erratic. 
Though I wholeheartedly agree with Butler’s contention that global 
power imbalances make it hard for Westerners to acknowledge the equal 
humanity of non-Westerners, I do not think that the matter is quite 
this simple, for if Americans have a hard time mourning the Iraqis and 
Afghans killed by the United States military, Iraqis and Afghans might 
also have a hard time mourning those who are far away from them, 
including each other. Butler suggests that we identify with the suffering 
of some people more than others because their names and faces are 
familiar to us in the sense of being culturally and ethnically similar to 
us, and undoubtedly this is true. But there are other ways that alliances 
based on familiarity are forged, ways that cut across cultural and ethnic 
differences. For instance, that my friend is black, my colleague is Chinese 
and my downstairs neighbour is Muslim does not change the fact that if 
this friend, colleague or neighbour is harmed or killed, I – a white atheist 
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woman – will mourn more intensely than I would mourn another white 
atheist woman harmed or killed somewhere in Sweden. In other words, 
there seems to be an important link between familiarity (and thus our 
ability to mourn), on the one hand, and intimacy, proximity and shared 
history, on the other, that is not necessarily in any way based on similarity 
of culture or ethnicity. From this perspective, the ability to mourn the 
other may be too haphazard, too random a basis for ethics.
The second risk that accompanies an ethics based on our ability to 
identify with the suffering of others is that it can replace political action 
with paralysing grief. Grief can be privatising, and thus potentially 
depoliticising, because it tends to result in a retreat from the social 
world. This retreat may, in part at least, be a defence against our own 
vulnerability, for grief reminds us of the immensity of our dependence 
on others: the fact that we can be undone by the loss of others highlights 
the flimsiness of our fantasies of sovereignty. Indeed, besides acute 
bodily suffering, there are few things in life that ‘interrupt’ the coherence 
of our being more than the anguish we feel when we have lost someone 
who feels irreplaceable to us. If desire, intimacy and sexuality already 
challenge our aspirations of autonomy, grief often results – at least 
momentarily – in the utter dissolution of the self. As Butler correctly 
remarks, we ‘cannot invoke the Protestant ethic when it comes to loss’ 
(Precarious Life 21); we cannot decide how the task of grieving is to be 
performed or when it is going to come to an end. Rather, we are forced 
to ride waves of sadness that mock our attempts at self-mastery, that call 
us back to prior experiences of dispossession. Some of these experiences 
relate to losses we can name, but, ultimately, what grief touches is the 
unnameable core of melancholia that connects us to our constitutive 
inability to attain closure (to disavow our dependence on others). Butler 
describes such melancholia as a kind of timeless enigma that ‘hides’ in 
each loss we mourn, as an indelible trace of a primary vulnerability that 
we can no longer access directly but that our losses touch indirectly. 
In a more Lacanian vein, one could say that every loss reanimates the 
primary loss – the loss of das Ding (the primordial non-object of desire) – 
that constitutes the melancholy core of our being. That is, when we lose 
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another person, we not only mourn that loss but we also mourn, with 
renewed energy, our own incompleteness, our own helplessness, even if 
we are not aware that this is what we are doing.
Butler asserts: ‘On one level, I think I have lost “you” only to discover 
that “I” have gone missing as well’ (22). This can be understood to mean 
that when I lose you, I no longer know who I am because who I am is so 
intimately tied to you that losing you makes me unintelligible to myself. 
But it can also be understood to mean that in losing you I have come up 
against melancholy realms of my being that I usually keep at bay through 
my efforts to lead a self-sufficient and reasonably organised existence. 
Butler implies that there are ethical lessons to be learned from such an 
encounter with the melancholy foundations of my being in the sense that 
my heightened sensitivity to my own precariousness leads (or should 
lead) to my heightened sensitivity to the precariousness of others. As she 
posits: ‘Despite our differences in location and history, my guess is that it 
is possible to appeal to a “we,” for all of us have some notion of what it is 
to have lost somebody. Loss has made a tenuous “we” of us all’ (20).
Unquestionably, this is a poignant way to characterise the solidarity 
of suffering. But would it not be equally possible to argue that 
melancholia might lead to the kind of preoccupation with the self – the 
kind of solipsistic turning inwards that excludes all others from the 
self ’s sacred crypt of sadness – that represents the very antithesis of 
ethical accountability? Melancholia, even more than mourning, fends off 
others; it sacrifices present and future objects for the sake of the one 
that has been lost. As Sigmund Freud already argued, the melancholic 
copes with his or her loss by incorporating the lost object into his or her 
psyche, thereby translating a loss in the external world into an internal 
possession, with the result that this psyche, for the time being, becomes 
closed to other objects. The memory of the lost object, as it were, crowds 
out the possibility of new affective ties, which is why, for instance, we 
find it hard to cathect to a new love object when we are still mourning 
a lost one. In this sense, while grief may well function as an ethical 
resource in the way that Butler suggests, the melancholia that grief 
awakens may pull us in the opposite direction, away from others, from 
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alterity, from the stimulation of new bonds. In addition, melancholia is 
difficult to translate into the vocabulary of ethical intervention because 
it arrests action; it is hard to get a depressed person out of bed, let alone 
into a political rally.
IV
Though grief may be a potent source of indignation, as an ethical resource 
it may also be somewhat unreliable precisely in so far as it conjures up 
the melancholy ghosts of our constitutive despair. Moreover, it would be 
relatively easy to stage a critique of Butler’s ethics of mourning akin to the 
one that Wendy Brown stages in relation to Western notions of tolerance, 
namely that mourning – like tolerance – can function as a distraction 
from political and economic solutions to global problems. In the same 
way that discourses of tolerance make us feel that we are accomplishing 
something when in fact nothing has changed in concrete terms, the 
ethics of mourning can obscure the fact that mourning by itself does not 
transform things. If anything, as long as we get to focus on our grief, we do 
not actually need to do anything; we can feel good about ourselves because 
we experience ourselves as benevolent Western subjects who feel the 
appropriate remorse about the suffering and death of those far away from 
us. One could even propose that Brown’s argument about tolerance being 
what the powerful extend to the disempowered – about how tolerance 
merely debases the tolerated even further – applies to grief as well in the 
sense that the objects of our grief may become all the more disempowered 
(pitiable, pathetic) by that grief.
Along similar lines, there might be an argument to be made about the 
potentially patronising implications of Butler’s insistence that Western 
subjects are somehow uniquely responsible for grieving those who are 
less fortunate. Though she does not state the matter in these terms 
exactly, the implication of much of her discussion of shared precarity is 
that it is the Western subject in particular who must develop the capacity 
to mourn the violated other. The non-Western subject is, in this model, 
invariably the one who is the more violated, the more victimised and 
therefore in need of ‘our’ grief, while we, the Westerners, do not deserve 
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the grief of non-Westerners but should, first and foremost, feel our guilt. 
There are of course excellent historical reasons for this line of reasoning. 
Obviously, the West should feel guilty about the colonial past and about 
the ways in which its ongoing aspirations of empire-building contribute 
directly to the suffering of non-Westerners. Yet there is also something 
questionable about the branding of the Western subject as one who is 
supposed to be racked by grief while it is the lot of the non-Westerner to 
be the suffering object of this grief. One could even say that, within this 
model, grief becomes the way in which Western subjects suffer. Does that 
mean that other forms of suffering have, once again, been relegated to 
the rest of the world (so that, say, they have their poverty while we have 
our grief)?
Yet Butler is also right in insisting that, under certain circumstances, 
grief can furnish a sense of political community, and that it can 
furthermore do so on a basis that is both more fundamental and more 
complex than mere identitarian identifications. If our goal is to transcend 
identity politics without thereby discarding our understanding of the 
reasons why various individuals and populations have sought shelter 
under identitarian labels (black, Muslim, queer and so on), then shared 
grief is a potentially powerful place to start. If I can get to the point where 
the other’s grief becomes my grief, then the other’s outrage about her 
oppression also becomes my outrage, with the consequence that I may 
be willing to overlook the differences between self and other to act on 
behalf of this other. There are alternative ways to arrive at the same place, 
and these include my rational assessment that the other has been unjustly 
treated, but Butler is correct in suggesting that there is something 
viscerally powerful about the grief we feel when the other’s vulnerability, 
particularly the other’s bodily vulnerability, has been exploited. Accounts 
of genocide, torture and rape, for instance, tend to move us even when 
we have no personal connection to the victims, which is precisely why 
Butler’s call for a rethinking of grievability as a foundation for alleviating 
the power imbalances of the global order strikes a chord, why her 
ethics of precarity makes such intuitive sense, why it is hard to deny 
her basic insight that ‘there can be no equal treatment without a prior 
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understanding that all lives have an equal right to be protected from 
violence and destruction’ (Parting Ways 21).
This is precisely why public acts of grieving are so important, why 
it is essential to see the pictures, to apprehend the names and faces of 
those who have been wounded even when these names and faces are not 
immediately familiar to us. Butler is right that the prohibition against 
mourning is the flipside of the derealisation of loss, of the indifference 
we are asked to display with respect to the other’s suffering or even death. 
Furthermore, even when it comes to losses that are avowed, that ‘count’, 
we are encouraged to mourn as expediently as we can, so as to leave no 
debilitating residue of sadness that might impede the nation’s general 
robustness, let alone interfere with capitalism’s demand for efficiency; we 
are urged to grieve quickly, to get back on our feet, to brush ourselves off, 
to get back on track, to get ‘back to business’. After a catastrophe, such as 
9/11, there is a haste to return the world to its previous order, whether 
by sending people back to work, by resorting to nationalist slogans of 
renewed prowess, or by staging flamboyant architectural competitions 
to prove technological (and, by implication, military) invincibility. In 
the Western world, money, the Protestant work ethic and extravagant 
displays of power are used to bandage the wounds of violence, to re-
establish the fantasy of being inviolable, beyond the reach of dangerous, 
‘irrational’ others. This is one reason Butler maintains that there might 
be ‘something to be gained from grieving, from tarrying with grief, from 
remaining exposed to its unbearability and not endeavoring to seek a 
resolution for grief through violence’ (Precarious Life 30).
V
I appreciate Butler’s claim that overcoming grief too quickly might 
eradicate one of our most important ethical resources. But I also want to 
note the masochistic tendencies of her ethics of precarity because these, 
in my view, complicate the task of theorising (not to mention attaining) 
social justice. Butler has always been quick to equate subjectivity with 
subjection (disempowerment), but the masochistic strain of her outlook 
has become acutely pronounced with her turn to Levinas, who famously 
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quotes Fyodor Dostoyevsky: ‘We are all guilty for everything and 
everyone, and I more than all the others’ (105). The obvious problem 
with this formulation is that it implies that I am responsible for the 
other regardless of what the other has done – that is, regardless of any 
normative considerations. This, indeed, is the crux of the Levinasian 
ethical attitude. However, Levinas does not stop here. He draws a clear 
distinction between ethics (where normative considerations have no place) 
and justice (which arbitrates between different ‘faces’ on the basis of a 
priori norms of right and wrong). Levinas, in short, recognises that justice 
places limits on our ethical accountability. Butler, in contrast, ignores for 
the most part the distinction between ethics and justice, attempting, as it 
were, to apply Levinasian ethics to questions of global justice. Moreover, 
undoubtedly in part because of her anti-Enlightenment poststructuralist 
predilections, she resists the ideal of a priori principles of justice, with the 
result that she sometimes speaks as if normative judgements had no place 
in her theory.
Levinas argues that our ethical responsibility for the other is 
unconditional and inescapable, that the other is inviolable and that, 
unfortunately for us, even the executioner, even the Nazi guard, has a 
face. We may feel tempted to attack such a face, but ethics demands that 
we resist this temptation. This seems reasonable: I do not take issue with 
the idea that I should not counter murder with murder, particularly given 
that, as I just stressed, Levinas maintains that it is the task of justice – as 
opposed to ethics – to mediate between different faces. The trouble begins 
when Butler translates this Levinasian (ethical) injunction into a general 
theoretical stance, which means that assigning responsibility – in the 
sense that normative justice strives to do – becomes virtually impossible. 
In this manner, Butler arguably – though no doubt unintentionally – 
shifts the burden of responsibility from the victimiser to the victim; after 
all, in the absence of normative judgements regarding the behaviour 
of the victimiser, what matters is not the content of this behaviour but 
rather the response (and responsibility) of the victim. As Butler, chillingly 
enough, writes in Precarious Life, ‘our responsibility is heightened once 
we have been subjected to the violence of others’ (16).
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Consider also the following statement from Parting Ways: ‘The 
responsibility that I must take for the Other proceeds directly from being 
persecuted and outraged by that Other. Thus there is violence in the 
relation from the start: I am claimed by the other against my will, and my 
responsibility for the Other emerges from this subjection’ (59, emphasis 
added). The basic idea here is that because the other ‘interrupts’ the 
coherence of my being, impeding my self-closure, I am, in a sense, always 
‘persecuted’ and ‘outraged’ by the other; yet because the other is always 
already an ingredient of my self, I cannot denounce my responsibility for 
this other. In this model, responsibility is the flipside of being impinged 
upon by the other in ways that sometimes feel persecuting and outrageous. 
As Butler reminds us, according to Levinas ‘precisely the Other who 
persecutes me has a face’ (Giving an Account 90). Consequently, ‘I cannot 
disavow my relation to the Other, regardless of what the Other does, 
regardless of what I might will’. Responsibility, in this sense, is ‘not a 
matter of cultivating a will, but of making use of an unwilled susceptibility 
as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other’: ‘Whatever the Other 
has done, the Other still makes an ethical demand upon me, has a “face” to 
which I am obliged to respond’ (91).
I understand why Butler’s appropriation of Levinasian ethics 
represents an effective critique of Enlightenment rationality, particularly 
of the individualistic pretensions of the autonomous subject, who – to 
borrow from Adriana Cavarero – is ‘too preoccupied with praising 
the rights of the I ’ (in Giving an Account 32). This critique, for good 
reasons, is longstanding in posthumanist theory. But does Butler’s 
version of it not swing too far to the other extreme, making a virtue out 
of masochism? Is there not, say, from a feminist perspective, something 
quite uncomfortable about the idea that I am responsible for others who 
violate me ‘against my will’? Along related lines, Butler’s critique of ‘the 
rights of the I’ tends to backfire whenever it comes up against accounts 
of extreme oppression, such as Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, 
which voice the need of a traumatised collectivity to re-establish its 
autonomy and self-determination in the face of subordination. Likewise, 
individual trauma narratives – such as Holocaust memoirs or chronicles 
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of rape – often emphasise that being able to recover a degree of agency 
is an essential part of surviving trauma. In other words, they reveal 
that the quest for sovereignty is not invariably a synonym for arrogant 
individualism. And they also illustrate the problematic nature of an 
ethics that operates wholly without norms, that asks us to sustain others 
indiscriminately, irrespective of how appallingly they might behave.
VI
More generally speaking, the problem with Butlerian theory is that 
it consistently sets up a rigid dichotomy between bad autonomy and 
good relationality. Indeed, one could say that this is an instance where a 
vehemently anti-essentialist thinker falls into the kind of poststructuralist 
essentialism where some possibilities – such as the idea that autonomy 
might sometimes be an important component of human life – become 
unthinkable. Butler often talks as if the fact that we are not fully 
autonomous creatures means that we have no capacity for autonomy 
whatsoever. Yet in the same way that having an unconscious does not 
erase the conscious mind but merely complicates its functioning, our 
lack of seamless autonomy does not render us completely devoid of it. 
Moreover, as Jessica Benjamin, among others, has illustrated, autonomy 
is not necessarily always the repugnant antithesis of relationality, so 
that Butler’s depiction of autonomy as intrinsically violent comes off 
as overly simplistic. Butler asserts that there is ‘no recentering of the 
subject without unleashing unacceptable sadism and cruelty’: ‘To remain 
decentered, interestingly, means to remain implicated in the death of the 
other and so at a distance from the unbridled cruelty … in which the self 
seeks to separate from its constitutive sociality and annihilate the other’ 
(Giving an Account 77).
I agree that self-assertion can take place at the expense of others. 
And I agree that the fantasy of sovereignty can promote contempt not 
only for others but also for alternative, more relational modalities of 
being. But I am not convinced that the subject who seeks to recentre 
itself is automatically sadistic and cruel, driven to annihilate the other. 
Indeed, looking back, one might ask whether feminism, the civil rights 
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movement, anticolonial struggles and resistance to apartheid would 
have been possible if those involved had decided that autonomy and self-
determination are inherently malevolent. Moreover, I wonder whether 
such initiatives would have been possible without a priori values such 
as freedom and equality – values that arguably hark back to the very 
Enlightenment that Butler tries so hard to bury.
Interestingly, Butler’s resistance to a priori values, even ones derived 
from the Enlightenment, dissipates in the context of her critique of Israeli 
state violence against Palestinians, for she argues that Palestinians have 
the right to basic rights, such as not to be dispossessed of land, due to 
their membership in a global human community. Regarding Palestine’s 
claim ‘to the lands that rightfully are its own’, Butler writes: ‘One could 
formulate the right in light of international law or on the basis of moral 
and political arguments that may or may not be framed within a specific 
version of the nation-state’ (Parting Ways 205). I agree with this stance: I 
also think that Palestinians should have basic human rights regardless of 
whether or not they belong to a nation-state. Yet there is nothing about 
Butler’s Levinasian vision that supports her sudden turn to the kind of 
liberal rights-based cosmopolitanism that can be traced, through Hannah 
Arendt, all the way back to Immanuel Kant. If Butler stayed faithful to 
her Levinasian approach, she would not be calling for equal rights for 
Palestinians but rather saying that self-preservation should not be a 
priority for them, that, indeed, there might be something profoundly 
unethical about their quest for sovereignty and self-determination. Butler 
makes a valiant effort to show that her cosmopolitanism is not the same as 
that of Kant by arguing that it is precarity rather than the integrity of the 
autonomous self that is the foundation for equal rights. But this does not 
change the fact that, in this instance, she falls back on the very system of 
Enlightenment morality that she has spent much of her career criticising, 
so that all of a sudden equal rights are all the rage. One could of course 
argue that the Enlightenment does not own the ideal of equal rights, that 
it is possible to think about equal rights beyond their humanistic context, 
as Jacques Derrida does when he claims that ‘what remains irreducible 
to any deconstruction’ is ‘an idea of justice – which we distinguish from 
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law or right and even from human rights – and an idea of democracy – 
which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined 
predicates today’ (74). But Derrida’s elusive definition of justice and 
democracy is not what Butler is working with when she, in a Kantian 
vein, calls for international laws that recognise the rights of individuals 
not on the basis of their attachment to nation-states but rather on the 
basis of their humanity.
It seems to me that Butler cannot have it both ways. If she is going 
to recoil from any mention of the Enlightenment, as she consistently 
does, then she cannot use its values whenever these happen to suit her 
political purposes. Nor is it true that we can simply just discard a priori 
normative limits. There are situations where all of our talk about human 
precariousness will not get us very far, where normative judgements are 
indispensable. One of the limitations of posthumanist theory is that it 
places so much emphasis on deconstructing normativity that it tends to 
forget that while there certainly are normative limits we need to criticise 
and transgress, there are others we need to endorse and treasure. As 
Dominick LaCapra explains with his characteristic levelheadedness, 
there are some normative limits ‘you might want to place in question, 
some you may want to reform, and others you may want to test critically 
and perhaps validate’ (154). That is, not all normative limits are diabolical: 
there are some that are by far the best (or even the only) way to check the 
abuses of power. There are times when we need to make decisions about 
right and wrong, and to act accordingly. Whether we are talking about a 
man aiming his gun at Norwegian youth, or about a dictator aiming his 
genocidal rage at segments of his own population, we need universally 
applicable principles – normative limits – and the fact that we might 
never be able to agree fully on their parameters does not diminish the 
urgency of our desperate need for them.
Nor is there any reason to reject a priori norms, as many poststructuralist 
thinkers seem to do, on the basis that they are metaphysically founded, 
for it is perfectly possible to derive a set of a priori principles from 
provisional social agreements – agreements that remain open to constant 
re-evaluation and revision. As the feminist philosopher Amy Allen has 
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argued persuasively, a priori norms are always historically specific in the 
sense that they arise in particular social contexts. This, however, does not 
mean that they are invariably worthless; that is, the loss of metaphysical 
foundations for our normative systems does not automatically invalidate 
them but merely reveals their historicity. Any a priori set of principles, 
Allen explains, is by definition ‘our historical a priori’, yet rejecting such 
principles wholesale ‘would mean surrendering intelligibility’ (35).
VII
Butler’s resistance to normative limits explains, in part at least, her 
conflicted attitude towards the universal implications of her ethics of 
precarity. As I have emphasised, one of the strengths of this ethics is that 
it offers a universally applicable ethical paradigm that is grounded not 
in Enlightenment notions of sovereignty but rather in a social ontology 
that foregrounds human relationality and vulnerability. As we have seen, 
Butler explicitly acknowledges the universal reach of her paradigm: the 
fact that precariousness is a generalisable condition of human life. Yet 
her relationship to this universality is ambivalent, even reluctant, no 
doubt because it is difficult to talk about universality in the context of 
ethics without raising the very spectres of Enlightenment rationality and 
Western imperialism that she is trying to outwit. This ambivalence is 
particularly manifest in Parting Ways, where Butler performs an awkward 
retraction of her earlier rhetoric of generalisability by claiming that her 
emphasis on shared human precariousness is a matter of pluralisation 
rather than universalisation. Under pluralisation, she writes, ‘Equal 
protection or, indeed, equality is not a principle that homogenizes those 
to whom it applies; rather, the commitment to equality is a commitment 
to the process of differentiation itself ’ (126). Speaking of suffering 
specifically, Butler adds that, unlike universalisation, pluralisation 
recognises that even though all of us are defenceless against suffering, 
any given experience of suffering is so unique that the attempt to 
compare various forms of suffering is bound to founder. If, as I noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, Butler’s earlier work included a sustained 
effort to navigate the tension between universality and singularity, she 
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now presents this tension as more or less insurmountable: ‘If we start 
with the presumption that one group’s suffering is like another group’s, 
we have not only assembled the groups into provisional monoliths – and 
so falsified them – but we have launched into a form of analogy building 
that will invariably fail ’ (128, emphases added).
Butler’s ambivalence about using the trope of universalism in 
Parting Ways is understandable, for in this text – which includes the 
aforementioned critique of Israeli state violence against Palestinians – 
she is walking a tightrope between arguing, on the one hand, that the 
Jewish history of exile, violation and dispossession should yield insight 
into the experiences of exile, violation and dispossession of others, 
including the Palestinians, and insisting, on the other, that we should 
not conflate these two experiences. In other words, however critical 
Butler is of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians (and she is very 
critical), she wants to make absolutely sure that she cannot be accused of 
claiming that these policies are akin to Hitler’s National Socialism; she 
obviously does not want to imply that ‘Zionism is like Nazism or is its 
unconscious repetition with Palestinians standing in for the Jews’ (29). 
One can certainly understand why the context of her discussion calls 
for repeated disclaimers about strict analogies, and why it therefore 
complicates the discourse of generalisability that she has used more 
freely in her earlier books. The rhetorical challenges of Butler’s analysis 
in this text are formidable because she does not want to downplay the 
specificity of the Nazi genocide, yet she seeks to build a model of political 
responsibility that would recognise convergent modes of dispossession; 
she wishes to acknowledge that ‘there are historically specific modalities 
of catastrophe that cannot be measured or compared by any common 
or neutral standard’ (29), yet she also strives to leap from one history of 
oppression to another. As she maintains: ‘In thinking about the history 
of the oppressed, it seems imperative to recognize that such a history can 
and does apply to any number of people in ways that are never strictly 
parallel and tend to disrupt easy analogies’ (100). Butler, in short, wishes 
to translate divergent experiences of suffering into claims about justice 
without thereby implying that the experiences in question are equivalent.
THE ETHICS OF PRECARITY
111
I understand why Butler insists that histories of dispossession can 
be convergent without being equivalent. I agree with her resistance to 
the kind of universalisation that erases important distinctions. And I 
would never endorse an ethical model where one history of suffering 
would negate another, where the specificity of suffering would be lost. 
Yet there is also something unconvincing about Butler’s sudden attempt 
to replace universalisation with pluralisation, and particularly about 
her claim that, when it comes to experiences of suffering, analogies will 
‘invariably fail’. Given that the ability to draw analogies between different 
forms of suffering constitutes the very crux of her ethics of precarity, it 
is difficult to see how this ethics can survive the collapse of this ability. If 
anything, it seems that this collapse would instantly undermine the most 
radical potential of Butler’s ethics, namely its ability to compete with 
other universalising paradigms, such as transcendental Enlightenment 
ones. Nor does Butler’s hesitation about universalism seem theoretically 
necessary, for drawing an analogy does not cancel out the distinctiveness 
of the entities being compared. As Butler herself postulates in Precarious 
Life: ‘When analogies are offered, they presuppose the separability of the 
terms that are compared. But any analogy also assumes a common ground 
for comparability, and in this case the analogy functions to a certain 
degree by functioning metonymically’ (72). Exactly. If I draw an analogy 
by saying that you and I both have two eyes, this does not mean that our 
eyes are therefore identical: my eyes will still be blue while yours will still 
be brown. But what is important is the understanding that if someone 
throws acid in our eyes, we will both scream. Likewise, if I say that bodily 
vulnerability is something that you and I share, I do not mean to suggest 
that we experience this vulnerability in the same way.
A universalist ethics of precarity does not demand a similarity of 
experiences but merely that we are able to recognise points of contact 
between different experiences. Let us recall that even the most banal 
forms of universalism, such as the liberal rhetoric of ‘different but equal’, 
do not ask that we all have the same experiences but merely that – as 
human beings – we possess the capacity to recognise the correspondences, 
the often quite abstract resemblances, between different experiences. 
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When it comes to suffering, for instance, universalism does not presume 
that my suffering is like yours but merely that I am able to draw a 
parallel between your suffering and mine. In this sense, Butler’s fear that 
universalisation is intrinsically homogenising seems somewhat misplaced, 
and in fact directly contradicts her own statements elsewhere in Parting 
Ways, such as the following: ‘It is only possible to struggle to alleviate 
the suffering of others if I am both motivated and dispossessed by my 
own suffering’ (127). Likewise, Butler explicitly posits that one history 
of suffering provides ‘the conditions of attunement to another such 
history’, so that ‘one finds the condition of one’s own life in the life of 
another where there is dependency and differentiation, proximity and 
violence’ (130). I have already expressed my reservations about the idea 
that ethics should be based on something as unreliable as my capacity to 
be moved by the suffering of others. But if such an ethics is going to work 
at all, we must presuppose that the common experience of precariousness 
provides a grounds for translating from one experience to another in 
ways that open to a degree of universalization, that though each human 
life is unique, there is a kernel of sameness that makes identification (and 
therefore ethical indignation, outrage and action) possible.
VIII
This attempt to sort out the relationship between the universal and the 
particular, the generalisable and the singular, the potentially equivalent 
and the unique, surfaces strongly in the context of the concept of 
global apartheid that the editors of this volume foreground in their 
introduction. Like the relationship between Israel and Palestine on 
which Butler focuses, South African apartheid is one of the sorest spots 
in recent world history, frequently discussed with an emphasis on its 
exceptionality. Can it, then, be raised to an emblem of racism, inequality, 
suffering and poverty outside its original context? Can analogies be drawn 
between its oppressions and more global oppressions without losing 
the distinctiveness of the South African experience? Achille Mbembe 
seems to believe so when he remarks that the student protests that have 
recently rocked South African campuses ‘can be felt afar, in a different 
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idiom, in those territories of abandonment where the violence of poverty 
and demoralization have become the norm’. Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri suggest the same when they assert, in Multitude, that in ‘the global 
Empire today, as it was before in South Africa, apartheid is a productive 
system of hierarchical inclusion that perpetuates the wealth of the few 
through the labor and poverty of the many’ (166–167).
The volume editors find much that is productive about such attempts 
to draw comparisons, not least because they recognise that insisting on 
the specificity of South African apartheid makes it all too easy for Western 
powers to disavow oppression on their own doorstep, to insist that 
systematic segregation is not a problem ‘over here’ – say, in the United 
States – in the same way as it is ‘over there’. The emphasis on global 
apartheid is effective in rendering this type of disavowal impossible. At 
the same time, the editors point to an important pitfall in drawing the 
analogy between South Africa and global apartheid too carelessly, namely 
that this can enable the global West to use South Africa as a screen upon 
which to project its optimistic fantasy that since apartheid was dismantled 
in South Africa, it can also be easily dismantled globally. The editors note 
that such a fantasy is particularly pernicious in light of the fact that the end 
of South African apartheid coincided ‘with South Africa’s entry into the 
neoliberal order of global capitalism’ (15). Even though this state of affairs 
merely rearticulates some of the very pillars of inequality upon which 
apartheid was built, it is expedient for supporters of neoliberalism who 
wish to promote global capitalism as an antidote to the world’s problems, 
including the problems of ‘global apartheid’. This is why the editors reject 
the kind of facile globalisation of apartheid that allows the West to engage 
in hypocritical gestures of self-critique without actually doing anything 
to alleviate global inequalities. Instead, the editors advance a concept of 
global apartheid that acknowledges that apartheid ‘stretched back to the 
dawn of modernity and to the beginning of European colonialism’. In 
other words, if it is convenient for Western powers to think of apartheid 
as a malaise that started in South Africa and has now somehow suddenly 
spread to the rest of the world, the editors ask us to admit that global 
apartheid reaches back at least as far as René Descartes and ‘the division, 
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the separateness, the apartness, of mind and body, and the subjection of 
body to mind that he inaugurates’ (18).
Though the volume editors find the Marxist approach of Hardt and 
Negri more palatable than its neoliberal counterpart, this approach is also 
not without its problems, for the image of the multitude that underpins 
it – the image of an unruly but potentially revolutionary swarm of people 
from all walks of life – could be accused of being falsely universalising in 
the sense that it appears more open to difference than it actually is. Hardt 
and Negri portray the multitude as a mesh of singularities that come 
together for political purposes. This is an inspiring vision. Unfortunately, 
in their haste to transcend the categorisation of people by race, class, 
gender and so on, Hardt and Negri do what other Marxist critics, such 
as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, have also done: they move directly 
from the level of singularity – the unique individual – to the level of 
universality without pausing at the level of the particular. In a different 
context (see Ruti), I have argued that the cost of doing so is to lose track 
of the fact that the particularity of subject positions can impede the 
access of certain individuals to the universal (in this case, the multitude). 
It is not that people necessarily want to be categorised according to race, 
class, gender and so on. But they cannot avoid external perceptions that 
insist on this categorisation, with the result that some of them may find 
it harder than others to enter the multitude. For instance, I can well 
imagine that the politicised multitude welcomes the figure of a male 
revolutionary (a familiar Marxist figure) more eagerly than the figure of 
a South African female farmer. This is why the editors are right to argue 
that it is not enough to posit, as Hardt and Negri do, that, when it comes 
to the composition of the multitude, ‘no one is necessarily excluded but 
their inclusion is not guaranteed’ (226). The editors are correct to insist 
that in the context of envisioning ways to defeat global apartheid, the 
inclusion of the subaltern is politically non-negotiable.
Because singularities always – and sometimes against their will – 
participate in particular groupings of identity, a theory of the multitude 
that fails to account for the ways in which some singularities are by 
default excluded from this multitude does not reach far enough. This, 
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of course, is the reason Butler resists universalisation. As I hope to 
have demonstrated, I agree with her hesitation – to a point. I certainly 
agree that we need to remain keenly cognisant of the fact that some 
individuals and populations remain much more acutely precarious 
than others and therefore potentially marginalised by attempts to build 
generalisable platforms for collective action. Even so, I believe that 
remaining too cautious about drawing analogies between different sites 
of oppression leads to the kind of theoretical and political paralysis that 
today’s world cannot afford. I suppose I would rather take the risk of 
levelling some distinctions than of not being able to discern any points 
of correspondence at all. The latter predicament makes it too easy for 
the world’s powers that be – as well as for ordinary citizens – to deny 
oppressions that are taking place in their own backyard at the same time 
as it impedes the formation of global solidarities. The promise of such 
solidarities is why I find the concept of global apartheid theoretically 
and politically auspicious. It seems to me that the editors sum up the 
conundrum at hand perfectly when they state: ‘The knot in the concept 
of global apartheid is that apartheid both must and yet cannot be detached 
from South Africa; it is necessary that apartheid be detached from South 
Africa and, at the same time, impossible to fully detach it, leaving an 
untranslatable remainder’ (21–22). I view this impasse not as a site of 
paralysis but rather as a potential opening towards ‘justice to come’ (à 
la Derrida).
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CHAPTER 5
HANNAH ARENDT’S WORK OF MOURNING:  
THE POLITICS OF LOSS, ‘THE RISE OF THE 
SOCIAL’ AND THE ENDS OF APARTHEID
Jaco Barnard-Naudé
No revolution has ever solved the ‘social question’ and liberated men from 
the predicament of want, but all revolutions … have followed the example 
of the French Revolution and used and misused the mighty forces of 
misery and destitution in their struggle against tyranny and oppression 
(Arendt, On Revolution 112).
Politicization, for example, is interminable, even if it cannot and should 
not ever be total (Derrida, ‘Force of Law’ 971).
The ‘rise of the social’ constitutes the demise of politics and yet there is 
a politics that rises from these ashes – a politics occasioned, precisely, 
by the emergence of the social question as inaugurating a particular 
kind of loss. This politics of loss is a politics of the social. Following 
the work of Hannah Arendt, I accept the twofold contention that ‘loss 
is not only constituted by, but is constitutive of, the social’ (Truscott, 
Van Bever Donker & Minkley 1). I begin with Arendt’s definition of 
the social question as what ‘we may better and more simply call the 
existence of poverty’ (On Revolution 60). I continue to follow her in her 
argument that the loss at stake, as the constituted/constitutive loss that 
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marks the ‘rise of the social’, is the loss of politics. However, I take my 
leave of Arendt to the extent that I argue that she, unwittingly perhaps, 
politicises the rise of the social precisely through her mourning for the 
loss of politics.
The thesis as regards the politics of loss as a politics of the social, read 
in the light of Arendt’s definition of the social as the question of poverty, 
should not be taken to imply an argument that the loss of politics is 
somehow responsible for the existence of material poverty, for it is hardly 
the case that the factual existence of scarcity and poverty through the ages 
is or was caused by the loss of the particular kind of politics that Arendt 
considered invaluable. Yet, at the same time, in an age marked by what 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe have called the ‘retreat of 
the political’ (122) and Slavoj Žižek, with reference to Giorgio Agamben, 
‘post-political’ biopolitics (‘A Permanent Economic Emergency’ 92), the 
possibility of a retrieval of politics depends, to an ever-increasing extent, 
on a concern with the factual existence of poverty.
In this regard, it seems that the supreme symptom of our postpolitical 
age, the rootstock of all social antagonisms of the era, lies ultimately 
in the fundamentally unequal distribution of this factual existence of 
poverty – a condition which is increasingly being (but has by no means 
only recently been) described as ‘global apartheid’ (Bond 5).1 Already in 
1978, Gernot Köhler published an article in which he showed that the 
structure of apartheid South Africa was markedly similar to that of global 
society. He thus defined ‘global apartheid’ as follows:
a structure of world society which combines socioeconomic and racial 
antagonisms and in which (i) a minority of whites occupies the pole of 
affluence, while a majority composed of other races occupies the pole 
of poverty; (ii) social integration of the two groups is made extremely 
difficult by barriers of complexion, economic position, political 
boundaries, and other factors; (iii) economic development of the two 
groups is interdependent; (iv) the affluent white minority possesses a 
disproportionately large share of world society’s political, economic, and 
military power (266).
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Recently, Žižek drew attention to the segregationist dimension of 
globalisation when he pointed out with reference to Peter Sloterdijk that 
‘capitalist globalization not only stands for openness, conquest, but also 
for a self-enclosed globe separating the Inside from the Outside’ (Trouble 
in Paradise 63). ‘Global apartheid’, however, does not simply refer to 
increasing levels of welfare inequality in our ‘postmodern’ societies. Rather, 
it is the name of a very specific (post-)political system of rule at the level 
of the planetary – a system which incorporates the newly authoritarian 
political conditions (dictated by supra-sovereign institutions like the 
World Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) 
by way of which the hegemony of neoliberal market consumerism, the 
so-called great ‘leveller’, is perpetuated and entrenched in these societies 
(see Aitkenhead).
It is against this backdrop that Jacques Derrida could open his seminal 
Specters of Marx with the following words:
One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of 
Apartheid can always be treated as a metonymy. In its past as well as in 
its present. By diverse paths (condensation, displacement, expression, 
or representation), one can always decipher through its singularity 
so many other kinds of violence going on in the world. At once part, 
cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what takes 
place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest  
to home (xv).
Taken with Derrida’s earlier insistence in ‘Racism’s Last Word’ that 
apartheid is untranslatable, the elevation of ‘Apartheid’ to the level of a 
signifier that pertains to a ‘global’ condition means that it has nevertheless 
moved beyond the irreducible territorial specificity of its coinage. In this 
sense ‘Apartheid’ always will have been an exemplar of what Georg W.F. 
Hegel called a concrete universal. It is in recognition of the losses that 
humanity as a whole suffers, as well as in the hope of a retrieval of what 
has been lost as a result of this concrete ‘universality’ of ‘apartheid’, that 
I revisit Arendt’s critique of the social question.
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My argument holds that Arendt’s identification of poverty as, specifically, 
the social question should be of primary concern to us (see On Revolution). 
It is Arendt’s argument that the social question encroached detrimentally 
upon the terrain of politics ‘proper’ when its solution became a matter 
of politics, when we attempted ‘to liberate mankind from poverty by 
political means’ (114). This, she argues in The Human Condition, is the case 
because the social question struck at what she considered to be the very 
heart of politics: plurality. The social question struck politics in this way 
by changing the imagery of the historical process as a revolving motion, 
to the biological imagery which sees ‘a multitude – the factual plurality 
of a nation or a people or society – in the image of one supernatural body 
driven by one superhuman, irresistible, “general will” ’ (60).
I will make the case for an understanding that Arendt’s work does mourn 
for the loss of this politics grounded in plurality. In this sense alone can 
it be said that Arendt’s position on the social is melancholic or ‘nostalgic’. 
I continue to argue that Arendt’s position on the social is, nevertheless, 
a political one, one that still makes politics responsive to and responsible 
for the social question, and this means that her position is not simply or 
‘properly’ melancholic. In short, by way of the very ‘political’ antagonism 
that Arendt adopts towards the social question, she politicises the latter. 
This leads to the conclusion that Arendt adopts a transformative position 
in relation to politics. As such, her political philosophy on the subject is 
better characterised as its own particular work of mourning. I use the word 
‘mourning’ here in its Derridean sense, as opposed to the sense in which 
Sigmund Freud used it in his early work to signify the overcoming of 
melancholia.
Following Andrew Schaap’s assertion that ‘how politics is distinguished 
from the non-political is always a political question’ (167), I argue that, 
precisely because Arendt’s philosophy of the social is its own work of 
politics, it is unnecessarily reductive to read her work as no more than a 
nostalgic yearning for politics in the ancient sense. I particularly oppose 
Emilios Christodoulidis’s contention that Arendt’s work on the social 
leaves the political ‘gloriously vacuous’ (515). Arendt certainly describes 
very carefully a certain loss in relation to the political – a loss that occurred 
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contemporaneously with the ‘rise of the social’. But far from a glorious 
evacuation, I claim that this description, this genealogy of loss, 
constitutes itself politically as a work of mourning. While Arendt 
certainly does not use the term ‘mourning’ explicitly, the very fact that 
she takes up the decline of politics as correspondent with the rise of the 
social means that she constitutes the rise of the social as a political work 
of mourning.
In the late thought of Derrida, there repeatedly occurs an argument 
that mourning is an intensely political activity. As a result, an 
encounter with Derrida’s thinking on the work of mourning becomes 
indispensable, both in terms of approaching Arendt’s work on the 
social and characterising it as political work. One of the key features 
of Derrida’s work on mourning is its disruption of the early Freudian 
distinction between mourning and melancholia (see ‘Fors’ and Memoires 
for Paul de Man). This disruption, I will argue, is what enables Derrida to 
arrive at the conclusion that mourning is political through and through. 
The implication of this reading of Derrida alongside Arendt will be an 
understanding that Arendt’s mourning for politics engages politics, as 
I’ve already mentioned, in a transformative way. What this means, in 
essence, is that Arendt keeps intact the ontological distinction between 
the realm of politics and the domain of the social, while she recognises 
the admission of the social to political consideration – though without 
positing the (to her mind inappropriate) solution of the social question 
as such – as a task for politics. It is at the level of the ‘solution’ that 
Arendt was always sceptical about what politics can or should be asked 
to do. Arendt believed politics to be entirely incapable of resolving the 
existence of poverty. But contrary to how some commentators have 
read her, she also did not believe that politics could somehow be kept 
insulated from the social question. That is why she distinguishes, in 
the epigraph quoted above, between solution, ‘use’ and ‘misuse’. In the 
end, Arendt redraws the social as a work of politics and as a work of 
mourning. I will conclude by briefly relating the implications of this 
work of mourning to the question of transformation in ‘postapartheid’ 
South Africa.
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The rise of the social and the loss(es) 
of politics
Arendt characterises the emergence of society as the ‘rise of housekeeping’. 
With the ‘emergence’ of society she means the passing of matters of the 
household – ‘the activities of sheer survival’ (The Human Condition 46) – 
from the private sphere into the ‘light of the public sphere’ (38). Her 
contention is that this passage has blurred the distinction between the 
private and the political and thereby has changed the meanings of the 
terms as well as their significance for the life of ‘the individual and the 
citizen’: ‘Since the rise of society, since the admission of the household 
and housekeeping activities to the public realm, an irresistible tendency 
to grow, to devour the older realms of the political and private as well 
as the more recently established sphere of intimacy, has been one of the 
most outstanding characteristics of the new realm’ (45).
It is important for our purposes to emphasise that Arendt explicitly 
distinguished the homogenising or ‘levelling’ imperatives of the social 
from the political principle of ‘equality among peers’ (40). The difference 
between the two lies in the views they take on plurality. Whereas the 
principle of political equality among peers continues to value and 
protect plurality, society insists on conformist action and homogeneity 
of opinion – an insistence that was originally based in the patriarchal 
household. The decline of this family arrangement caused the absorption 
of the family unit into the social and its groupings, characterised by a 
‘kind of no-man rule’ (39) and a principle of equality based on uniformity 
of interest and opinion.
The form of government that emerges from this shift of the family 
to society is bureaucracy – a form of mass administration and rule by 
nobody. In the context of the French Revolution, Arendt remarks:
Since the revolution had opened the gates of the political realm to 
the poor, this realm had indeed become ‘social’. It was overwhelmed 
by the cares and worries which actually belonged in the sphere of the 
household and which, even if they were permitted to enter the public 
realm, could not be solved by political means, since they were matters of 
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administration, to be put into the hands of experts, rather than issues 
which could be settled by the twofold process of decision and persuasion 
(91, emphasis added).
The rise of mass society, in turn, signifies that ‘the social rather than 
the political’ (43) now constituted the public realm, and this movement 
corresponded with the victory of equality-as-uniformity in the modern 
world where distinction and difference have become matters of the 
‘intimate’ and the individual. This equality is ‘in every respect different 
from equality in antiquity’ (41) where the public realm was permeated by 
an agonistic spirit among equals according to which everybody constantly 
had to distinguish themselves from their peers through action and speech.2 
It was in the public realm that men could exhibit their individuality and 
irreplaceability and, for such a public realm to exist, men had initially to 
come together as equals in their difference.
If bureaucracy marked the victory of the social in governmental affairs, 
the rise of economics and statistics (the study of ‘behaviour’) marked that 
victory in the realm of the social sciences. For Arendt, economics by its 
very nature could only emerge as a science when individuals became 
social beings ‘and unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior’ 
(42), so that the exception could be characterised as asocial or abnormal. 
And this application of the law of large numbers and long periods 
marked the ‘wilful obliteration’ (42) of the very thing that makes the 
study of history and politics meaningful: acts and events. In the end, the 
victory of economics, statistics and behavioural sciences indicates that 
man’s animality as a species-being (his ‘one-ness’) has paradoxically and 
alarmingly been elevated to the level of distinction: ‘through society it is 
the life process itself which in one form or another has been channeled 
into the public realm’ (45).3
It should be clear from the above that for Arendt, the social, when it 
‘burst’ into the public realm, constituted a series of losses from the point 
of view of authentic politics. The most significant of these was, from the 
ontological point of view, ‘the conditio sine qua non and the conditio 
per quam’ of all politics – plurality – as the expression of the principle 
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that ‘we are all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is 
ever the same as anyone else’ (8). At the experiential level, the loss of 
plurality triggered the decline of the experience of action, an experience 
that embodied par excellence the principle of spontaneity and distinction 
through excellence. The loss of plurality and action, then, meant for 
Arendt a decline in the very worldliness of Man.
In Arendtian terms, the rise of the social as a loss of plurality and of 
action necessarily meant a loss of freedom (as opposed to liberty). This is 
the case, because Arendt harboured a deeply positive notion of freedom. By 
linking freedom to appearance and the public realm, Arendt insisted that 
‘the raison d’etre of politics is freedom and its field of experience is action’ 
(in Arendt & Kohn 145). From this point of view, Arendt’s conception of 
freedom is positive in that it posits the presence of the human being with 
others (appearance) as the precondition for action, in contradistinction to 
the negative idea of freedom as an absence, namely of constraint (which 
others represent). Arendt makes it clear in her meditation on revolution 
that the French Revolution started out in the name of freedom but, 
because it came to consider liberation from the necessity and want of 
the life process as the overarching end of the revolution, it ended in the 
supreme violence of terror, which in itself marked a profound loss of the 
political concept of power as acting-in-concert.
But Arendt did not simply describe or report these losses that were 
occasioned by the existence of poverty politically formulated as the 
social question. My claim is that she mourned these losses and that this 
mourning itself constituted a politics or a political work. As Hanna 
Pitkin puts it with reference to the political experiences that Arendt 
held dear: ‘She regarded these experiences and activities as the most 
valuable available to human beings, called them our “lost treasure”, and 
tried to restore our access to the full significance of these words so that 
we might also recover the corresponding forms of life’ (1). If Pitkin’s 
description is taken as valid, then a certain diagnosis imposes itself: 
Arendt argued that humanity suffered a tremendous loss at the hands of 
the rise of the social. Yet it is precisely by recognising and accepting this 
loss (‘moving on’ from it) that she was able to work towards a certain 
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‘restoration’ of our access to the political experiences and activities that 
were lost. By taking up that task again and again, she mourned the loss 
of politics politically. It is to such politics as the work of mourning that 
I turn below.
Mourning and melancholia
The argument of this chapter depends to a critical extent on an 
understanding that politics ‘is’ the work of mourning (for the social). 
I want to attempt now to justify this contention with reference to 
the ‘traditional’ psychoanalytic account of the relationship between 
melancholia and mourning, questioned as it is by Derrida’s rereading of 
Freudian mourning.
In the early work of Freud, the distinction between melancholia 
and mourning takes place by way of an identification of melancholia as 
a pathology and mourning as a ‘normal affect’ (203). Melancholia and 
mourning describe psychic responses and/or reactions to the experiences 
of loss: ‘of a beloved person or an abstraction taking the place of the 
person, such as fatherland, freedom, an ideal and so on’ (203). Freud 
thus describes melancholia as ‘a profoundly painful depression, a loss of 
interest in the outside world, the loss of the ability to love, the inhibition 
of any kind of performance and a reduction in the sense of self ’ (204). 
Mourning is distinguished from melancholia by one trait, namely that 
the ‘disorder of self-esteem is absent’ (204). And this is the case because, 
as Freud famously puts it: ‘In mourning, the world has become poor and 
empty, in melancholia it is the ego that has become so’ (206). Melancholia, 
quite simply, represents a loss of ego, mourning a loss of the love object.
Melancholia corresponds with the process of incorporation: I identify 
with the object lost in reality in such a way that I deny its loss. I interiorise 
it in such a way that I keep it alive in me, refuse to release my libidinal 
investment in it and, consequently, refuse to mourn the lost object 
as lost because, for me, it is not ‘really’ lost. Moreover, the paradox of 
incorporation is that, by refusing to accept the actual death of the lost 
love object, I do not keep the dead alive in me. In other words, the tragedy 
of incorporation is that the ego refuses to mourn: ‘I pretend to keep the 
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dead alive, intact, safe (save) inside me, but it is only in order to refuse, in a 
necessarily equivocal way, to love the dead as a living part of me, dead save in 
me, through the process of introjection, as happens in so-called “normal” 
mourning’ (Derrida, ‘Fors’ 71, emphasis added). As Derrida so pointedly 
remarks: ‘Incorporation is a kind of theft to reappropriate the pleasure-
object’ (72).
Whereas melancholic incorporation, then, is failed introjection, 
introjection proper is associated with mourning, because in introjection 
the libidinal investment in the object is withdrawn and the object is 
interiorised in such a way that it does not become a living part of the 
ego. ‘Where the process of mourning works through loss and allows us to 
move on to form new attachments and re-engage with life, melancholia 
thwarts our re-engagement with life; it leaves us paralysed in the loss, 
closes off the future and prevents us from moving on’ (Walker 116). The 
melancholic state is accompanied by grief, nostalgia and always ‘the 
feeling of loss – a loss of direction ensuing from the collapse of a project 
or horizon for action’ (Arditi 81).
In his later work, Freud thought of melancholia as the resurrection of 
the lost object within the ego as a signal contribution to ego formation. 
As Tammy Clewell puts it, Freud comes to realise that it is only through 
internalisation of the lost object through ‘bereaved identification’ that the 
subject becomes as such: ‘Freud collapses the strict opposition between 
mourning and melancholia, making melancholy identification integral 
to the work of mourning’ (61). The outcome of this revision of the 
distinction between melancholia and mourning is that grief work may 
well be interminable.
In the wake of this shift in Freud’s thinking, Derrida’s rereading of 
Freud and of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok departs from and 
further complicates the original distinction between mourning and 
melancholia, introjection and incorporation. Whereas the change that 
Freud made to the original distinction addresses the fundamental (and 
possibly interminable) nature of melancholic incorporation, his theory 
still relies on the incorporation of the lost object into the self through 
identification. In other words, melancholic incorporation has the effect 
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of a denial of the otherness of the Other (Clewell). In his foreword to 
Abraham and Torok (The Wolf Man’s Magic Word), Derrida writes:
the question could of course be raised as to whether or not ‘normal’ 
mourning preserves the object as other (a living person dead) inside 
me. This question – of the general appropriation and safekeeping of the 
other as other – can always be raised as the deciding factor, but does it 
not at the same time blur the very line it draws between introjection and 
incorporation, through an essential and irreducible ambiguity (‘Fors’ 71)?
In his approach to mourning, Derrida retains the later Freudian notion 
that mourning is constitutive of the self, but he adds that mourning also 
constitutes the relation with the Other (Kirkby). This leads Derrida to 
adopt a different idea of incorporation, one in which, in order to mourn 
the Other as such, incorporation must always fail: ‘The incorporation 
should not be total, and in that case, of course, the Other remains foreign 
in myself, it remains Other, it doesn’t become part of myself ’ (in Kirkby 
466). And this means that mourning proper is impossible.
Mourning, if there is such a thing, is always failed mourning 
(impossible) and as such interminable. There is no mourning that is not 
always already also melancholic. One of the implications of this addition 
of the relation with the Other through failed incorporation is that the 
nature of mourning involves necessary failure, because for Derrida, 
without such a failure there can be no relationship to the Other. Mourning 
is impossible because the one (the Other) who is lost is both within us but 
also beyond us, unreachable – ‘nothing we say of or to them can touch 
them in their infinite alterity’ (Derrida, The Work of Mourning 11). Yet, 
fidelity to the Other consists in mourning and so is worked out – at least 
initially – in the interiorisation of the dead Other, in the necessity of an 
interiorisation that is at once impossible. In this sense, ‘the possibility of 
the impossible commands here the whole rhetoric of mourning’ (Derrida, 
Memoires for Paul de Man 34). Inevitably and according to this logic, the 
interiorisation of loss must fail and, as Derrida puts it, interiorisation must 
‘fail well’ in order for mourning to be successful (The Work of Mourning  
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144), in order to be faithful to the Other. If mourning is simply successful 
it would amount to an introjection-incorporation of the Other, which 
would deny both the otherness of the Other and the otherness of death.
The work of mourning, then – the active taking up – of this infinite 
responsibility reveals the political aspect of mourning. As Derrida puts it 
in Aporias: ‘I would say that there is no politics without an organization of 
the time and space of mourning, without a topolitology of the sepulcher, 
without an anamnesic and thematic relation of the spirit as ghost 
[revenant], without an open hospitality to the guest as ghost’ (61). Joan 
Kirkby argues that Derrida’s reconstruction of Freudian incorporation 
means that the politics of mourning resides in ‘an ongoing dialogue with 
the other’ (470): ‘At the death of the other a conversation is initiated, it is 
a time of reading and thinking’ (471). The ethical imperative of mourning 
is that it remains and remains as impossible. It suggests an undeniable 
responsibility – an infinite responsibility which cannot and does not leave 
us with ‘any form of good conscience’ (Derrida, Specters of Marx xv).
Kirkby suggests that the politics of mourning resides in the openness 
to be transformed by the Other, ‘a provocation to think new paths, new 
ways through apparent impasses’ (470). As Derrida puts it in Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas: ‘It is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from 
ethics. This deduction is necessary in order to determine the “better” 
or the “less bad” ’ (115, emphasis added). Politics, as Derrida taught and 
Žižek recently affirmed (see Demanding the Impossible), is the realm of 
responsible decisions. Simon Critchley argues that it suggests a ‘realm of 
risk and danger. Such danger calls for decisions or … “political invention”, 
an invention taken in the name of the other’ (271).
Arendt’s reading of the social as a Derridean 
‘work of mourning’
Reading Arendt’s essay ‘We Refugees’, Samantha Hill suggests that there 
is a dimension or undercurrent in Arendt’s work that is deeply concerned 
with the problem of loss. This remark read with Freud’s description of 
mourning, according to which it is the world that has become poor, and 
Arendt’s description of the social as the existence of poverty, raises the 
HANNAH ARENDT’S WORK OF MOURNING
129
provocation to surmise that Arendt’s definition of the social is ultimately a 
definition that calls for or engages the kind of mourning of which Derrida 
writes. To be sure, while the social is a definition of material poverty, ‘the 
rise of the social’ is a description of the poverty that ‘the world’ (which 
for Arendt is inescapably the public sphere and, as such, the political) has 
come to suffer. In other words, the definition of the social as the existence 
of poverty occasions for Arendt the mourning for what was lost with the 
emergence of the social and for Arendt, as we know, this loss was politics; 
politics as, to put it succinctly, the conditions for what Nancy has called 
‘the experience of freedom’.
However, if we consider closely the way in which Arendt engaged 
the loss of politics, we might certainly see that the ‘interiorisation’ of 
this loss in her work passed through the ‘melancholic identification’ to 
which Freud subscribed in his later work. But in the final instance, such 
a close consideration will reveal that Arendt’s position corresponds to, 
or can be better rendered as, the necessarily failed incorporation that 
characterises the Derridean politics of mourning. For, as Pitkin indicates, 
Arendt never ceased her conversation with the ‘lost treasure’, and for her 
the ‘perpetrator’ of the loss of this treasure was undeniably the ‘rise of the 
social’. In fact, if the work of mourning is the work of necessary failure, 
then although Arendt might not have realised it, her mourning for politics 
in the wake of the emergence of the social question caused her to set up 
a veritable politics of the failure of politics. This is the politics of loss, the 
politics of the social. It is this politics of the necessary failure of politics, 
this politics of the social, which amounted to her work of mourning (at 
least as regards this aspect of her work).
The fact that Arendt did not change her position, but relentlessly 
and unyieldingly held on to the argument that the emergence of the 
social question coincided with the loss of politics and, correspondingly, 
the experiences ‘most valuable’ (Pitkin 1) to human beings, can be read 
from the consistency with which she argues the matter, from The Human 
Condition (first published in 1958) to On Revolution (published in 1963) 
right up until an interview from 1970 collected in Crises of the Republic 
(1972) in which she comments that the revolutionary student movement 
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in the United States achieved enormous success ‘so long as it was a 
question of purely legal and political matters’ (202) but ‘accomplished 
nothing’ (202) when it collided with the ‘enormous social needs’ (202) of 
the city ghettos in the north.
This insistence on the loss/failure of politics when it confronted the 
social question or when the social question became a ‘political’ question 
started, as we have seen, in The Human Condition, where Arendt carefully 
traces the ‘unconscious substitution’ of the ‘social’ for the ‘political’ from 
the Greek to the Roman heritage and comments that such a substitution 
betrayed ‘the extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics 
had been lost’ (23). For Arendt this loss of politics meant the loss of the 
two activities that constituted the bios politikos – action (deeds) that is, 
as she famously says, ‘not brutal’, and speech (words) that is ‘not empty’ 
(200) – and these were the only activities within the vita activa that could 
constitute ‘an autonomous and authentically human way of life’ (13) 
because it took place directly between human beings.
But it is crucial to note that the rise of the social did not for Arendt 
imply the permanent and irretrievable loss or total eclipse of politics 
as action and speech (Pitkin). Julia Kristeva remarked in a lecture on 
Arendt that the idea of a ‘refoundation as survival’ of politics for our 
age was central to Arendt’s work and it implies the duty to ‘modify and 
augment old foundations in accordance with new discoveries that now 
lend meaning to diverse lives’ (‘Refoundation as Survival’ 354). What this 
would imply, as I read Kristeva, is that in Arendt’s work the ‘libidinal’ 
investiture in the possibility of politics could never have been and never 
was withdrawn, yet the relationship to the ‘old foundations’ could not 
simply be ‘incorporated’ either. In other words, this modification and 
augmentation of which Kristeva writes indicates a transformative relation 
to the ‘lost treasure’ and, as such, the posture of necessary failure or 
infidelity that characterises mourning.
Thus, already in the conclusion to The Human Condition, Arendt 
writes that the capacity for action is still with us, although (referring 
to ‘the scientists’) it ‘has become an experience for the privileged few’ 
(324). And in the 1970 interview, she unequivocally recognised the 
HANNAH ARENDT’S WORK OF MOURNING
131
political initiative of the revolutionary student movements as action and 
commented that what ‘really distinguishes this generation in all countries 
from earlier generations … is its determination to act, its joy in action, 
the assurance of being able to change things by one’s own efforts’ (Crises 
of the Republic 202). Moreover, with the student movements ‘another 
experience new for our time entered the game of politics: It turned 
out that acting is fun’ (203). In these comments, Arendt also gives us a 
very important clue regarding what made it possible to recognise these 
movements as authentic politics. She writes: ‘The basic question is: What 
really did happen? As I see it, for the first time in a very long while a 
spontaneous political movement arose which not only did not simply 
carry on propaganda, but acted, and, moreover, acted almost exclusively 
from moral motives’ (203, emphasis added).
From these comments it is possible to conclude that Arendt’s diagnosis 
of the social as coinciding with the loss of politics did not amount to 
the early Freudian melancholic or ‘nostalgic’ yearning for what was 
supposedly irretrievably lost in politics, nor to such a melancholic’s denial 
of this loss. Yet, in a theoretical posture characteristic of the later Freud’s 
view of mourning, there is a ‘melancholic identification’ in Arendt’s 
work with the ‘lost treasure’, which caused her to engage with the traces 
that remained of politics.4 This generated in her work ‘sites for memory 
and history, for the rewriting of the past as well as the reimagining of 
the future’ (Arditi 81). Indeed, I want to suggest that Arendt’s work of 
mourning for politics allowed her to identify those experiences in the 
post-war era that resembled the (lost) principle of action and therefore 
allowed her to honour the memory of politics in its ancient sense. In this 
sense, she did not deny the loss of politics or yearn for it nostalgically. She 
soberly and realistically engaged with the loss by describing the historical 
process that led to it, and she actively and tirelessly took up the infinite 
responsibility that this loss left us with.
To summarise, Arendt’s work of mourning for the loss of politics is 
a work that disrupts the clean distinctions between incorporation and 
introjection, melancholia and mourning as it was conceived by the early 
Freud and later elaborated upon by Abraham and Torok. As such, its 
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closest psychoanalytical ‘fit’ is the Derridean idea of failed incorporation. 
This is the case because Arendt realised that the recognition of action in 
the modern age depended on a certain interiorisation of, or identification 
with, action as it existed in the Greek polis, while refusing a dogmatic 
fidelity to – or a successful incorporation of – it. In other words, and 
conforming to Derrida’s account of mourning, a certain reappropriation 
of the lost tradition was crucial in order for modern politics to maintain a 
relation of resemblance with what was lost, in order for it to be recognised 
as authentic politics when it did occur.
In Arendt’s work, the loss of politics occasioned a mourning process of 
necessary failure or impossibility: it was necessarily impossible to return to 
politics in the ancient sense, because Man and the world he inhabits had 
changed fundamentally and permanently. Yet it was impossibly necessary 
that, with the rise of the social, those exceptional instances of action and 
freedom in the modern age be recognised and memorialised as such, so 
as not to succumb to the temptation to dismiss such moments as mere 
aberrations in accordance with an ideology that would have the general 
progress of History be the emergence of the uniformly behaving masses 
or One Man of society. Such an ideology, as she argued in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, was proto-totalitarian and, as such, utterly destructive of 
the politics she held dear and worked to restore.
The theoretical consequence of this unfaithful/faithful mourning for 
politics was that Arendt did not exclude the emergence of social matters 
from political processes such as action and speech: she acknowledged that 
the rise of the social necessarily meant that social problems would form 
part of political processes, that, for instance, revolution as the political 
event par excellence would ‘use and misuse’ the social question. In her 
discussion of the labour movement in The Human Condition she notes, quite 
frankly, that the difference between premodern slave labour and modern, 
free labour is that the labourer ‘is admitted to the political realm and fully 
emancipated as a citizen’ (217). In addition, she recognises ‘the sudden and 
frequently extraordinarily productive role’ this movement has played in 
modern politics when it appeared that the labourers, ‘if not led by official 
party programs and ideologies, had their own ideas about the possibilities 
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of democratic government under modern conditions’ (216).5 What these 
remarks reveal is that the overwhelming concern for Arendt was the 
restoration of the experiences to which politics granted access: appearance, 
action, freedom. It is for this reason that, years later, in answering a question 
put to her by her friend Mary McCarthy at a conference dedicated to her 
work, as regards what a person is supposed to do in the public space if he 
does not concern himself with the social question, she admitted that social 
matters have a ‘double face’, one of which should not be subject to political 
debate (because it is a question of administration) and one which should be 
(or, at least, could be) (see Benhabib).
In this way, by admitting the social to political consideration, Arendt 
was ‘unfaithful’ to the tradition and thus willing to mourn it as lost (Other). 
In the 1970 interview, she commented that ‘this new assurance that one 
can change things one doesn’t like is conspicuous especially in small 
matters. A typical instance was a comparatively harmless confrontation 
some years ago. When students learned that the service employees of 
their university were not receiving standard wages, they struck – with 
success’ (Crises of the Republic). She regards this instance as ‘positive’ 
action ‘exclusively from moral motives’ (203) and thus clearly regards and 
recognises the political action taken in consequence of and in solidarity 
with this social issue as authentic and worthwhile political action in the 
name of the Other. Why would her comment here not amount to Arendt 
contradicting her earlier refusal of a political solution for the social? 
Because, as Schaap points out with reference to James Clarke (and this is 
the crucial point about the ‘politics of the social’ that I have been talking 
about), in Arendt social matters become political when ‘others recognize 
it as a shared reality … when it can become the basis for solidarity and 
action’ (165).
In a short passage in On Revolution in which Arendt discusses the 
principle of solidarity, she moreover intimates that politics can ‘out 
of solidarity’ establish ‘deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately 
a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited’ (88) and 
concludes that ‘solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide action’ 
(89). Why this emphasis on ‘solidarity’ through which social matters are 
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admitted to the political realm? I think that the answer lies in solidarity’s 
disclosure of a plurality acting in concert and, as such, revealing the 
possibility of the action as political and, therefore, as holding open the 
space for an experience of freedom.
In addition, solidarity arises out of respect, which Arendt held to 
be a crucial condition of politics since it was grounded in ‘a kind of 
“friendship” without intimacy and without closeness’, a ‘regard for the 
person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us’ 
(The Human Condition 243). It is, in this regard, important to point out 
that Arendt considered the modern loss of respect as a ‘clear symptom 
of the increasing depersonalisation of public and social life’ (243); in 
other words, the loss of respect was a symptom of the emergence of 
the social. By the same token, one could argue that the re-emergence of 
respect in the way Arendt defines it, and coincidental with solidarity, 
would mark for her a political moment in the treatment of a social issue. 
And as noted above, she acknowledged that this was indeed an actuality 
that came to pass in the face of the emergence of the social. To put it 
differently, this was the ‘face’ of social matters that could be subjected to 
political debate: the extent to which they could and should give rise to 
solidarity and action.
Quite apart from this, Vanya Gastrow has argued that Arendt’s use 
of the term ‘social question’ as the given existence of poverty carries 
‘a narrow meaning, and is only intended to refer to the administrative 
and bureaucratic question of meeting the physical needs of the poor, as 
opposed to all questions and matters of debate relating to poverty’ (10). 
What Arendt thus relentlessly resisted was the idea that politics could 
solve the mere existence of poverty, that is, the social question: ‘For Arendt 
the bare fact of poverty alone in the form of scarcity does not equate to 
political oppression, and the technical processes of alleviating it cannot 
be achieved by deliberation in the political realm’ (59). But, as Gastrow 
argues, where poverty was the result of exploitation and oppression, 
there would be no reason to exclude deliberation on and action against 
the way in which such exploitation and oppression contributed to the 
social question, since in these cases the ‘common interest’ would be 
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something akin to ‘the dignity of man’ and action would arise out of the 
solidarity generated by such common interest (Arendt, On Revolution 88).
In this sense, it could be argued that while Arendt did not believe that 
mankind could be ‘liberated’ from poverty through political means, she 
certainly thought that politics could contribute to the relief of poverty 
where such poverty was the result of exploitation and oppression in 
general. The inclusion of ‘social’ issues as viable for consideration in 
politics as such indicates that Arendt did not adopt a stance towards 
politics in which she was simply unable truly to mourn the loss of politics 
in the ancient sense at the same time as she lamented, in a paralysed way, 
the ‘rise of the social’. It is for this reason that Christodoulidis’s analysis 
is inaccurate in its conclusion that Arendt leaves the political ‘gloriously 
vacuous’. Arendt realised that her work of mourning for the loss that 
politics sustained with the rise of the social would have had to be alive, 
henceforth, to the concerns of the day, and in the modern age those 
relating to ‘the social’ irrevocably infiltrated politics. As she remarks in 
the famous interview with Günter Gaus: ‘I live in the modern world, 
and obviously my experience is in and of the modern world’ (Essays in 
Understanding 52).
It was, however, her reverence for the original or premodern 
principles and practices of politics, as well as her acute awareness of 
the history of the fate of politics when it attempted to solve the social 
question (that is, terror and collapse), that left in her thinking a resistant 
melancholic trace, one which caused her to adopt a rigid political stance 
towards the social question and, as Gastrow indicates, caused her to 
underestimate the extent to which debate can exist over seemingly 
private, or then ‘social’, matters. Put in a different register, it was her 
very fidelity to the tradition which she was mourning that generated 
an inability to appreciate fully how much the social question would 
become the burden of the sphere of politics. But even in this aspect, 
the Derridean character of her mourning stands in full view: Arendt’s 
mourning for the loss of politics was unfaithful to the loss, by virtue of 
the very fidelity to what was lost. We can thus see why Kristeva (Hannah 
Arendt 19), in her biography of Arendt, could write as follows: ‘ “Faithful 
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and unfaithful.” That is precisely how we find Hannah all throughout 
our reading of her intellectual experience.’ Such are the paradoxes and 
pitfalls, Derrida counsels, of any process of mourning: we must mourn, 
we cannot mourn (enough).
The work of mourning in postapartheid  
South Africa
Christodoulidis implored South African readers to question ‘conventional 
conceptions’ (501) of the social and the political and of their separation, 
specifically Arendt’s. In the course of his formulation, Arendt’s description 
of the way in which the rise of the social eclipsed the scene of politics, 
how the revolutions ‘used and misused the mighty forces of misery and 
destitution in their struggle against tyranny and oppression’, becomes 
her normative theory of ‘the political as a denial of the social’ (501).6 
Questionable as such a formulation of Arendt’s project might be (she 
hardly ‘denied’ the social politically; her point is precisely that politics 
couldn’t deny the onset of the social, while she still insisted on an ontological 
distinction between politics as freedom and the social as necessity), 
Christodoulidis insists that Arendt depoliticised poverty and aimed at 
undercutting our ‘ability to understand and redress’ it as a political issue 
(501). I hope that my argument thus far has shown that Arendt not only 
admitted ‘the social’ to political consideration, she also thought that, 
under certain conditions, political action in the name of social issues was 
possible and necessary. What Arendt remains ultimately concerned about 
is the extent to which politics misuses the social question and ends up 
denying its conditio sine qua non and conditio per quam: plurality. And this 
is why she held that it is dangerous to attempt to ‘liberate mankind from 
poverty by political means’ (On Revolution 114). I will return to this point 
in conclusion.
Be that as it may, Christodoulidis identifies in postapartheid South 
Africa an ‘Arendtian’ separation of the political and the social that has 
generated an elevation of the political above the social, which, in turn, 
has resulted in a neoliberal, market-driven (as opposed to politics-driven) 
structural adjustment programme that has failed to address the social 
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devastation left in South Africa in the wake of the disastrous politics 
of apartheid: ‘In this disturbing conjunction the political having been 
so successfully separated off from the social is made to yield to market 
imperatives, and the whole cohort of “natality”, “worldliness”, “acting-in-
concert” and the rest, become hollowed out to the point where “democratic 
experimentalism” means nothing but market adjustment, and delivers 
nothing but the reproduction of privilege’ (503). He concludes by urging 
us to resist ‘analytical exercises that separate the social from the political, 
the ‘ “sphere” of social equality from the “sphere” of political participation’ 
because such exercises are ‘from the point of view of the plight for social 
justice nothing short of catastrophic for those who find their life-chances 
increasingly sacrificed to the false necessities of markets’ (520).
As far as Christodoulidis’s diagnosis goes – and while I remain sceptical 
of the very rosy political picture he draws, in Arendtian terms, of the early 
years of South Africa’s political transition – there is much in it with which 
I agree. It is certainly the case that the political moment in South Africa 
came at the cost of politically addressing the social question adequately 
and that a certain social–political divide disconcertingly lies ‘at the 
very heart of South Africa’s constitutional settlement’ (Christodoulidis 
516), irksome as Arendt might have found such a formulation (‘at the 
very heart’). However, the divide that Christodoulidis claims for the 
postapartheid transition is not Arendt’s. This is the case because Arendt’s 
identification of the existence of material poverty as the social question is 
not, without more, a definition of the grossly skewed/unequal/racialised 
distribution of poverty that South Africa inherits from apartheid and that 
structurally corresponds to the condition of global apartheid. To be sure, 
this inequality in the distribution of material resources, opportunities and 
welfare in general is the political dimension or ‘face’ of the social question, 
and there is absolutely nothing in Arendt that militates against or is 
targeted to prevent the political consideration of this aspect of the social 
question. On the contrary, if one takes the view that it is this inequality 
that prevents or reduces political plurality, then there is everything 
to  suggest that the matter would be as political for Arendt as it is for 
us today.
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But what is even more troubling about Christodoulidis’s argument is 
how he ignores his own plea to avoid ‘analytical exercises that separate the 
social from the political’ (517–518) when he argues that the inclusion of 
justiciable socioeconomic rights in a constitution (such as ours) redraws 
the social–political divide and thus depoliticises poverty, because the 
transformative potential of such social rights constitutionalism inevitably 
ends up, under conditions of global capitalism, yielding to the market. 
Apart from the point that today all institutionalised politics appear to 
ultimately end up yielding to the market – this is the point of the critique 
of the ‘postpolitical’ condition – Christodoulidis fails to take into account 
the postpositivist point that the argument could certainly be made that to 
include socioeconomic rights in a constitution (as law) and to make them 
justiciable is necessarily to repoliticise them, is perhaps even to defer their 
depoliticisation indefinitely.
Rather than a dogmatic adherence to an ontological distinction between 
the social as necessity and the political as freedom, the unprecedented 
inclusion of these ‘social’ rights in a constitution in postcolonial Africa 
is surely to undercut the very distinction between the political and the 
social. And to make their meaning and interpretation at least partially a 
matter for the judiciary (as a branch of government) is at the very least to 
intensify, not reduce, their politicisation. This conclusion holds as long 
as one is prepared to admit to a view of constitutionalism that sees the 
judiciary and judicial review as a necessary and irreducible site of politics 
and the political process (see Michelman).
The inclusion and justiciability of socioeconomic rights under a 
constitution in fact holds the potential for political action that does not 
always already end up yielding to the market. This has been illustrated 
repeatedly in our socioeconomic rights jurisprudence where the 
Constitutional Court has ordered realisation of socioeconomic rights (and 
thus has deployed the social in a political fashion) against the dictates of the 
market and has thereby served as the focal point of an extraparliamentary 
politics of the social. The best example of such a politicisation is probably 
the Constitutional Court’s judgment in the famous Treatment Action 
Campaign case in which the Court held that restrictions on the availability 
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of the antiretroviral drug Nevirapine to HIV-positive pregnant women 
in the public health sector were unreasonable and, as such, violated 
unjustifiably the right to access to healthcare in the Constitution.7 In the 
course of the judgment, the Court held that state policy must take account 
of the existence of poverty and that the limitations on the availability of 
Nevirapine disproportionately affect the poor. It further held that while it 
is an ‘extraordinarily difficult’ task to realise the socioeconomic rights in 
the Constitution, they nonetheless impose constitutional obligations on 
the state, which means that it ‘has to find the resources’ to satisfy a court 
order in this regard.8
For the sake of plurality
Arendt’s work of mourning the loss of politics is ultimately motivated by 
an overriding concern for the experience of freedom. In Arendt’s account, 
the experience of such freedom is possible only under conditions of a 
public sphere not overwhelmed by the society of uniform and uniformly 
behaving mass men, but vibrant with the plurality of the human condition. 
As she writes: ‘What is at stake is the revelatory character without which 
action and speech would lose all human relevance’ (The Human Condition 
182), and such revelatory character cannot exist in the absence of plurality.
Arendt’s worry about the ‘society’ of labour and consumption was 
that the togetherness one could find in it ‘has none of the distinctive 
marks of true plurality’ (212) because it requires ‘the actual loss of all 
awareness of individuality and identity’ (213); it rests ‘not on equality 
but on sameness’. Under conditions of vast socioeconomic inequality (in 
which the ‘sameness’ and ‘conformity’ of labour prevails), plurality and, 
consequently, an experience of freedom stand little chance, for under 
such conditions man is entirely thrown back unto himself – lonely  – 
in the darkness of the household and unable to distinguish himself, to 
disclose a world, from the homogenous society of ‘behaving’ masses. 
Under such conditions, as Arendt speculates, ‘the withering of the public 
realm, so conspicuous throughout the modern age, may well find its 
consummation’ (220).
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Aletta Norval has argued that if, in postapartheid South Africa, ‘the 
conception of the people as homogenous unity is to predominate, then 
the prospects for a truly plural, open process of nation-building would 
seem to be limited’ (297). In other words, if the social is to predominate, 
the prospects of authentic politics would be limited. However, argues 
Norval, if non-racialism and the impossibility of nationhood could 
become a ‘central articulating principle’, South Africa could avoid the 
pitfalls that have beset the postcolonial process of nation-building. 
However, Norval readily admits that for the latter to come true, a series 
of conditions will have to be met, and she includes crucially among these 
‘the elimination of gross material inequalities’ (298).
Considerations of time and space do not allow me to pursue Norval’s 
argument any further, save to say that it simply cannot admit of any doubt 
that in postapartheid South Africa ‘the social question’, the existence of 
poverty, is, to an undeniably great extent, a consequence of the political 
misuse of the social during apartheid. For what is ‘apartheid’ if not the 
untranslatable political name of an imposed set of social conditions, of 
the imposition of inequality? What is it if not a homogenising logic that 
attempted to deny at all cost the plurality of the human condition? Without 
addressing the social question in South Africa as a political question, 
the equality and plurality that are the very condition of politics and the 
experience of freedom remain as a loss that the social will have mourned. 
Arendt herself wrote in the Preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism that 
‘to turn our backs on the destructive forces of the century is of little avail’ 
(viii) and that efforts to escape from ‘the grimness of the present into 
nostalgia for a still intact past’ (ix) would be utterly in vain.
In our own context, I doubt that Arendt would have counselled us 
to turn a blind eye to the loss of equality and plurality in the wake of 
the misuse of the social question by the ‘politics’ of the apartheid and the 
early postapartheid eras. In other words, I doubt that her work carries the 
message that politics in (post)modernity can dispense with (as in ‘be finished 
with’ or, as I have argued, ‘resolve’) the social question. Her work certainly 
seemed unable to do so at the same time as it never fails to converse with 
the spectre of the ‘lost treasure’. In this way Arendt inaugurated a politics 
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of the social as her work of mourning for the loss of politics, incomplete 
and imperfect as it invariably was and has to be as a work of mourning.
As Kristeva remarks, Arendt ‘advocates neither the nostalgic conservatism 
of the past, nor a destructive dismantling. There is no instructions manual 
for this new world and its new politics’ (‘Hannah Arendt Prize’). It is high 
time that not only the ‘new world’ of postapartheid South Africa, but also 
and indeed the whole world situated as it now firmly is in a new millennium, 
learns from Arendt that a politics of the social is an inevitable part of the 
work of mourning for the devastating losses perpetrated by the ‘destructive 
forces’ that History collects under the signifier ‘apartheid’. As a Kantian, 
Arendt was well aware that ‘it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any 
and every specified limit’ (Kant 312). It is on this possibility of the experience 
of freedom, inseparable as it is from plurality, that Arendt  refused to give 
up. It is on this possibility that we should continue to resolutely insist at the 
same time as we soberly mourn the loss of politics that the ‘rise of the social’ 
inaugurated.
NOTES
1. If there was any doubt that ‘austerity’, as applied to fiscal spending, is a term 
that emerged only recently, say after the 2008 global financial meltdown, 
Patrick Bond’s book makes it clear that the postcolony has long been the 
victim of ‘fiscal austerity’ (vii). Imposed by the international financial system 
in the early stages of South Africa’s reintegration into the global political 
economy, this ‘austerity’ lies arguably at the root of postapartheid South 
Africa’s intractable inability to overcome its social ills.
2. Arendt describes the Greek polis as ‘the most individualistic and least 
conformable body politic known to us’ (The Human Condition 43).
3. To this extent, Arendt is certainly one of the earliest thinkers of what Michel 
Foucault would later describe as ‘biopolitics’.
4. Ranjana Khanna describes the trace as ‘that supplement that has become 
remaindered but insists on its presence covertly’ (76).
5. We have certainly seen in our own time how protest over a seemingly 
insignificant social issue, such as a small increase in metro fares (Brazil), 
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can result in large-scale political protest and the demand either for a new 
government or even for an entirely new form of government. As regards the 
latter, I am thinking of the case of Tunisia, where Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-
immolation in protesting unemployment unleashed the wave of protest that 
would eventually lead to the ousting of a president that had been in power 
for 23 years and a democratisation of the country that culminated in free and 
fair elections.
6. Christodoulidis makes much of the often quoted passage in On Revolution 
where Arendt writes that ‘nothing could be more futile and more dangerous’ 
than the attempt to ‘liberate mankind from poverty by political means’ (114). 
Arendt was of course concerned by the fact that the history of revolution has 
revealed that such a ‘futile’ attempt unleashes violence and eventually terror, 
all while leaving the social question as prevalent as ever.
7. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No. 2) 
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
8. Ibid., para. 99.
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The key figure in early allegory is the corpse. In late allegory, it is the 
‘souvenir’ [Andenken]. The ‘souvenir’ is the schema of the commodity’s 
transformation into an object for the collector. The correspondences are, 
objectively, the endlessly varied resonances between one souvenir and the 
others (Benjamin, Selected Writings 4: 190).
In Trust, the American philosopher Alphonso Lingis explains how 
he never liked to travel with a camera. He had the usual objections of 
a conscientious tourist: ‘It objectifies people with whom I wanted to 
interact … there is something false and delusive in trying to fix and stock 
up images and situations from the past … it was the changes in my heart I 
brought back home that were alone real’ (49). However, when he was given 
a camera as a gift, he decided to try it out. At first he only shot images of 
buildings and landscapes, but one day, while focusing on some willows 
fringing a lake in Kashmir, he accidentally snapped some men bathing. 
To his surprise, the men smiled and called out, ‘Thank you!’ Lingis writes 
that he then realised that taking photographs of people, especially those 
‘who have no, and never will have, possessions, is the most innocent gift 
I could give them’.
There is much to feel uneasy about here: the implication that those 
without possessions are to be pitied; that they are the passive recipients 
of a gift, even though the gift in question is a photograph that will not 
in fact be given, but kept by the one who has transformed these people 
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into an image for his own use and pleasure; and, perhaps above all, the 
claim that this exchange between perceiver and perceived, tourist and 
native, rich and poor, is ‘innocent’. This kind of discomfort accompanies 
the reader through many of Lingis’s recent books, which are part travel 
memoirs and part philosophical meditations about encounters with 
strangers and the strange.1 It is evident that Lingis wants to cut through 
socioeconomic and political determinisms and subjectivations in order 
to get at what it is for one thinking, feeling, breathing body to encounter 
another thinking, feeling, breathing body – not a subject-to-subject 
encounter, still less a human-to-human one, but rather a creaturely one, 
epidermis to epidermis.2 In a different register, that of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, who inform much of Lingis’s thinking, a person precedes 
and exceeds all markers of subjectivity: he/she/they/it is a site of pure 
expressivity that cannot be forced to represent, a singularity that cannot 
be made to signify, a rhizome that cannot be arborified.
Fine, one might say – but the discomfort remains, stubbornly. While 
Lingis often seems quite deliberate in soliciting such discomfort in his 
readers, this is not simply the discomfort of those he dismisses as ‘tight-
assed liberals’ who, out of ‘respect’ (Body Transformations 96) for the 
people they deem Other, refuse to engage in the most basic and simple 
forms of social interaction, such as bodily contact, erotic innuendo, dirty 
jokes and slapstick humour. Rather, the discomfort that Lingis activates 
for us – that is, for those whom Pierre Bourdieu famously describes as 
‘the dominated fraction of the dominant class’ (196) – is the collective 
guilt of those who possess enormous privilege over those who have 
none and who are historically implicated by that possession. Guilt stems 
from a sense of responsibility, from the knowledge of the social and 
economic injustices that create privilege and distribute power, and this 
sense of responsibility is necessary for the exercise of ethical caution, a 
bulwark against further injustices. But guilt can also become a protective 
device for the guilty, operating on the principle that the more you feel 
bad, the less you are bad. It can lead to a smug sense of righteousness 
through which one resists certain feelings, such as the sorrow or pity or 
love one might feel for the plight of a stranger, because those feelings 
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stem  from self-indulgent sentiment, they betray a moral narcissism, a 
lack of social awareness and sophistication; they are self-serving, trite 
and embarrassing. In the ultimate extension of this thought, empathy 
itself becomes an ethical transgression. It is precisely this assumption that 
Lingis targets. At a fundamental level, his work asserts, people need to 
care about each other, to love each other, and even if the ways in which 
this love is expressed can seem self-serving, trite or embarrassing, it is 
vitally important that we feel it.
There is another photograph discussed in Trust. Lingis recounts a day 
in Ethiopia when he had to pay a visit to the bank in Addis Ababa. As 
he approaches the building, he sees a woman lying on the sidewalk with 
her two children. She is evidently dying of Aids: her body is emaciated, 
her breasts shrivelled, her skin pocked with dark blotches. When Lingis 
finishes his business at the bank and exits it, he slips between two cars and 
surreptitiously snaps a photograph of her. On his return to the United 
States, he develops the film roll and writes the following:
There was only the thin bent smear of black on the silent paper of the 
photographic print. Yet I looked at the print and saw her and her children 
too as though she were there in front of me, in the aisle of the mall. I see 
her blinded by the midday Ethiopian sun, not seeing me, her wasted hand 
supporting her child in the last extremities of love. In writing this I know 
I am returning to her, though she is dead by now. This inability to depart 
from her, this desperate weakness, is perhaps also love (106).
Love, or simply another way that the first world feeds off the third, a 
hearty chicken soup for the soul made out of the suffering of others? This 
chapter will follow a rather counterintuitive route and take the claim to 
love as sincere. My subject is not the work of Lingis, but love: love as a 
form of ‘desperate weakness’ and its relation to the aesthetic image. It 
is true that Lingis makes his claim to love from the safe distance of an 
American shopping mall and that the woman in the photograph most 
likely did not benefit much from his trip to the bank. For this reason, 
it is easy to dismiss this claim. But perhaps it is a little too easy: the 
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default mode of the conscientious tourist, that good liberal, is to perform 
respect for the Other by reducing the Other to the context in which 
they are viewed, to avoid creaturely contact, to cause no offence, and, 
at the extreme, to uphold the isolation that maintains caste separation. 
But Lingis pointedly refuses context. He refuses to make the photograph 
of the woman and her child, and his own position in relation to her, 
representative of the larger issues that have converged in the conditions 
that allow such a photograph to exist in the first place. What interests 
him is not, to use Roland Barthes’s term, the photograph’s studium, but 
only the personal, wounding quality of the photograph, its punctum.3 The 
punctum of a photograph can be so strong that Barthes goes on to suggest 
that it emits ‘a kind of little simulacrum … which I should like to call the 
Spectrum of the Photograph, because this word retains, through its root, 
a relation to “spectacle” and adds to it that rather terrible thing which is 
there in every photograph: the return of the dead’ (Camera Lucida 9).
For Walter Benjamin, that feeling of haunting is the symptom of 
the allegorical condition: in symbol, the relation of life to its image is 
seamlessly reciprocal; but in allegory, image and life are profoundly, 
disturbingly fused. The figure for early allegory is the corpse because in 
the corpse the image and that of which it is an image are riveted to one 
another in mute bondage; the figure for modern allegory is the souvenir 
because it presents an image of life at the same time as it presents life 
as an image – like the commodity, it is essentially ungraspable and 
distant. In his essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, Benjamin relates this 
distant quality to love. He argues that earthly love cannot be fulfilled, 
it cannot complete itself; rather, it is marked by its perpetual striving, 
which ‘is not a naked foundering but rather a true ransoming of the 
deepest imperfection which belongs to the nature of man himself ’ 
(Selected Writings 1: 345). For Benjamin, reinstating weakness as the 
principal characteristic of man is of utmost political importance: in 
the ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, he writes that redemption and 
the ‘coming of the Messianic kingdom’ depend on the intensification 
of creaturely experience, and that the ‘profane, therefore, though not 
itself a category of this Kingdom, is a decisive category of its quietest 
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approach’ (Reflections 312–314). The sacred can only be broached through 
a deepening of the profane. It is therefore a ‘question of dialectics’, not 
of striking a balance between the two elements, but going so deeply into 
one element that a second element is drawn out and redeems the first: 
‘Just as a force can, through acting, increase another that is acting in the 
opposite direction, so the order of the profane assists, through being 
profane, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom’ (314). This movement 
between two extremes is again invoked in his essay on surrealism where, 
writing on the tendency of the surrealists to veer towards a kind of 
Romantic intoxication, he argues that the purpose of such intoxication 
is to win ‘the energies of intoxication for revolution’ (Selected Writings 
2: 215), because ‘all ecstasy in one world [is] humiliating sobriety in the 
world complementary to it’ (210). When Lingis writes of a ‘desperate 
weakness [which] is perhaps also love’ (Trust 106), he is articulating a 
dialectical operation: out of the sense of desperate weakness love is 
produced and becomes its redeeming force. This kind of love is not a self-
valorising Absolutism, but rather a ‘sober’ Absolute; that is, an Absolute 
that has ‘forfeited its transcendence’ and establishes itself instead amid 
the ordinary folds of immanence.4
In what follows, I first compare Barthes’s statements about the 
photographic image to Benjamin’s concept of the ‘dialectical image’. 
According to Benjamin, the dialectical image opens up a specific mode of 
cognition whereby understanding is reached by way of a ‘flash’ that arrests 
thought. In order to consider how this flash of the dialectical image can 
be understood as an experience that produces love, I then turn to Baruch 
Spinoza’s concept of the third kind of knowledge, and in particular to 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, in order to suggest that the dialectical 
image can be understood as a conduit for the third kind of knowledge, 
and since the affect of the third kind of knowledge is love, the dialectical 
image can likewise be understood as the redemptive force that Benjamin 
argued it was. Both Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge and Benjamin’s 
dialectical image depend on a specific experience of temporality in which 
the past collides with the present and the present becomes saturated 
with time. Benjamin articulates this idea in his concept of allegory and 
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the flash of Messianic time in the dialectical image; in Spinoza, the 
apprehension of the total face of nature (facies totius naturae) can only 
take place under a species of eternity (sub species aeternitatis). In the final 
section I try to draw together these several strands through a reading of 
Deleuze’s concept of a life as pure immanence: a life is the common skin 
we share, a creaturely skin that is the mark of our ‘desperate weakness, 
which is perhaps also love’.
I. The photograph and the dialectical image: 
Barthes and Benjamin
The connection between love and photography has been explored by 
Eduardo Cadava and Paola Cortés-Rocca in their article ‘Notes on Love 
and Photography’, which is primarily a reading of Barthes’s Camera Lucida. 
Since both love and photography transform their object into an image, 
they contend that for Barthes ‘the law’ governing both photography 
and love is that which ‘interrupts identity by marking it with the sign of 
difference and transformations’ (10). But more fundamentally, I would 
argue, what unites Barthes’s discussions of both photography and love 
is the problem of the image, for it is indeed a problem. In The Lover’s 
Discourse, the amorous subject attaches his desire to an array of different 
images, which together form a vast structure that Barthes calls the ‘Image-
repertoire’. The heart is ‘held, enchanted, within the domain of the Image-
repertoire’ (52), and if this Image-repertoire could have a language (that is, 
if it could be made to signify successfully), then it would ‘be precisely the 
utopia of language; an entirely original, paradisiac language, the language 
of Adam’ (99).
In Benjamin’s register, this ‘utopia of language’ is the ‘language of 
Adam’; that is, the pre-Fall, pre-allegorical state in which words and 
things were locked in the luminous fusion of the symbol, and the word 
was both creative and the thing created.5 Post-Fall, words no longer 
share natural correspondence to things, and we thereby enter into the 
condition of ‘overnaming’, which is the condition of allegory and ‘the 
deepest linguistic reason for all melancholy’ (Selected Writings 1: 73). 
For Barthes, as for Benjamin, it is precisely due to this overnaming that 
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love cannot be signified as such and thus cannot be fulfilled. As Barthes 
writes, the Image-repertoire may be forced into writing, but only at a 
cost: ‘What writing demands, and what any lover cannot grant it without 
laceration, is to sacrifice a little of his Image-repertoire, and to assure 
thereby, through his language, the assumption of a little reality. All I 
might produce, at best, is a writing of the Image-repertoire; and for that 
I would have to renounce the Image-repertoire of writing’ (The Lover’s 
Discourse 98–99). Writing, in other words, although produced by the 
Image-repertoire, cannot reproduce that from whence it came. It always 
somehow says both too much and too little, confined to everything that 
has already been said and named. The lover is trapped by the platitudes 
of love just as the photograph is confined to its platitudinous surface: 
sign and signified are irretrievably riveted to one another and yet the 
sign seems inadequate, inexpressive, mute. In the ‘Winter Garden’ 
photograph, a photograph of Barthes’s mother taken when she was a 
child, the peculiar ‘air’ that characterised his mother seems to have been 
transported intact unto the photograph’s surface, and it manifests only 
at the level of that surface: the ‘air’ ‘flows back from presentation to 
retention’ and must be experienced entirely ‘on the level of the image’s 
finitude’ (90).
This is why Barthes asserts that one cannot read a photograph and 
that the photograph is therefore essentially undialectical, at least if one 
understands the dialectic as ‘that thought which masters the incorruptible 
and converts the negation of death into the power to work’ (90). In 
his writings on photography, Benjamin also invokes the connection 
between readability and photographs.6 But, in contrast to Barthes, who 
understands the dialectic in terms of completion or fulfilment, Benjamin 
understands the dialectic as the irreconcilable separation of two elements, 
which, through their separation, create a charged flashpoint between 
each other. The dialectic, understood in Barthes’s sense, is compatible 
with Benjamin’s idea of symbol, but in Benjamin’s sense the dialectic 
belongs to allegory. In The Origin of German Tragic Drama, symbol is 
that wherein ‘the beautiful is supposed to merge with the divine in an 
unbroken whole’ (160), in a ‘mystical instant’ (178). Allegory, on the 
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other hand, is dialectical: it is ‘accomplished in the movement between 
two extremes’ (178), and these extremes are nature and history.7 In 
Convolute N of The Arcades Project, the mystical instant of symbol is the 
bud of ‘mythic time’; its ideal form is the epic. The historical materialist 
must renounce the epic element of mythic time and expose history as 
that which is composed of ‘images, not stories’ [N11, 4]: not the story of 
man’s serene progression through time in a continuous and unbroken 
narrative, in other words, but snapshots and souvenirs ripped from the 
context that would catalogue and explain them. History is the ruin of 
time, and its ideal form is citation: ‘To write history … means to cite 
history. It belongs to the concept of citation … that the historical object 
in each case is torn from its context’.
However, for Benjamin allegory is specifically a form of writing. 
History is denatured time in the same way that the inscription is 
denatured speech. The inscription is like fossilised speech, marooned in 
historical time from the mystical instant of its utterance. It is a fragment, 
and by themselves fragments are ‘quite incapable of emanating any 
meaning or significance on their own’; but in the hands of the allegorist, 
they can be transformed into a constellation or schema, and through this 
‘he speaks of something different and for him it becomes a key to the 
realm of hidden knowledge; and he reverses it as emblem of this. This is 
what determines the character of allegory as a form of writing’ (German 
Tragic Drama 184).8 In other words, the inscription is not the key to 
knowledge, but the image – the pattern that the constellation or schema 
forms – of the key to knowledge. In inscription, speech is petrified in the 
image of the word.
It is due to this slippage between image and inscription that a quarrel 
exists in Benjamin studies as to whether or not the ‘dialectical image’ – 
which is the name that Benjamin gives to the allegorical schema or 
constellation in The Arcades Project and ‘On the Concept of History’ (in 
Selected Writings 4) – designates an actual image or if it is something that 
should be understood solely in linguistic terms.9 However, this distinction, 
simple as it is, obscures things: the dialectical image is an image, but an 
image of words. Benjamin makes this very point when he quotes from 
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a ‘monologue-like essay’ by ‘the brilliant Johann Wilhelm Ritter’: ‘The 
letter alone speaks, or rather: word and script are, at source, one, and 
neither is possible without the other’ (German Tragic Drama 214). For 
Benjamin, Ritter gets to ‘the very heart of the allegorical attitude’ (214) 
with the theory that ‘alles Bild sei nur Schriftbild’ – every image is only a 
word-image or, as in the common German use of this word, a typeface.10 
In allegory, the image ‘is only a signature, only the monogram of essence, 
not the essence itself in a mask’ (214). Not essence itself, but a monogram 
of essence, and allegory is a kind of monogram: it is ‘a schema; and as a 
schema it is an object of knowledge, but it is not securely possessed until 
it becomes a fixed schema: at one and the same time a fixed image and a 
fixing sign’ (184).11
With some justification, Anselm Haverkamp complains of the 
‘ongoing misreading’ of the dialectical image in Benjamin, particularly 
the tendency to interpret the ‘flash’ and ‘shock’ of the dialectical image 
as some mystical recognition scene and to interpret the dialectical image 
as simply an image.12 For Haverkamp, the dialectical image is, rather, a 
‘readable citation’ (72). He argues that ‘image’ is the metaphor for citation 
and that the word ‘dialectical’ has to be taken as reading: ‘Language is 
citation: language reused and reread’ (71). According to Haverkamp, 
Benjamin used the term ‘image’ in accordance with ‘a fashion of the time’ 
(72), though he resisted the ‘mainstream application of the term’, and 
Benjamin draws attention to that distinction in The Arcades Project when 
he delineates between his idea of the dialectical image and the ‘archaic’ 
image [N3, 1]. The dialectical image, unlike the archaic image, is not 
essence in a mask but the monogram of essence. The difference between a 
dialectical image and an archaic image may be further characterised in the 
same terms in which we have discussed historical time and mythic time: 
the archaic image is a symbol or representation, whereas the dialectical 
image is produced through a historical perspective. Benjamin argues 
that what distinguishes ‘images from the “essences” of phenomenology 
is their historical index’, and this historical index ‘not only says that 
they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to 
legibility only at a particular time’. This ‘now’ depends on the moment 
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of legibility, which is a moment that is also marked by the ‘death of 
intentio’ because it brings ‘dialectics to a standstill’: deciphering the world 
according to the signs and meanings with which we have endowed it is 
possible only up to a point. The moment at which reading is brought up 
against the limit of readability is the moment at which inscription passes 
into image and becomes something that we can no longer read but only 
see: ‘image is dialectics at a standstill’ [N2a, 3]. The inscription thus 
becomes an image.
In The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin famously states: 
‘Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars’ (34), meaning that 
ideas, as verbal concepts, are as separate from the objects they seek to 
represent as the individual stars are from the patterns we read in them.13 
In ‘The Doctrine of the Similar’, he writes again about the concept of the 
constellation:
The perception of similarity is in every case bound to a flashing up. It 
flits past, can possibly be won again, but cannot really be held fast as can 
other perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily 
as a constellation of stars. The perception of similarities thus seems to 
be bound to a moment in time. It is like the addition of a third element – 
the astrologer – to the conjunction of two stars; it must be grasped in an 
instant (Selected Writings 2.2: 695–696).
Perceiving the image – or reading the inscription – depends on the 
perception of similarities, what Benjamin will later call, in the essays on 
Charles Baudelaire and Marcel Proust, correspondences. This perception 
is bound to a specific moment in time, an instant that cannot be wilfully 
prolonged, a flash.
In Camera Lucida, Barthes argues that it is through light that the 
photographic image is produced and through light that the viewing 
subject is touched or wounded by the image. Light becomes a ‘carnal 
medium’, a shared skin, and this carnality accounts for the ‘pangs of 
love’ that some photographs impart to their viewers; not those pangs of 
a lover’s sentiment, but ‘another music … its name oddly old-fashioned: 
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Pity’ (116).14 These emotions are not provoked by every photograph, but 
when it happens, it happens in a flash: the ‘reading of the punctum (of 
the pricked photograph, so to speak) is at once brief and active’ (49). For 
Barthes, the photograph is therefore close to the haiku, for ‘the notation 
of a haiku, too, is undevelopable: everything is given, without provoking 
the desire for or even the possibility of a rhetorical expansion’ (49). The 
haiku and the photograph are schematic images: constellations. The 
constellation cannot be read star by star but only through the pattern 
that the stars form when viewed together all at once. We are thus in 
the realm of Benjamin’s dialectical image: ‘Where thinking comes to a 
standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions – there the dialectical 
image appears. It is the caesura in the movement of thought’ [N10a, 
3]. The power of the dialectical image cannot be reduced merely to its 
parts. It depends, rather, on the imperceptible element that creates the 
concatenation between things, just as the brilliance of a mosaic depends 
more ‘on the quality of the glass paste’ than it does on its individual 
pieces (German Tragic Drama 29). The flash occurs on the horizon of 
thought, a horizon, as Deleuze and Guattari write, from which ‘we 
return with bloodshot eyes’ (What Is Philosophy? 41): bloodshot because 
the horizon is real – it takes place between bodies, in time and space. Yet, 
they continue, the bloodshot eyes that witnessed and saw ‘are the eyes 
of the mind’ (41).
II. Deleuze’s book of light
It is a well-known but underappreciated fact that Spinoza was a lens 
grinder by profession. This daily activity may have influenced his 
understanding of the human mind – Spinoza approaches the mind as a 
kind of lens, a material device that can be manipulated to move beyond 
the capacity of merely human perception. In Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes 
between conceptions (conceptus) and perceptions, asserting that the ‘word 
“perception” seems to indicate that the mind is in a passive relation 
to an object; but “conception” seems to express an action of the mind’ 
(2Def3Exp).15 Later, he reiterates the point, cautioning against confusing 
thinking with mere ‘picturing’: ‘I understand by ideas, not images, such 
SOUVENIR
157
as those which are formed in the bottom of the eye and, if you wish, in 
the middle of the brain, but under conceptions of thought’ (2P48S). These 
conceptions of thought are ideas, and all ideas, according to Spinoza, 
are adequate and true if they are related to God: that is, if they are 
derived from and express the facies totius naturae or rerum concatenatio 
(the concatenation of all things).16 If the ideas are related solely to the 
individual mind alone, then they will be false and inadequate.
The subtitle of Book V of Ethics is ‘On the Power of the Intellect, 
or, On Human Freedom’, and Deleuze describes it in ‘Spinoza and the 
Three “Ethics” ’ as an ‘aerial book of light, which proceeds by flashes’ 
(32–33). He arrives at this conclusion after working through the three 
forms of knowledge as presented by Spinoza in Ethics. The first form 
of knowledge is that of signs and affects (affectio), and these pertain to 
one’s physical situation in a particular moment in time. They constitute 
a ‘slice of duration (durée)’ (22). Signs are effects of the affects, ‘shadows 
that play on the surfaces of bodies, always between two bodies … effects 
of light in a space filled with things colliding into each other at random’ 
(24). However, the kind of knowledge produced from signs and affects ‘is 
hardly a knowledge but an experience in which one randomly encounters 
the confused ideas of bodily mixtures, brute imperatives to avoid this 
mixture and seek another, and more or less delirious interpretations of 
these situations’. When Spinoza speaks of the affect-images produced 
by this first form of knowledge, says Deleuze, it is ‘only to be severely 
criticized, denounced, and sent back to their night, out of which light 
either reappears or in which it perishes’ (26).
The second kind of knowledge, what Spinoza calls ‘common notions’, 
are concepts of bodies or objects and constitute the ‘second aspect of 
light’ (26). With the first kind of knowledge, light is reflected or absorbed 
by bodies that produce shadows, and the imagination grasps only those 
shadows. In the second kind of knowledge the intellect can apprehend 
the intimate structure (fabrica) of those shadows, and thereby the relation 
between bodies. A common notion is the concept of the structure that is 
formed by at least two bodies; common notions are thus universals, but 
they are ‘more or less’ universals depending on whether their concept 
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takes in just two bodies or that of all possible bodies (facies totius naturae) 
(25). Deleuze then makes the following claim:
Understood in this way, modes are projections. Or rather, the variations 
of an object are projections that envelop a relation of movement and rest 
as their invariant (involution). And since each relation involves all the 
others to infinity, following an order that varies with each case, this order 
is the profile or projection that in each case envelops the face of Nature in 
its entirety, or the relation of all relations (25).
Modes are projections or extrinsic individuations. But these projections 
envelop the relation of movement and rest that brought those projections 
into existence: in other words, they envelop their cause, which is God. 
Every projection is therefore an invariant (something that is unaltered by 
transformation) and an involution (a function that is its own inverse) and 
is connected to every other relation and on to infinity to comprise ‘the 
relation of all relations’ or the facies totius naturae. Hence, Deleuze refers 
to Spinoza’s philosophy as an ‘optical geometry’: each relation is formed 
by at least two bodies, each of which, in turn, is formed by two or more 
bodies and so on into infinity. When we encounter a body that agrees 
with our own, joyful passive affections are produced, which become joyful 
active affections when we can form an idea of the intrinsic structure that 
we share with that other body. A common notion is a relation, in this 
sense, and the accumulation of joyful affections helps us form that initial 
relation. Modes are ‘projections of light’, and therefore also ‘coloring 
causes’ (25), which at their limit would merge with every other colour as 
an infinite mode.
It is towards this kind of knowledge, the kind capable of taking in 
the facies totius naturae, which Spinoza calls the third kind of knowledge 
and Deleuze the ‘third state of light’, that the whole of the Ethics moves.17 
According to Deleuze, this knowledge is composed ‘no longer [of] signs 
of shadow or of light as color, but light in and of itself ’ (29). Deleuze 
argues that common notions, ‘insofar as they are projections, are already 
optical figures’ (30) because they are concepts of relations. The first 
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kind of knowledge presents a ‘logic of the sign’, the second a ‘logic of 
the concept’, the third ‘a logic of essence’: Shadow, Colour and Light, 
respectively (33). One cannot begin with Light, but ‘one must reach it as 
quickly as possible’ (29).
For Deleuze, Book V is ‘a method of invention that will proceed 
by intervals and leaps, hiatuses and contractions, somewhat like a dog 
searching rather than a reasonable man explaining’ (31). Its form is 
different from the other books because what Spinoza points to is the 
direct knowledge of essences: ‘absolute and no longer relative speed, figures of 
light and no longer geometric figures revealed by light’ (32, original emphasis). 
Where common notions always refer to relations of movement and 
rest (relative speeds), essences make themselves understood in flashes: 
‘Essences on the contrary are absolute speeds that do not compose space 
by projection, but occupy it all at once in a single stroke’ (30).
However, as Deleuze admits, the chain of reasoning that leads to the 
third kind of knowledge is less self-evident than the others. The first 
kind of knowledge is derived from an associative chain of signs and 
affects. The second kind is produced by an automatic chain of concepts 
and causes. But the chain for the third kind of knowledge, the final link, 
is missing: as Deleuze writes, it leads to a ‘double interval’.18 Deleuze 
takes proposition 10 as an example. Quoting Spinoza: ‘As long as we 
are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have the power of 
ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the 
order of the intellect’ (32). Deleuze points out that the subordinate 
clause (bodies that agree with our own and thus increase our power or 
joy) and the principle (that through this power we can form a common 
notion and from there we can ultimately move to an apprehension of 
the facies totius naturae) actually open up a rift: we are required to fill in 
the gap ourselves, and unless we do so, we will be ‘undecided about the 
fundamental question: How do we come to form any common notion at 
all? And why is it a question of the least universal of notions (common to 
our body and one other)’ (32)?
Deleuze does not answer his question, but instead argues that Book 
V surpasses demonstration and decidability because its method depends 
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on a form of thought that operates at absolute speed. With this kind of 
thought, leaps, lacunae and cuts are positive characteristics. He compares 
the style of Book V to the thought of certain mathematicians:
When mathematicians are not given over to the constitution of an 
axiomatic, their style of invention takes on strange powers, and the 
deductive links are broken by large discontinuities or on the contrary 
are violently contracted. No one denies Desargues’s genius, but 
mathematicians like Huygens or Descartes had difficulty understanding 
him. His demonstration that every plane is the ‘polar’ of a point, and every 
point the ‘pole’ of a plane, is so rapid that one has to fill in everything 
it skips over. No one has described this jolting, jumping, and colliding 
thought better than Evariste Galois, who himself encountered a good 
deal of incomprehension from his peers: analysts ‘do not deduce, they 
combine, they compose; when they arrive at the truth, it is by crashing 
in from all sides that they happen to stumble on it’. Once again, these 
characteristics do not appear as simple imperfections in the exposition, so 
that it can be done ‘more quickly’, but as powers of a new order of thought 
that conquers at absolute speed (31).
This new order of thought depends on the interval to function and on 
a ‘speed of absolute survey’ (survol) to draw together to the maximum 
degree terms that are distant as such (32). The double interval in Spinoza 
thus invites a double reading: ‘on the one hand, a systematic reading in 
pursuit of the general idea and at the same time, the affective reading, 
without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put 
in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the philosophy of this 
or that part’ (Spinoza 129).
Deleuze compares the expressionist philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz 
in terms of light and dark: Leibniz is said to be closer to the Baroque, 
to darkness, his ‘fuscum subnigrum’ is a matrix out of which colour and 
light emanate, but in Spinoza all is light. He is therefore closer to the 
Byzantine, where ‘everything is light, and the Dark is only a shadow, a 
simple effect of light on the bodies that reflect it (affection) or absorb 
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it (affect)’ (24). In his book on Leibniz, The Fold, Deleuze compares the 
camera obscura to the dark and windowless monad. The Leibnizian 
monad and the Spinozan mode are similar: both are individual centres 
of expression. But for Leibniz, the world that each monad expresses does 
not exist outside the monad that expresses it. Furthermore, Leibnizian 
expression is tied to concepts of creation and emanation, and expression 
is inseparable from signs. It is thus a ‘symbolic’ philosophy, and equating 
signs to expression means that at times expression is confused and 
at other times it is distinct: ‘Such a symbolic philosophy is necessarily a 
philosophy of equivocal expressions’ (Deleuze, Expressionism 29, original 
emphasis). Spinoza, however, separates signs from expression. The type 
of knowledge that comes from signs is inherently inadequate. However, 
we are capable of forming an adequate idea, which is to say ‘a distinct 
idea that has freed itself from the obscure and confused background from 
which in Leibniz it was inseparable’ (330). Where Leibniz operates in the 
realm of symbolism, harmony and analogy, Spinoza’s language,
on the other hand, hinges on univocity: first of all, the univocity of 
attributes (in that attributes are, in the same form, both what constitute 
the essence of substance, and what contain modes and their essences); 
second, univocity of causation (in that God is the cause of all things in 
the same sense that he is cause of himself); then univocity of ideas (in that 
common notions are the same in a part as in a whole). Univocity of being, 
univocity of production, univocity of knowing; common form, common 
cause, common notion – these are the three figures of the Univocal that 
combine absolutely in an idea of the third kind (332).
To take this in, a special perception is required – absolute survey or 
overview. It is the momentary glimpse capable of taking in the facies totius 
naturae or immanence, the flash of the dialectical image. Indeed, Deleuze 
uses this very language: Spinoza’s philosophy ‘is the quintessential object 
of an immediate, unprepared encounter, such that a nonphilosopher, 
or even someone without any formal education, can receive a sudden 
illumination from him, a “flash” ’ (Spinoza 29).
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Curiously, in The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin attributes 
his understanding of the Idea to Leibniz:
The idea is a monad. The being that enters into it, with its past and 
subsequent history, brings – concealed in its own form – an indistinct 
abbreviation of the rest of the world of idea, just as, according to Leibniz’s 
Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), every single monad – the pre-stabilized 
representation [Repräsentation] of phenomena resides within it, as in their 
objective interpretation. The higher the order of the ideas, the more perfect 
the representation [Repräsentation] contained within them. And so the real 
world could well constitute a task, in the sense that it would be a question of 
penetrating so deeply into everything real as to reveal thereby an objective 
interpretation of the world. In the light of such a task of penetration it is 
not surprising that the philosopher of the monadology was also the founder 
of infinitesimal calculus. The idea is a monad – that means briefly: every 
idea contains an image of the world. The purpose of the representation 
[Darstellung] of the idea is nothing less than an abbreviated outline 
[Verkürzung] of this image of the world (47–48, translation modified).
The original German words are telling: the monad-Idea is a stabilised 
re-presentation. Deleuze agrees: in The Fold, he describes how Leibniz 
puts a great screen between the Many and the One, between chaos and 
order. This screen is the fuscum subnigrum, and ‘is like the infinitely 
refined machine that is the basis of Nature’ (87). If chaos is the ‘sum of 
all possibles’, a ‘universal giddiness’, then it is the screen that makes it 
possible to ‘extract differentials [to be] integrated in ordered perceptions’ 
(87). For Benjamin, the idea is an ‘image of the world’, but it is not a 
dialectical image, because a dialectical image is marked by time, whereas 
Ideas are ‘timeless constellations’ (German Tragic Drama 34). However, the 
Darstellung of the idea is a ‘contraction’ (Verkürzung) of that image – it is 
what produces the dialectical image, which is the image of an image, or a 
citation of a citation. As Haverkamp argues with marvellous succinctness, 
‘ “Legibility” is what cuts [the dialectical image] off from mere imagerie 
and mere imagination and turns it, dialectically, from what it contains, 
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fossil-like, into the schema of what this fossil, flash-like, reveals’ (74). 
The flash occurs at the collision of affect and concept. It emerges like the 
sudden apparition of a ghost that haunts the remains. One can never be 
sure of what it is that one has seen, but only that one has seen, that one has 
felt that one has seen, and in its wake this spectrum leaves a trace in eyes 
that are now bloodshot.
III. A life
Considered in allegorical terms … the profane world is both elevated and 
devalued (Benjamin, German Tragic Drama 175).
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze states that paradox is ‘the pathos or 
the passion of philosophy’ (227). Paradox is always opposed to the order 
of common sense. It breaks up the faculties and ‘places each before its 
own limit, before its incomparable: thought before the unthinkable which 
it alone is nevertheless capable of thinking; memory before the forgotten 
which is also its immemorial, sensibility before the imperceptible which 
is indistinguishable from its intensive’ (227). It is what, in Benjamin’s 
language, brings dialectics to a standstill. However, at the same time, says 
Deleuze, paradox ‘communicates to the broken faculties that relation 
which is far from good sense, aligning them along a volcanic line which 
allows one to ignite the other, leaping from one limit to the next’ (227). 
One part igniting the other, like the glass paste of a mosaic, or the jagged 
strokes of lightning. ‘Objectively,’ Deleuze continues, ‘paradox displays the 
element which cannot be totalized within a common element, along with 
the difference which cannot be equalized or cancelled at the direction 
of good sense’ (227). This element is singular essence, which is to say, 
immanence itself.
In one of his final texts, Deleuze defines immanence as ‘A LIFE’ (Pure 
Immanence). The indefinite article is of crucial importance: it is ‘the 
mark of the person only because it is determination of the singular’ (30). 
Immanence is pure expression expressing. It is life itself, we might say; but 
it is, more importantly, a life. We must pay attention to the articles in this 
statement: ‘The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, 
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and the plane of immanence by a life’ (28). The transcendental field is 
defined by a plane of immanence, which is to say the transcendental field 
is singular essence, the difference that cannot be equalised, the element 
that cannot be totalised; the plane of immanence is defined by a life, which 
is to say, a mode. Through its singular essence, through its difference that 
cannot be equalised, through an element that cannot be totalised, a mode 
expresses substance. But in order to express substance, one must not 
‘faithfully rest in the contemplation of bones’ (233), as Benjamin states in 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama: the leap forward to redemption, to 
beatitude, means, for Deleuze, ‘to become active; to express God’s essence, 
to be oneself an idea through which the essence of God explicates itself, to 
have affections that are explained by our own essence and express God’s 
essence’ (Expressionism 320). ‘If we take the indefinite article as an index 
of the transcendental’, Deleuze argues, then no one ‘has described better 
what a life is than Charles Dickens’:
A disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by everyone, is found as 
he lies dying. Suddenly, those taking care of him manifest an eagerness, 
respect, even love for the slightest signs of life. Everybody bustles about to 
save him, to the point where, in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself 
senses something soft and sweet penetrating him. But to the degree that 
he comes back to life, his saviors turn colder, and he becomes once again 
mean and crude. Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is 
only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way 
to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from 
the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity 
and objectivity of what happens: a ‘Homo tantum’ with whom everyone 
empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer 
of individuation but of singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral, 
beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the 
midst of things that made it good or bad. The life of such an individuality 
fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer 
has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a 
life … (Pure Immanence 28–29).
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Shorn of the markers that would individuate him, the man becomes – 
momentarily – pure intensity. It is no longer his life, but a life: pure event, 
the absolute speed of a light that reveals in its flash the facies totius naturae 
in a life. It is a moment that is lost as quickly as it arrives: returning to 
health, to waking life and reality, to context, he is reminded of who he is 
and of life as it has already been defined for him. Deleuze takes care to say 
that this experience of a life does not happen only in extreme situations 
that dramatise the passage between life and death: it can happen at any 
time, but only ‘between-times, between-moments’ – empty time, in other 
words, time not claimed by the individual, or by the demands of ‘internal 
and external life’, or by ‘the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens’, 
time in which one is no longer the subject but an indefinite article, a life. 
In the realisation of a life, life coincides with life, a momentary collision of 
presence with the present, pure event: ‘It doesn’t just come about before or 
come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the 
event yet to come and already happened in the absolute of an immediate 
consciousness’ (29).
The intellectual understanding of a paradox does not lead to the 
beatific state. One must abide in paradox. What the man experiences as a 
stage towards his momentary encounter with beatitude is this: ‘thought 
before the unthinkable which it alone is nevertheless capable of thinking; 
memory before the forgotten which is also its immemorial; sensibility 
before the imperceptible which is indistinguishable from its intensive’ 
(29). In the very next moment, a ‘volcanic line’ seems to ignite one relation 
to another, ‘leaping from one limit to the next’, and finally, though at 
an absolute speed that makes everything appear to have happened all at 
once, the relation of all relations, the facies totius naturae. This image, in 
Benjamin’s words, ‘flashes up at the moment of its recognisability, and is 
never seen again’ (Selected Writings 4: 390). In a moment of acute physical 
weakness, desperate weakness, a sweetness and a softness opens up in 
him, which is perhaps also love.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, the following works by Lingis: The Community; Foreign 
Bodies; Abuses; The Imperative; Trust; Body Transformations; Dangerous 
Emotions; First Person Singular.
2. I understand a ‘creaturely’ encounter as one that is not mediated through 
the representations and symbolic structures of consciousness and self-
consciousness, which would position a person as subject over and against 
the world as object. For extended discussions of this idea, see Weigel’s Walter 
Benjamin and Santner’s On Creaturely Life.
3. The studium of a photograph is all of its historical, political and socioeconomic 
significations, but the punctum is something less easily readable: it is what 
‘breaks’ or disturbs the studium by ‘wounding’ the viewer. With the studium, one 
may view photographs ‘as political testimony or enjoy them as good historical 
scenes’; with the punctum, what one sees is ‘that accident which pricks me (but 
also bruises me, is poignant to me)’ (Camera Lucida 26–27). Like Lingis, Barthes 
is not especially interested in the studium of a photograph, but rather in its 
punctum: ‘I am a primitive, a child – or a maniac; I dismiss all knowledge, all 
culture, I refuse to inherit anything from another eye than my own’ (51).
4. The ‘sober Absolute’, as Rudolphe Gashé notes, is the Absolute as the profane, 
the creaturely: it is that which has been ‘de-sacralized, de-divinized’, an 
‘Absolute that has forfeited its transcendence’ (65).
5. See the fragment ‘On Language as Such and the Language of Man’, which 
was composed in 1916, the same year he began thinking about his Trauerspiel 
study (Selected Writings 1).
6. See, in particular, ‘A Little History of Photography’. This is one of the first 
essays in which Benjamin mentions the ‘aura’, a concept that seems to 
correspond (at first blush, at least) to Barthes’s conception of the ‘air’. After 
naming the aura a few times in the essay, Benjamin pauses to ask, ‘What is 
aura actually?’ and answers that it is a ‘strange weave of space and time: the 
unique appearance or semblance of a distance, no matter how close it may 
be’ (Selected Writings 2: 518). Just as Barthes asserts that he cannot read a 
photograph, Benjamin makes a photograph’s readability germane to the loss 
of its aura. The subjects of early portrait photographs had their aura intact, 
he argues, because newspapers were still a luxury item, ‘photography had 
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not yet become a journalistic tool, and ordinary people had yet to see their 
names in print’ (512). The first people to be reproduced as images therefore 
‘entered the visual space of photography with their innocence intact – or 
rather, without inscription’ (512). While the gaze of the subjects of early 
portraiture instilled a sense of their enduring presence and caused viewers 
to feel a sense of sudden proximity, the post-aura photograph, with its 
accompanying inscription, effects a temporal disjunction.
7. It is ‘by virtue of a strange combination of nature and history that the 
allegorical mode of expression is born’ (Benjamin, German Tragic Drama 167).
8. In the original German, the last sentence of this citation reads: ‘Das macht 
den Schriftcharakter der Allegorie’ (161).
9. In Dialectical Images, Michael W. Jennings argues that Benjamin’s dialectical 
image is the result of a nihilist combination of mysticism and Marxism. In 
Walter Benjamin, Sigrid Weigel focuses on the figure of the ‘detail’ to establish 
a connection between The Origin of German Tragic Drama and ‘A ‘Little 
History of Photography’. She argues that Benjamin ‘develops his method of 
reading as a saving critique in nuce: as the gaze of a philosophical critique that 
perceives the historical charge in the detail and is able to decipher the traces 
of history in remnants and fragments’ (243). Susan Buck-Morss, in Dialectics 
of Seeing, and Eduardo Cadava, in Words of Light, both have produced readings 
that tend to ‘perform’ Benjamin’s understanding of the dialectical image. 
Cadava attempts ‘to understand Benjamin’s concept of history by analyzing 
his persistent recourse to the language of photography in his discussions of 
history’ (xix). Unlike Cadava’s book, which produces a set of ‘photographs 
in prose’ (xix), Buck-Morss reproduces actual photographs in her book, and 
comes under considerable censure from Anselm Haverkamp for doing so. 
Haverkamp is of the view that the dialectical image is primarily a readable 
image. Samuel Weber makes a similar argument but focuses on the ‘ability’ or 
potentiality of the dialectical image.
10. See Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (190). Disappointingly, 
John Osborne’s translation renders this phrase as ‘every image is only a form 
of writing’ (214).
11. This word ‘schema’, the Latin for figure, is important. It appears in my 
epigraph, where Benjamin describes the souvenir as marking ‘the schema 
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of the commodity’s transformation into an object for the collector’, while 
Barthes invokes the word ‘schema’ in the preface to The Lover’s Discourse: 
‘These fragments of discourse can be called figures. The word is to be 
understood, not in its rhetorical sense, but rather in its gymnastic or 
choreographic acceptation; in short, in the Greek meaning: σχήμα is not 
the “schema”, but, in a much livelier way, the body’s gesture caught in action 
and nor contemplated in repose: the body of athletes, orators, statues: 
what in the straining body can be immobilized. So it is with the lover at 
grips with his figures: he struggles in a kind of lunatic sport, he spends 
himself, like an athlete; he “phrases”, like an orator; he is caught, stuffed 
into a role, like a statue. The figure is the lover at work’ (3–4). Barthes 
suggests here that, at least in his understanding, schema is different from 
figure: schema is something frozen, petrified if you will, while figure is 
physical, active, dynamic. It is not clear if this distinction between figure 
and schema exists for Benjamin. About the inscription, he states at one 
point: ‘Ins Gelesene geht sie ein als >Figur<’ (the inscription enters into the 
read as its figure), which does not suggest that he considers ‘figure’ as 
either passive or active. But of schema, he writes that it is both fixed and 
fixing, and this apparent contradiction is resolved in his concept of the 
dialectical image.
12. He is particularly critical of Buck-Morss’s book in this respect: ‘Without more 
than the evidence of suitable pictures, Buck-Morss solves the mystery of the 
“dialectical image” much as Alexander solved another problem in cutting 
the Gordian knot. Why untie an obviously overcomplex theory if one can 
demonstrate so easily what it is about, and thus avoid the detour of too much 
thinking?’ (Haverkamp 72)
13. Benjamin states that Ideas are ‘something linguistic’, and in support of this 
point, he quotes Hermann Güntert: ‘Plato’s “Ideas” are – if, for once, they 
might be considered from this one-sided viewpoint – nothing but deified 
words and verbal concepts’ (German Tragic Drama 36).
14. As Cadava and Cortés-Rocca explain, Barthes here plays on the proximity 
between the French words for film and for skin: ‘From pellis, the skin, pellicule 
and “film” originally have the same meaning: a small or thin skin, a kind of 
membrane’ (26, n17). Barthes himself draws on this connection in Roland 
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Barthes by Roland Barthes when he describes the pellicule as a ‘skin without 
puncture’ (54–55).
15. As George H.R. Parkinson notes in his translation, ‘Spinoza may here be 
distancing himself from Descartes, who said that he took the word “idea” to 
mean “whatever is immediately perceived by the mind”’ (Spinoza 330, n4).
16. For full discussion of this, see Cesare Casarino’s ‘Marx before Spinoza’.
17. In Henri Bergson, there is a similar idea. In The Creative Mind, he distinguishes 
between two kinds of knowledge: ‘The first implies going all around it, the 
second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the 
symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests 
on no symbol. Of the first kind of knowledge we shall say that it stops at the 
relative; of the second that, wherever possible, it attains the absolute’ (133).
18. The term ‘double interval’ comes from Plato’s Timaeus: in the midst of 
creating the Soul of the world, God needs to neutralise differences between 
divisible and indivisible Sameness, Difference and Being, so he forges two 
separate chains, one marked by a double interval (1, 2, 4, 8), the other by a 
triple interval (1, 3, 9, 27) (Timaeus 35–37). In his commentary on this passage 
in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that in his effort to ‘draw from 
the depths of an intensive spatium a serene and docile extensity, and to dispel 
a Difference which subsists in itself even when it is cancelled outside itself’, 
Plato’s God ‘dances upon a volcano’ (234). Difference is singular essence, 
the multiple inequalities and differences that rumble beneath and threaten 
to fracture the auratic façade of the One. When the term ‘double interval’ 
resurfaces in Deleuze’s discussion of Spinoza, it is to mark a specific point at 
which the pathway to the third kind of knowledge suddenly falls away.
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CHAPTER 7
RE-COVER: AFRIKAANS ROCK, APARTHEID’S 
CHILDREN AND THE WORK OF THE COVER
Aidan Erasmus
Ek’s ’n agtergeblewende
op die grasvelde van my kinderdae1
(Fokofpolisiekar, ‘Kyk noord’)
In an eight-part series of short videos released on their website 
chronicling the recording of their latest album, Bloed, sweet en trane, the 
lead vocalist, Francois van Coke, from the Afrikaans rock band Van Coke 
Kartel (VCK) explained what he deemed was the inspiration for the lyrics 
on the album:
I think it’s like … that obviously comes across in the lyrics is like just, 
where life is at the moment. I think that’s probably my main goal with the 
lyrics on this album is just to write about normal, everyday things … like 
what I’m experiencing … Ja, I think Bloed, sweet en trane is a collection of 
songs about a new chapter for me and the band, and the realisation that 
things like love and playing music with others and music makes you part 
of … something, even if you’re very insignificant in the greater scheme of 
things (Eendag op ’n slag).
VCK emerged after the break-up of the Afrikaans punk-rock outfit 
Fokofpolisiekar.2 Fokofpolisiekar’s 2003 EP, entitled As jy met vuur 
speel sal jy brand,3 caused an uproar in conservative Afrikaans-speaking 
communities because of songs, such as ‘Hemel op die platteland’,4 which 
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openly expressed an antireligious sentiment, so distancing the band 
from a fundamental tenet of Afrikaner nationalism (see Badprop; De 
Olim; Herholdt; Nel). Given the ways in which their music challenges 
the subject position of white South Africans in particular – specifically, 
Afrikaans-speaking white youth – after the democratic transition of 
1994, the group has also been linked with a certain articulation of what 
it means to be white in a postapartheid South Africa constituted against 
the racialised apartheid past. Fokofpolisiekar, their music and their lyrics 
have been seen as marking an important moment in this shift in this set 
of debates, and their ‘contribution to the South African music scene with 
their questioning of white patriarchal South African values as well as 
their visceral and poetic use of the Afrikaans language, paved the way 
for a fresh alternative movement within South African music’ (Smit 2). 
Fokofpolisiekar has been seen by Sonja Smit as a direct antecedent of 
both the hip hop artist Jack Parow and the debate around whiteness in 
post-1994 South Africa. She notes that Jack Parow ‘emerges from within a 
context in which (some) young alternative Afrikaans [speaking] musicians 
are processing and reclaiming their Afrikaans-ness as something that is 
not always associated with apartheid… before Fokofpolisiekar made it 
popular and acceptable, singing in Afrikaans was not popular among 
white alternative bands in South Africa’ (2). The band became a popular 
cultural sensation, giving rise to a documentary film, Fokofpolisiekar: 
Forgive Them, a full-page newspaper advert condemning their actions, as 
well as a 224-page published biography (see Klopper).
As Fokofpolisiekar was well known for giving the Afrikaans music 
scene ‘a good kick in the balls’ (Weekly Mail & Guardian, 13 May 2004), 
the expectation that VCK would protest in the same brash manner was 
not unwarranted. Contrary to these expectations, Van Coke’s thoughts 
on the album seem subdued, and instead of expressing frustration with 
the apparatuses of cultural and political power that were the object of 
Fokofpolisiekar’s protest, Van Coke acknowledges that perhaps protest 
need not be voiced as explicitly as before; perhaps being a musician is in 
and of itself protest enough. According to Van Coke, it ‘makes you part 
of … something, even if you’re very insignificant in the greater scheme 
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of things’ (Eendag op ’n slag). In a recent review of Bloed, sweet en trane, a 
critic’s impatience with a song entitled ‘In die agtergrond’5 is audible:
Most of all I just don’t get the album. Since when do they sing about shitty 
jobs and being content on the weekends with an ‘uitsig en ’n ligte bries 
om in af te koel, son sak in die agtergrond’?6 When I listen to VCK, I want 
to escape the lousy whirlpool that is my reality, not be reminded of it. I 
want to be inspired to go out and break shit and be able to blame it on the 
music. But with this album I just kind of, you know, can’t (Van der Spuy).
Other reviewers, while not echoing this frustration as dismissively, 
also refer to VCK’s engagement in Bloed, sweet en trane with a sense of 
disillusionment. They also note VCK’s espousal of excessive alcohol 
consumption, substance abuse and a subculture of destructive habits, 
practices synonymous with ‘Afrikaans-rock junkies’:
With Bloed, Sweet & Trane [VCK] spits in the face of terms like ‘hitting 
the ceiling’ and ‘circling the creative cul-de-sac’ on their hardest-hitting 
album yet. They’ve conjured up enough fresh, fist-pumping riffs here to 
last Afrikaans-rock junkies a lifetime. There’s barbed-wire garage-rock 
tumbleweeds about gazing te diep in die bottel (‘Die dag’).7 There’s slow 
walking power anthems knowing that you know nothing (‘Môregloed’).8 
There are regular intoxicated liaisons with violence and friends with bad 
habits (‘Here, man’9) (Welfare).
In this chapter, I interpret this frustration with Bloed, sweet en trane that 
manifests in its inability to inspire its listeners to ‘go out and break shit and 
be able to blame it on the music’ (as Fokofpolisiekar may have done) as an 
invitation to take VCK’s supposedly absent, reactionary gesture seriously. By 
reading VCK and Fokofpolisiekar alongside earlier examples of Afrikaans 
popular music – specifically the ‘cover versions’ or new performances by 
VCK of previously recorded songs by other artists – as well as the historical 
narrative of white protest music within which they are inserted, I argue 
that the expectations placed upon VCK to protest are not unwarranted. 
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In fact, these expectations are the constitutive grounds upon which VCK 
(and, by extension, Fokofpolisiekar) can engage the postapartheid social. 
Moreover, in addition to the investment in dissent that marks the music 
of both groups, the work of VCK involves a covering, re-covering and a 
recovery of the everyday as constituted by apartheid’s difference. The 
‘cover’ or way in which VCK articulates the unstable terms of the social – 
as it emerges in the wake of apartheid – echoes insistently in their music, 
and I suggest that attention to these echoes renders the cover as the form 
constitutive of the remains that haunt rock and roll after apartheid.10
A season in paradise11
In 1988, the Afrikaans pop singer Carike Keuzenkamp released Ek sing, a 
compilation of ballads about South Africa. At the time of its release, South 
Africa was visibly at war, with the Internal Security Act of 1982 granting 
police greater powers to respond to the growing unrest and resistance 
in the country. In 1986 and 1987 alone, security forces detained 26 000 
people, the majority of whom were under the age of 18 (see Webster). 
Despite the country being in a state of emergency, the South Africa 
that Keuzenkamp presented in her album was utopian, pastoral and 
romanticised. The album – with tracks like ‘Bartolomeu Dias’, ‘As die 
suidoos gaan lê’12 and ‘Dom diedelie dom’ – was one of many recordings 
at the time that expressed ‘the escapist, fantasy nature of … mainstream 
Afrikaans pop’, and was ‘noteworthy for its almost complete denial 
of the realities of the social realm’ ( Jury 100).13 One song in particular, 
‘Dis ’n land’,14 demonstrates this in content as much as in form. The 
ballad’s chorus speaks of an incredibly diverse and inclusive country, one 
animated by a common goal.
In her references to a country which affords all its people a sense of 
belonging and which faces a hopeful and bountiful future, Keuzenkamp 
ascribes to South Africa (both as political and geographic formation) a 
historical trajectory that will produce a distinctly modern state that 
‘works for the people’ and acknowledges the right to self-determination 
of all its diverse constituencies. This devotion to futurity is encapsulated 
in Keuzenkamp’s evocation that South Africa is a country of dreams and 
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progressive sentiment, and the emphatic request that we allow the future 
to entirely envelope us. 
The future that Keuzenkamp offers is one that renders absent the 
violent, fraught and complex history that South Africa at war presents, 
and is almost desperate in its repeated recourse to the claim that South 
Africa will cater for all people within its borders, granting all the right 
to both a cultural and a political life. While we may attribute this to the 
tradition of Afrikaans balladry in South Africa, or to the very obvious 
manner in which Keuzenkamp’s project is the project of apartheid 
and its ideology of good neighbourliness, we should be aware of other 
reverberations of its content. Indeed, her lyrics implicitly echo Prime 
Minister P.W. Botha’s well-known warning to white South Africans of 
1979, amid growing unrest, unemployment and looming economic 
failure, that ‘we are moving into a changing world [and] we must adapt 
otherwise we shall die’(Giliomee 586). The repeated questions in the 
third verse about parental responsibility – of the protection of minors, 
the securing of possibility for the next generation, and the child as South 
Africa’s locus of potentiality  for the nation – resonate with the themes of 
reform, change and the South African state’s ‘overriding consideration’ in 
the 1980s that survival was key (587).
What is particularly resonant here is the figure of the child, which 
appears in various, often contradictory guises throughout ‘Dis ’n land’. 
In one sense, the child is the detained protester, fighting against the state 
(emblematic of youth involvement in anti-apartheid activities from the 
time of the Soweto Uprising of 1976 to the township unrest and resistance 
of the 1980s). In another sense, he is the soldier, fighting for the state 
(emblematic of the young white conscripts sent to fight in the border wars 
and to patrol the townships). Lee Edelman argues that within the child, 
as constituted in Lacanian psychoanalysis, lies the ‘perpetual horizon of 
every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political 
intervention’ (3), and that to elaborate a politics without the child at its 
centre is to deny an investment in futurism, or its ‘unquestioned good’ (7). 
In the case of ‘Dis ’n land’, the figure of the child carries Keuzenkamp’s 
vision of the future. The child must produce the heteronormativity that 
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apartheid demands, for ‘the fantasy subtending the image of the Child 
invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be 
thought’ (2). By invoking the child (who, as social actor within Afrikaner 
patriarchal society, must be male), and invoking him also through both 
mother and father as a rhetorical question, Keuzenkamp situates the 
child as both product and producer of the particular politics of Afrikaner 
society, a subject that is ensured and protected by the terms of apartheid 
as well as positioned as its condition of possibility.15 ‘Dis ’n Land’ is 
prescriptive for the generation that will follow Keuzenkamp, and renders 
the future of South Africa as dependent not only on the child, but also on 
the continuation of an unsustainable present. Similarly, ending the song 
with a repetition of the first two lines of the third verse — which speak 
specifically about the responsibility of the male and female parent — 
articulates the commitment to this reproductive futurity; to a politics that 
cannot account for a future without the child as its locus. Put differently, 
the children of apartheid must produce apartheid’s future or a future that 
is apartheid. It is a loop that resembles the rhythmic sympathy and tonal 
resonance of the cover – that which produces, that which determines the 
terms upon which what follows it will rest, and is that which follows it.
Apartheid’s children
bly en leef
want jou dood sal ek nooit verwerk nie16 (Van Coke Kartel, ‘Dankie,  
ek is veilig hier’)
In 2011, as the second single off their fourth album, Wie’s bang,17 VCK 
released their own song ‘Dis ’n land’. While not described explicitly as 
a cover of ‘tannie’ Carike’s version,18 it transforms her composition 
into what has been called a ‘fist-pumping requiem for a lost dream’ 
(see Keylock). VCK’s melding of violence and satire in their re-playing 
detracts from and denies the nostalgic anxiety of place and belonging that 
Keuzenkamp expresses, preferring instead a sombre and barren reading 
of the terms of the social set in motion by apartheid. Instead of replicating 
the chorus verbatim, VCK invoke elements of discord, disillusionment 
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and disunity that are in stark contrast to the yearning for togetherness-
in-difference that Keuzenkamp articulates:
Dis ’n land van kleure en klank
Dis ’n land van liefde vir drank
Jy is nie ek nie, ek’s jaloers op jou
Dis ’n land van korrupsie en goddank
Dis ’n land van liefde vir drank
Jy is nie ek nie, ek’s jaloers op jou.19
This reappearance of Keuzenkamp’s work in that of VCK can easily be 
read as parody – aligning VCK, Fokofpolisiekar and other post-1994 
white musical groups with the heritage of protest through rock and 
roll, which has largely been one of parody – but this would obscure the 
VCK version’s relation to the anxieties of Keuzenkamp’s original. One 
line that evokes this anxiety (which is elaborated more explicitly than in 
Keuzenkamp) is the mention of ‘murderers greeting each other with a hi-
five’, alongside snide commentary on the postcolonial state, corruption 
and the complexities of power:
In die land van die blindes is een-oog koning
Koning loop met die losprys weg
En moordenaars groet mekaar met ’n hi-five
Ek wou my krane stadig afdraai
Maar die lotery is klaar gewen
met ’n skoot deur die kop van ’n magnaat.20
One could say that anxiety about control – whether in the sense of a 
stability of self that pervades everyday life or a stability of the social – 
governs both Keuzenkamp’s and VCK’s renditions. While Keuzenkamp 
might not render the anxieties of a state at war explicit, it emerges 
through the investment in futurity that marks her composition. In fact, 
it is the future promised by apartheid (according to Keuzenkamp) – a 
future deferred in the wake of apartheid – that prevents any possibility 
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of VCK covering her work verbatim.21 VCK express worry about the 
present after the fall of the apartheid regime, but with an inflection that 
registers an earlier moment of engagement as a familiar failure – seen in 
the mention of the ‘king walk[ing] away with the ransom’ – and one that 
is (almost inevitably) interrupted by violence in the midst of an attempt 
to retain control: ‘I wanted to slowly turn my taps off/but the lottery has 
already been won/with a shot through the head of a magnate’. What is 
revealing is that in the following verse the anxieties of this moment are 
claimed by VCK, by self-consciously including themselves in the first 
person within a narrative of what could be referred to as ‘unrest’ (to use 
the terms of Keuzenkamp’s South Africa):
Blameer die duiwel
Lippe bewe morsig en die spoeg spat
Oorgehaal maar beheer verloor
En ons vier dit met ’n hi-five
Ek wou my krane regtig afdraai
Maar die lotery is klaar gewen
Met skote deur die bors van die magnaat.22
In their claiming ownership of land, their complacency and their depiction 
of post-1994 politics as well as through the line ‘and we celebrate it with 
a hi-five’, VCK – unlike Keuzenkamp’s song, where such a direct line 
does not appear – name themselves as part of something that is chaotic, 
divided and desperate. Preceding this affirmation is statement of being 
‘prepared but [having] lost control’, which should be interpreted as the 
expression of the fulfilment of Keuzenkamp’s anxieties in her original 
‘Dis ’n land’. In some sense, the figure of the child that has disappeared 
in VCK’s cover is represented by VCK themselves, who as the ‘children 
of apartheid’ must – and do – rearticulate Keuzenkamp’s politics. In the 
moment when VCK progress from observer in verse one to participant in 
verse two and, perhaps most prominently, to agent in the shift from ‘this 
is a land’ to ‘it is our land’ before the final chorus, VCK’s version of ‘Dis 
’n land’ moves from a mere repetition and amplification of Keuzenkamp 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
180
through the cover, to recovery, in the form of embodying the resonant 
loop that the cover enables; through becoming the children of apartheid, 
VCK must cover and re-cover.
To elaborate the work of the cover in inaugurating a different state 
of emergency more carefully, we need to return to Fokofpolisiekar, not 
only as musical progenitors of VCK, but also to establish VCK as the 
inheritors of Fokofpolisiekar’s gesture of protest. In this sense, we can 
locate VCK within a discourse about whiteness after apartheid. According 
to Ross Truscott and others, South Africa’s 1996 Constitution – which 
asks that the ‘injustices of the past’ be recognised – bears ‘the mark 
of authenticity’ (17), for it represents ‘[the] gaze towards the past of 
injustice and its legacy, from the “liberated” position of the present’. 
While the disavowal of any relation to or culpability for apartheid as a 
political project can be thought of as the constitutive act by which the 
notion of the postapartheid is inaugurated, the legacies of apartheid are 
still apparent in the cultural, social and psychological configurations 
of white South Africans in particular. This suggests that a complete 
rejection of apartheid would mean disentangling the white subject as 
produced by apartheid. To become a South African in the fullest sense 
of the term, one needs to disavow the past in a way that recognises it but 
does not repeat it. ‘The absence of a radical rupture with the past’ (196, 
emphasis added), as Gavin Steingo suggests, is what refuses a gesture of 
denunciation.
In a series of interviews by Cornel Verwey and Michael Quayle with 
white, middle-class Afrikaners, this specific tension becomes clear. While 
many ‘did much discursive work to discard certain visible aspects of 
Afrikaner identity’, they also ‘maintained whiteness as central to [this] 
identity, thus maintaining their claim to white privilege’ (552).23 As recent 
protest marches and allegations of a ‘white genocide’ by white groups 
such as Red October and other ‘minority advocacy groups’ have shown,24 
this results in the production (in the public as well as private sphere) of a 
‘ghettoized Afrikaner identity based on racial exclusivity, racist notions 
of inherent black inferiority, and out-group threat’ (560). Commenting on 
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this paranoia,25 Francois van Coke speaks, as if in a completely different 
temporal context – perhaps a state of emergency – about this fear that 
persists into the postapartheid:
‘I think there are a lot of scared people in South Africa at the moment’ 
explains Francois, and that fear is expressed succinctly in songs like 
‘Einde van die wêreld’26 … with lines like ‘Dis oor almal wat al jare vrees/
Altyd gereed vir die ongelukkige einde/Ons hoor dit oor en oor … (It’s 
about everyone that’s been afraid for years/Always ready for the unlucky 
end/we hear about it over and over) (Walker).
VCK’s cover of ‘Dis ’n land’ could be thought of as inaugurating a state 
of emergency around whiteness after the end of apartheid, as well as 
replaying the politics of an earlier moment of disquiet, as heard through 
‘tannie’ Carike. The line ‘you are not me/I am jealous of you’ renders VCK 
(and, in some ways, their fans) proponents or embodiments of Verwey 
and Quayle’s threatened whiteness, but it is also an act of dissociation, 
exacerbated by a distortion of Keuzenkamp through the dismembered 
chorus that VCK delivers. In much the same way as Keuzenkamp 
animates white fears by resorting to an insulated space where diversity 
reinscribes racial difference, VCK’s rendition, in both content and form, 
performs a similar incomplete gesture. By claiming ‘it is our land’, VCK 
refuse to relinquish ‘the land of colours and sounds’ (the only line from 
Keuzenkamp’s chorus that is reiterated unchanged) which they, as the 
‘children of apartheid’, must yield. The state of emergency is precisely that 
the cover cannot escape that which it is covering, nor can it transcend it. 
It is the act of living in a space where the angst of a community forms the 
script through which whiteness is worked through. Indeed, we must hear 
it over and over again.
Total onslaught
Let the simulation of ravening commence. Mechanisation means never 
having to wonder what to pretend to desire next (Daniels).
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Francois van Coke’s allusion to the centrality of music to everyday life 
needs to be taken seriously. In his writings on punk rock and its relation 
with race, Stephen Duncombe provides an apt point of departure for 
understanding how VCK’s protest is textured by the work of rock and roll:
My personal alienation was given social expression. In punk I found 
the outsider identity I desired, without borrowing a (Black) culture and 
a history that was so evidently not my own. As ridiculous as this might 
now sound, as a punk I imagined I could be White and not-White at the 
same time. White Noise [a band] was both a recognition of my race and an 
imaginary rejection of it (in Duncombe & Tremblay 3).
Duncombe views the relation between punk and race as one that 
allowed whiteness to be both questioned and affirmed through certain 
experiences in California in the 1960s in which he was involved. It was 
in this space that inhabiting the category of white became problematic, as 
for many the changing social circumstances made race very prominent: 
‘Whether through legal restriction, social exclusion or physical violence, 
non-Whites in the West were … continually reminded of their race’ (1–2). 
Duncombe stresses that what characterised this particular moment was a 
deliberate immersion in what he terms a ‘(Black) culture’. But instead of 
appropriating ‘black’ expressive forms, what is crucial about Duncombe’s 
articulation of the permeation of race is that through punk there is a 
negotiation of the category that, while already in question before it could 
be inhabited, had to be inhabited in order to inhabit punk. In a manner 
of speaking, punk’s condition of habitation is contestation. In this way 
punk can both highlight the issues pertaining to a certain articulation of 
whiteness and at the same time affirm it, despite what those issues may 
mean for a broader discourse about race. It comes as no surprise that as 
a student in the 1960s Duncombe played in a band named White Noise.
In the discursive space that punk offers (and it is important to read 
this discursive space as strongly determined by the genre of punk and 
the broader genre of rock and roll), whiteness is named as that which no 
longer constitutes the universal but which haunts any move beyond it. 
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As Duncombe notes, while whiteness was a subject positioning that many 
adopted openly, punk ‘forc[ed] … this subject positioning into popular 
consciousness’; ‘you had to name yourself as White … and figure out what 
the hell this meant’ (4). It is here that the affirmation of whiteness inherent 
in the first instances of punk’s racial politics takes on a particularly 
dissonant tone, one that celebrates difference while it reinforces the very 
categories it has posited as uncomfortable and contestable. In these terms, 
the presence of Nazi symbolism and the resounding calls of ‘White Power’, 
which have become synonymous with the genre, become irredeemable 
under the banner of something like postmodern pastiche or merely a 
collection of signifiers haphazardly thrown together.27 This occurrence is 
not confined to the US or Europe and can be seen in the name of what is 
considered the first punk group in South Africa, The Third Reich (Lucey 
interview). Punk allowed a white riot of a different kind, and it is a white 
riot that the cover enables.
To return to the point made earlier about inheritance, it is important 
to note that VCK is hardwired to produce music that must deliver some 
form of protest not only because of its parentage in Fokofpolisiekar, but 
because of rock and roll’s rendering as protest music in South Africa. 
The conflation of rock and roll and protest in South Africa comes to a 
head through punk, and it is no surprise that Fokofpolisiekar, through 
their protest, are referred to as a punk band.28 In her thesis on rock 
music in Durban from 1963 to 1985, Lindy van der Meulen highlights 
the connection between rock and roll as music and culture and protest, 
both in a broader sense and in the context of apartheid South Africa, 
suggesting that ‘the fact that rock has been linked to protest and defiance 
throughout its history is important, and that this feature of rock cannot 
be excluded from its definition’ (16–17). Given this conflation, the 
function that rock and roll may have within the broader configuration 
of whiteness after apartheid cannot be anything but protest, and protest 
in all its ambivalence, particularly as it emerges in South Africa. This 
not only permeates the sounds that VCK and Fokofpolisiekar produce, 
but is present in other creative forms as well. The design and layout of 
Fokofpolisiekar’s biography by Annie Klopper repeat this conflation 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
184
through subtle aesthetic references to what is known as punk’s DIY 
ethos, by the smudged fingerprints on the edges of the pages, and by what 
looks like handwritten corrections over certain paragraphs. A gesture of 
defiance is clearly visible on the title page with the words ‘Die Bende’ (The 
Gang) superimposed with adhesive tape onto the graphic of a Jägermeister 
brand logo. While this may reference punk rock’s DIY ethos as well as the 
practice of drinking that has a history alongside the genre, specifically in 
South Africa in the 1990s,29 this particular palimpsestic image signifies 
dysfunction, alcoholism and rebellion in the mind of the reader, setting 
the ‘bende’ on a journey towards dystopia.30
Although VCK deny any real alignment with punk or punk rock, 
with bassist Wynand Myburgh commenting on the ambiguity of the 
genre allocation by referring to the fact that ‘commercial guys call us 
punks, and punks call us commercial’,31 it is important to listen to the 
practice of naming at work here. In the same ways as punk rock as a set of 
practices seems to engage with whiteness in constructive ways but within 
that engagement complicates its own relationship with race, VCK and 
Fokofpolisiekar play to the same tune. While there is a visceral protest 
against visceral conditions, it is a protest that cannot be completed 
precisely because it affirms what it is attempting to reject. As Duncombe 
suggested in his own experience with his group White Noise, the gesture 
must imagine being both white and non-white at the same time, or reject 
race as well as affirm it. Fokofpolisiekar and VCK play out a rejection of 
whiteness after 1994 through the scripts of punk rock, which must return 
to another, familiar articulation of whiteness as reified by apartheid. It 
must cover in the guise of re-covering.
Lawrence Grossberg’s concept of the rock apparatus is helpful as 
a way of unpacking the work of genre alongside what punk enables. 
Grossberg constructs a theory of rock and roll as a lens of empowerment, 
locating ‘the effects of rock and roll at the level of an (at least potentially) 
oppositional politics which produces a rupture between the rock-and-
roll audience (in their everyday life) and the larger hegemonic context 
within which it necessarily exists’ (55). Grossberg attempts to define 
those effects through a definition of rock and roll as a strategy of survival 
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and empowerment in everyday life. The rock apparatus ‘locates what 
sorts of “pleasures” or energising possibilities are available to its fans 
[and] restructures social life by rearranging the sites at which pleasure 
can be found and energy derived, at which desire and power are invested 
and operative’ (54). For rock and roll fans, everything is desirable and 
deniable. The conditions for this reinvestment of energies and the 
reconstitution of what may be thought of as ‘possibilities’ derive from 
the youth experience of society – ‘the rock and roll culture transforms 
many of the structures of contemporary boredom (e.g. repetition and 
noise) into the structures and pleasures of its musical and listening 
practices’. Grossberg notes the historical implications of using the term 
‘youth’ here in relation to rock and roll, pointing out that ‘rock-and-
roll celebrates youth, not merely as a chronological measure but as 
a difference defined by the rejection of the boredom of the “straight” 
[heteronormative] world’. The boredom that he refers to is directly 
related to the ways in which ‘the politics of youth celebrate change, risk 
and instability’, and ‘the very structures of boredom become the sites of 
new forms of empowerment’.
Grossberg’s reminder that rock and roll must always reduce its 
surfaces to pleasure, but only in the terms of covering, is productive to 
hold on to. If we listen to VCK and Fokofpolisiekar through Grossberg, 
and if we take Francois van Coke’s words seriously, the protest that VCK 
and Fokofpolisiekar may make is largely a practice of ex-corporation, 
of reinvesting the boredom of the postapartheid into a rock apparatus 
that provides some sort of pleasure. Rock and roll and protest become 
a mechanism through which to survive, to adapt rather than die, as P.W. 
Botha exhorted.
Another review of Wie’s bang reads as follows:
Ek is een van daai pretentious faggots wat prentjies sien in hulle kop 
as hulle musiek luister. Wanneer ek na ‘Wie’s Bang’ luister, sien ek vir 
Francois, Wynand, Jed en Jason op ’n krans staan. Voor hulle is die einde. 
Die honger, lee maag van die duisternis, die vrees, die leemtes van die 
gate in ons kultuur. Voor hulle is die dinge, watookal dit mag wees, wat 
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jou bang maak. Dit dreig om hulle in te sluk. Maar die vier lede van VCK 
staan regop, en skree harder as nog ooit tevore dat hulle fokken WEIER 
om dit te laat gebeur32 (Zirkie).
A verse by the singer and songwriter Koos du Plessis from ‘Skadu’s teen 
die muur’33 demonstrates the very real sense of change in the 1980s in 
South Africa. With the apartheid state failing, the speaker recognised 
that bygone visions are now grave and ominous, and that apartheid has 
had its designated moment. What is interesting, however, is that ‘Skadu’s 
teen die muur’ is also covered verbatim by VCK in their version with the 
same name, on their third studio album, Skop, skiet en donner, released 
in 2010.34 Ironically, the term ‘skop, skiet en donner’ – while colloquially 
used in Afrikaans to describe a violent beating – was also used to describe 
the last whites-only general election in 1987, which was overshadowed 
by the National Party’s campaign slogan ‘Reform yes, Surrender no’ and 
was accompanied by widespread stayaway action by trade unions and 
opposition movements.
Simply through the practice of the cover, VCK repeat Du Plessis’s 
invocation of desperation, as well as the nonchalant manner in which he 
presents the dreams that have died. It is similarly fitting that the title of the 
album invokes violence, while the album that follows it (Wie’s bang) reiterates 
paranoia and fear as its framework, along with other references to war and 
dystopia found in Fokofpolisiekar album titles (As jy met vuur speel sal jy 
brand, Lugsteuring, Brand Suid-Afrika, Antibiotika).35 One reviewer described 
Skop, skiet en donner as ‘exhibit[ing] such a beautiful balance between angst, 
playfulness and attitude that it can’t help but feel like liberation’ (Young). 
What the work of the cover amplifies in the cases of ‘Skadu’s teen die muur’ 
and ‘Dis ’n land’ is not only the feeling of liberation, but the point that 
Fokofpolisiekar raises in a track titled ‘Verklaar’ off their first album with 
the line ‘en ons sing al jare saam/aan ons doodslied’.36 Put differently, VCK 
cannot renounce difference, which it must bring into being after those 
‘dreams have died’. Subsequently, they (and their fans too) stand on the edge 
of what is constituted as a perpetual and temporal end that never happens, 




1. ‘I am the one who stayed behind (or, I was left behind)/on the pastures of my 
childhood.’
2. ‘Fuck off police car.’
3. ‘If you play with fire, you will burn.’
4. ‘Heaven in the countryside.’
5. ‘In the background.’
6. ‘being content on the weekends with a view and a light breeze to cool off in, 
sunset in the background’.
7. ‘gazing too deep into the bottle’ (‘The Day’).
8. ‘Morning Glow’.
9. Literally, ‘Lord, man’; colloquially, ‘goddammit’.
10. An attendant question here is whether a postapartheid rock and roll that does 
not protest is possible. The answer, I argue, is that the cover is the only form 
in which dissent might be disavowed. I elaborate upon this later.
11. The title of a Breyten Breytenbach work.
12. ‘When the southeaster abates’.
13. Brendan Jury cites Hanneli van Staden and the way in which she describes 
Afrikaans popular music and its function: ‘By singing about beaches, seagulls, 
puppy love and rugby, society’s attention is taken away from socio-political 
issues – that … in South Africa are most relevant. In this way, Afrikaans light 
music artists help to create and promote a false consciousness’ (100).
14. ‘It’s a land’. The lyrics of ‘Dis ‘n Land’ by Keuzenkamp could not be reproduced 
in this chapter due to licensing complications, but it is easily accessible online. 
The album in which the song first appears, Ek Sing (1987), is readily available 
on iTunes and other online music stores. The lyrics (in Afrikaans) can be read 
here: http://www.lyricsbox.com/carike-keuzenkamp-dis-n-land-lyrics-
pzww9jq.html 
15. The child in Keuzenkamp’s ballad is caught up in a larger configuration of 
gender stereotypes espoused by Afrikaner nationalism that allow Afrikaans 
ballads such as ‘Dis ’n land’ and ‘liefdesliedjies’ (love songs) to render women 
‘passive, acquiescent, and the victims of unrequited love’, and ‘conversely men 
… as active manipulators of space and time, usually as farmers, soldiers or 
men of courage who engage in heroic struggles and quests’ ( Jury 101).
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16. ‘stay and live/because I could never work through your death’.
17. ‘Who’s Scared?’
18. ‘Tannie’ can be translated as ‘aunty’. Particularly in white Afrikaans-speaking 
communities, it is used to show respect to older women. Similarly, the word 
‘oom’, ‘uncle’, is its masculine form. On being asked in relation to the music 
video for ‘Dis ’n land’, where VCK donned clothing associated with elderly 
Afrikaner women, whether their attire in the video was inspired by Carike 
Keuzenkamp in the 1980s, bassist Wynand Myburgh responded, ‘Die idee 
was om op tannie Karike en 80’s tannies te speel [the idea was to play on 
Aunty Karike and ’80s aunties]’ (Griffin).
19. ‘It’s a land of colour and sound/it’s a land with a love for alcohol/you are not 
me, I’m jealous of you/it’s a land of corruption and immorality/it’s a land 
with a love for alcohol/you are not me, I’m jealous of you.’
20. ‘In the land of the blind being one eyed is king/king walks away with the 
ransom/and murderers greet each other with a hi-five/I wanted to slowly 
turn my taps off/but the lottery has already been won/with a shot through 
the head of a magnate.’
21. We see this embodied in the five-track EP Energie released in 2015 by VCK, 
of which all tracks are covers, ranging from the Beatles’ ‘Help’ to ‘Got to 
Give It Up’ by Thin Lizzy. Striking here is that the only South African and 
Afrikaans cover is that of ‘Energie’ by Johannes Kerkorrel, a figure renowned 
for his position within the white Afrikaans-speaking anti-apartheid cultural 
collective or protest movement Voëlvry of the 1980s. We see the foreclosure 
represented in the fact that the pop singer Keuzenkamp can only be perverted, 
while the protest musician Kerkorrel must emerge as close as possible to the 
original, with obvious punk rock inflections.
22. ‘Blame the devil/lips shake messily and the spit splatters/prepared but 
lost control/and we celebrate it with a hi-five/I really wanted to turn off 
my taps/but the lottery has been won/with shots through the chest of the 
magnate.’
23. The use of the term ‘Afrikaner’ here mirrors that of the text cited in 
this case for the sake of conceptual clarity. There are obvious debates 
(especially in the postapartheid era and specifically referenced by Verwey 
and Quayle in their discussion) surrounding whether or not people associate 
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with or use the term ‘Afrikaner’ or prefer the term ‘Afrikaans-speaking’, 
and what exactly both the use of the terms and the terms themselves 
actually mean.
24. On 10 October 2013, a group of protesters representing white rights in South 
Africa marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria as part of ‘Red October’, 
and ‘despite arguments that the event was intended to advance minority rights 
in general, the focus was very much on the rape and murder of white people 
by black people, something organisers did not shy away from characterising 
as genocide’ (De Wet).
25. In 2014, Fokofpolisiekar released a single track titled ‘Paranoia’ as a 
precursor to a new album. Hunter Kennedy (rhythm guitarist and lyricist) 
noted that Fokofpolisiekar’s intent was always to change Afrikaner identity 
by deconstructing known opinions and stereotypes, and ‘that identity is not 
fully formed yet and [they] think a big part of forming that identity will be for 
Afrikaners to accept their “Africanness” … Afrikaners are the ones alienating 
themselves … Paranoia is one of the side-effects of not understanding who 
you are and where you fit in’ (in Inggs). At the time of writing, this promised 
album has yet to be released.
26. ‘End of the world’.
27. Duncombe characterises the adoption by the Ramones and others of Nazi 
regalia and terms such as ‘blitzkrieg’ as being part and parcel of ‘an attempt 
by young Whites, dissatisfied with the world they were born into, to grab and 
forge a new ethnicity for themselves’ (Duncombe & Tremblay 5).
28. From the 1970s onwards, culminating in the late 1980s, there was a 
significant increase in the nature of cultural resistance, musical protest 
and involvement from specifically white English-speaking South Africans 
(later Afrikaans-speaking in the form of the Voëlvry Movement) against the 
apartheid government and its policies through the musical idiom of rock and 
roll. Before the 1970s, what was considered rock and roll engaged in playing 
covers, or ‘hit parade material’, particularly in Durban. However, by the 
early 1970s, rock and roll had become a veritable white middle-class youth 
culture, with more and more ‘progressive’ rock, or ‘rock with a message’, 
beginning to take hold. This growth was paralleled by a noticeable boom in 
South African popular music in general in the 1970s and 1980s, specifically 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
190
with regard to jazz – said to represent a ‘discourse closest to an international 
musical vernacular of the oppressed’ (Ballantine 309) – and groups 
combining Western and African musical idioms, like Johnny Clegg with 
Juluka and Savuka, among others. The first punk bands emerged in Durban, 
and sprouted a plethora of bands over the period from 1977 to around 1982 
alone, with some trailing into the mid- to late 1980s as well. Nasan Pather 
argues that ‘since its inception in this country, the idea of the punk rock 
… song lyric as a space within which social issues could be addressed then 
evolved into the highly politicised articulations of the alternative bands in 
the 1980s’ (2).
29. Lauren Basson highlights this in the context of the punk scene specifically, 
when she notes: ‘At every Fuzigish gig that I have been to, including the 
ones at Woodstock (30 September 2005) and Violent Femmes (5 November 
2005), the trumpeter whose stage name is Big Willy will suspend a beer 
funnel from the stage so that the skankers can refresh themselves as they 
run by. The photograph of Fuzigish in a Stage magazine that was analysed 
has all four members holding a beer (Stage 2005: 29). A quick quantitative 
analysis of how many times the words beer, alcohol and drunk are used 
in any of the Hog Hoggidy Hog interviews on their website reveals that 
these words appear in twelve of the twenty interviews that are provided. 
The words beer and drunk are also used extensively in Hog Hoggidy Hog 
lyrics, for example, in the songs “Sad Goodbye” and “The Incident”. The 
address of Half Price’s website is www.drunkpunk.co.za. In fact, when the 
punk bands were starting out in the country they would get drunk and 
play terribly. A few of them developed serious reputations for being out 
of control. Half Price has been banned from three Cape Town venues for 
their drunken behaviour. Half Price’s drinking habits are reflected in their 
lyrics as well. For example, the song “I Drink All Day” starts with five word 
repetition of the word beer, which is shortly followed by a list of their 
favourite local beers: I drink a Castle and an Amstel and a Black Label. 
I drink as long as I am able. Their songs “Real Men” and “Can-O-Beer” 
follow a similar theme pattern’ (51).
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30. The epigraph at the beginning of the biography, taken from ‘Evening’ 
by Frederic Prokosch, also creates an image of the band as disturbing, 
uncomfortable, introducing ‘wildness’ and ‘terror and desire’ (Klopper 5).
31. This was to highlight the response of one reviewer on www.punk.co.za who 
referred to them as sounding much like Avril Lavigne, an American pop 
singer (see Badprop).
32. ‘I’m one of those pretentious faggots who see pictures in their head when 
they listen to music. When I listen to “Wie’s bang”, I see Francois, Wynand, 
Jed and Jason standing on a cliff. In front of them is the end. The hungry, 
empty stomach of the wilderness, the fear, the emptiness of the holes in our 
culture. In front of them are the things, whatever they may be, that make you 
scared. It threatens to swallow them. But the four members of VCK stand up 
straight, and scream louder than ever before that they fucking REFUSE to let 
it happen.’
33. ‘Shadows against the wall’.
34. ‘Kick, Shoot, and Beat Up’.
35. Translation: If you play with fire you will be burnt, Air Disturbance, Burn 
South Africa, Antibiotics.
36. ‘and we have been singing together for years/our song of death’.
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CHAPTER 8
THE GRAVES OF DIMBAZA: TEMPORAL REMAINS
Gary Minkley and Helena Pohlandt-McCormick
This chapter takes as its starting point a formulation of liberation, read 
as inaugurating the non-racial as constitutive of the postapartheid social. 
Or perhaps, stated somewhat differently, liberation (as the ‘after’ of 1994) 
is understood as having seemingly prepared the ground for the capacity 
to move beyond the always already racial individuation of the social (see 
Van Bever Donker).
Yet liberation also holds within it the folds of a particular materialism 
and framing discourses of both class and of socialism,1 as well as how 
these conceptualisations are sutured to those of race and nation. 
Materialism and concepts of class also of course function internal to the 
logic of capitalism, although they are there repressed even as capitalism 
imagines itself as antithetical to the politics of socialism and the Left. A 
central proposition to emerge from this is how race and class are stitched 
together in various formations of disciplinary (history, psychology) 
and instrumental reasonings (systems of governance), and in a politics 
of resistance, and are seen to define apartheid (and anticipate the 
postapartheid), ranging from the Native Republic Thesis and Colonialism 
of a Special Type (CST), to those of racial capitalism.
In these formulations, often bracketed as the ‘race–class debate’, three 
central suppositions for defining the apartheid social can be discerned: 
(i) race is always already individuated by the imperatives of class; (ii) race 
is read as irrational and ‘false consciousness’, and its false irrationalities 
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can be disclosed through class struggle and resistance; and (iii) class will 
enable the disappearance of race through the modern figure of the worker 
(and a non-racial modernity). Read from a different vantage point, what 
remains of the social of apartheid – of race – are fragments, legacies and 
inheritances that continue to refuse or withhold this non-racial modernity 
even as the promise of a socialist answer has dissipated.
We wish to add another provocation to this assemblage through a 
recent engagement seeking to refigure the South African bantustan 
as constitutive of a South African ‘empire’, thought simultaneously 
as a dependent space in which the South African state commanded 
sovereignty, (despite its ‘independence’), and as a theoretical concept 
to re-examine the unexpected wider, global trajectories of race. This 
has two components. If, as Jacques Derrida has suggested, apartheid is 
the ‘last word’ in the text of racism, the ‘most racist of racisms’ (291), 
then, following the logic of South African historiography, it is the 
bantustan that is its most extreme form of expression. Secondly, how 
might we interrupt, yet simultaneously extend, these readings through an 
invocation of an empire of liberation, assembled here through the social 
itineraries of Dimbaza’s remains?
Thinking South Africa as empire brings to mind various imperial 
histories: British Dominion, Afrikaner nationalism or an increasing 
conflation of the interests of (British) capital and the (Afrikaner) 
nationalist and ethnic project of separate development structured 
around racial capitalism. When thinking about the National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR), the notion of CST, articulated first by the Communist 
Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1962, emerged as a way to explain the 
peculiarities of the South African colonial situation.2 Revisiting the early 
documents of the CPSA and the Communist International, it is evident 
that they reflect a certain understanding of empire and the colonial 
subject through which the native and the racial spatial command of 
the sovereign reverberated. This raises the spectre that the Communist 
Party and radical positions in South Africa were informed by (and 
reflective of) uncritical notions of empire that returned to the figure 
of the backward and tribal subject and reaffirmed this as the racial and 
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racist figure of the native. Stated differently, this means that seemingly 
antagonistic historical formulations, particularly CST, Africanism and 
the politics of exile and liberation, which claim anti- and non-racism 
as their foundations, ironically continue to structure and suture the 
binary terms of race within their articulations. In tracing the itinerary 
of CST and the NDR we were prompted to consider that ‘time does not 
pass … it accumulates’ (Baucom 34) and that race, the native subject 
and empire as the dependent space to command sovereignty may yet 
continue to inform what we call the ‘empire of liberation’: a dependent 
space of anticolonialism and postcolonialism that continues to command 
sovereignty within the ‘native question’.
At the core of this chapter lies a question about the tenacity of racial 
formations. Given the predicaments of the postapartheid present and the 
troubling legacies of the past, the concern over the failure or limitations 
of the transition remains an urgent question. How and why does the 
‘native’ subject continue to be given form through disciplinary categories 
inherited from the racialised past and through the instrumental reason 
of a developmental postapartheid state that is concerned with defining 
and enabling progress and modernity by overturning poverty and 
creating sustainable livelihoods? How and why does the subject that has 
been invoked in historical formulations seemingly opposed to apartheid 
continue to be constituted through concepts and archives that remain 
racially read?
Our attempt to trace the lines along which the postapartheid fold of 
time and space, read through Dimbaza, hinges on the concept of race as 
global apartheid requires that we attend to the various expressions of this 
fold. Drawing on formulations of montage and imagination, we assemble 
our arguments through the overdetermined, socially concentrated 
extreme of Dimbaza to draw on the unstable lines of thought that 
dominate explanations from different, contradictory angles in order to 
unsettle, activate and amplify their fissures. In seeking to make apparent 
the ‘materialist undercurrents’ of the wager that was apartheid, and in 
thinking about how this persists into the postapartheid, it is apparent 
that this rethinking cannot be a return to a reading of race as class. 
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Rather, we want to think how race might be read through an extended 
version of global apartheid.
Before we turn to the graves and the ruinous history of Dimbaza, we 
want to consider a clear cold night on the banks of the Liesbeek River in 
the Mother City, Cape Town as a possible starting point. The story – one 
of perhaps many such stories of the socialist Left – begins on Alfred Street 
in the suburb of Observatory. There, on some nights during the 1980s, 
young members of a secret cell of the Communist Party produced, on a 
mimeograph copy machine hidden at the back of the house, thousands 
of fliers advocating the ‘national democratic revolution’ (NDR) on behalf 
of the African National Congress (ANC) and its Alliance partners, which 
included the Communist Party. The reams of A4 paper fitted perfectly 
and miraculously into Omo washing-powder boxes emptied of their 
soapy contents. Resealed, they were in turn, 20 boxes at a time, driven all 
over the city for distribution at the darkest hour of the night.
But Observatory had eyes, real and imagined, everywhere and even 
youthful zeal could not dispel mounting anxieties. When it became too 
much, the young communists dug a large deep hole, again in the small 
hours of the night, and buried the mimeograph machine on the banks of 
the Liesbeek River, watched over only by the dark and empty windows of 
Valkenberg psychiatric hospital.
What we can imagine as a kind of madness, fuelled by the anxiety of 
discovery, had taken hold of these young communists and abruptly cast 
the clarity of political conviction and action into doubt. Today, those 
covert efforts of a minor Communist Party cell on behalf of the ANC and 
the Alliance might seem clumsy, tenuous and unclear in their distinctions. 
And yet, in ‘re: working’ the remains of the apartheid social,3 and in 
thinking the work that the remainder of race does, we return to the boxes 
of Omo washing powder and the machine that lies buried on the banks of 
the Liesbeek River and the thoughts it reproduced.
Walter Benjamin reminds us that ‘the historical index of … images 
not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, 
that they attain to legibility [Lesbarkeit] only at a particular time’ (The 
Arcades Project 463; Didi-Huberman 89). The scene at the Liesbeek River, 
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covered over by time and thought, becomes legible now in the context of 
postapartheid anxieties. Returning to that scene, and the memory of those 
events, made legible a concealed or buried dimension of the question of 
race: the thought that ‘the socialist State, socialism, is marked by racism’ 
and that racism is at work ‘in the various forms of socialist analysis, or of 
the socialist project’ (Foucault 261–262) and that this had begun to haunt 
those who buried the printing press, as it did Michel Foucault.
A further expression of this argument can be attended to by considering 
global apartheid as an ordering of desire, not only its structuring, and as 
something that must, yet cannot, be detached from South Africa. An iconic 
image by Santu Mofokeng, entitled ‘Winter in Thembisa, ca. 1991 (Figure 
8.1), illuminates the ‘non-photographed of apartheid’ and the ‘invisible of 
the everyday’ (Hayes 42). It features a box-shaped Omo washing-powder 
billboard tilted precariously towards the figure of a man striding beneath 
it, head bowed.
Figure 8.1. Winter in Tembisa, ca 1991.
Photographer: Santu Mofokeng.
© Santu Mofokeng Foundation, courtesy of Yale University Art Gallery and Lunetta 
Bartz, MAKER, Johannesburg.
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It serves as a reminder of a 1950s advertising slogan, which claimed that 
Omo ‘adds brightness to cleanness and whiteness’ and permits us to 
locate unanticipated racial anxieties within the very small acts of political 
liberation described above. By the late 1980s, the Omo slogan had 
changed, but in the context of apartheid South Africa the play on racial 
anxieties in the original slogan is not exactly subtle and perhaps offers 
another linking of race and class. Here, an emphasis on the purification 
of the social body reveals not only the way race was encrypted in class 
struggle, but also the possibility that this encryption occurred through 
its container: the text itself and the fliers advocating the NDR on behalf 
of the ANC. The image or scene that encloses pamphlets of desire hidden 
in boxes of washing powder, which themselves played on anxieties about 
cleanliness and racial degeneracy, about the labour of washing and of 
racial subjectification, locates the subject ‘outside itself as a constellation 
of singularities resistant to its ordering within subjective certainty’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 448; Van Bever Donker). The disciplinary categories 
inherited from the racialised colonial past and the instrumental reason 
of a developmental, postapartheid state are the stolen wheelbarrows of 
liberation through which race has been smuggled into the postapartheid – 
here as race’s Omo box.4
Dimbaza
Dimbaza can be ambiguously evoked as a homeland resettlement village, 
a betterment rural township, a decentralised industrialisation showcase, 
a site of political banishment, an international symbol of apartheid 
difference and as a graveyard of the racially discarded, among other 
things. Dimbaza was first established as a resettlement village in the 
Ciskei bantustan, now part of the Eastern Cape, by the apartheid state 
in 1967. Like other similar settlements, it formed part of the massive 
social engineering project of apartheid that has come to be called ‘forced 
removals’. It was but one such village in the attempted consolidation of 
the bantustans as racial ethnic homelands into which apartheid could 
relocate and separate out African sovereignty and citizenship and 
consolidate a ‘decolonised’ white settler nation-state. Conditions in these 
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resettlement villages, including Dimbaza, were dire, a form of what 
Giorgio Agamben has called ‘bare life’ (13), marked most tragically by the 
deaths of hundreds of children from malnutrition and tuberculosis in the 
first few years of their establishment.
One of the first film critiques of apartheid, released internationally 
in 1974, chose to title its depiction of the policy of separate development 
and the accompanying forced removals of people Last Grave at Dimbaza, 
although Dimbaza features only briefly, in the film’s conclusion. In direct 
response to both local and international criticism, both the apartheid 
government and the soon-to-be ‘independent’ Ciskei rulers (under 
the leadership of Lennox Sebe and his Ciskei National Independence 
Party) implemented a strategy of decentralised industrialisation in 
the homelands and in particular in Dimbaza. The intention was to 
make Dimbaza into the showcase industrial centre of the Ciskei, 
which became ‘independent’ in 1981. More than 50 largely foreign 
(particularly Taiwanese) factories were established here on the back 
of massive power, labour, tax, service, transport and import subsidies 
offered by the state. As a result Dimbaza was rapidly industrialised and 
a resident working class emerged in a significant process of rapid forced 
urbanisation and development. After 1994, with the reincorporation 
of the bantustans and thus of the Ciskei into South Africa, these 
subsidised forms of protection for industry located in Dimbaza were 
withdrawn, and an equally rapid process of de-industrialisation took 
place. Today, there are only three remaining factories in Dimbaza, all 
local, small-scale food-processing plants. Alongside this, the ‘urban’ 
place and population of Dimbaza remain and continue to expand in the 
supposedly non-racial liberated space of postapartheid South Africa. 
Dimbaza is now the object of state-led development, and its problems 
of poverty, unemployment and need are being addressed by vacant 
attempts to revitalise its industrial past.
Dimbaza, also thought here as landscape, as place, as an archive, as a 
concept and a history, provides a particular way of thinking about the 
historical relationship between the bantustans and the apartheid state, 
the periphery and the core, that reaches into the global present. It allows 
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us to think about the relationship of historical memory, archives and anti-
apartheid nationalist renditions of the past, about the relationship between 
anticolonial struggle and postcolonial realities, and about the accretions, 
persistence and compulsion of colonial routines and constituents in the 
postapartheid present. And it allows us to think about new ways in which 
to think about ‘the native’, race, racism and antiracism and the non-racial, 
and about the recurring relationships between the subject, subjectivity 
and subject formation, on the one hand, and the socials of apartheid and 
the postapartheid, on the other.
Through a reading of different ‘texts’ in and of the archive of Dimbaza, 
we bring together an assemblage of folds. We draw on several forms of 
knowledge amenable to being assembled by historical imagination – 
written documents, letters, contemporary testimonies and visual sources – 
concentrating primarily on the letter collection in the International 
Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF)5 archive and on the film Last Grave at 
Dimbaza. In both there is a literal articulation of apartheid to the global 
context.
For 35 years, IDAF, an organisation that began in South Africa but 
was forced to move to England, secretly funded the legal defence of those 
persecuted by the apartheid state and supported victims’ families. IDAF 
also established a cottage industry of primarily British correspondents, 
recruited mostly by word of mouth from among anti-apartheid and 
resistance movement family and friends, trade unions, and school and 
church organisations (over 700 people were involved by 1991). They 
exchanged letters in secret every two months or so with thousands of 
families in South Africa, sending £3 million per year in small postal orders 
to the dependants of prisoners and ex-prisoners. Across 30 years, over 400 
000 letters crossed the globe and tied recipients and senders into lasting 
relationships. Many of the letters came from and were sent to political 
prisoners or their families in Dimbaza. They reflect the experience of 
those who endured Dimbaza primarily as a site of political banishment, 
hardship and resettled ‘bare life’ (Agamben 13).
In 1944 the South African liberal Leo Marquard, writing under the 
pseudonym of John Burger (‘John Citizen’) in The Black Man’s Burden, could 
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still argue, ‘The ruling class in Britain is thus able to enjoy the financial 
benefits of association with South Africa while discarding all responsibility 
for the welfare of the mass of the inhabitants’ (251, emphasis added). But 
increasingly, and certainly after 1974 in the aftermath of Last Grave at 
Dimbaza, and with the burgeoning of the international anti-apartheid 
struggle, this was no longer possible, and – at least for some – Britain could 
no longer disavow responsibility. This ‘responsibility’ translated into a 
system of support and welfare, and appealed to the liberal sensibilities 
of a certain sector of the British public, who made use of the structures 
inherited from empire (literacy in English, the art of letter writing and 
the institution of the post office) to counter some of the worst legacies 
of British colonial exploitation in South Africa and to turn, as it were, 
against the South African successor state, now arguably itself an ‘empire’. 
The ANC, which, of all the exiled resistance movements, stood to gain the 
most from an invigorated anti-apartheid struggle, therefore turned to the 
British empire and its networks of solidarity, of which IDAF was one, to 
muster material support.
More or less contemporaneously with IDAF’s letter campaign, the film 
Last Grave at Dimbaza was made in 1974. Shot in secret, the documentary 
was released internationally (being banned in South Africa). It attempted 
to turn Dimbaza into an international symbol of apartheid difference and 
mobilised Dimbaza, through its imagery, as a metaphor for the graveyard 
of the racially discarded. According to one of the producers, Nana 
Mahomo, the intention was to ‘show what it is like for the black people 
of South Africa to be on the receiving end of the white government’s 
apartheid policy’ (in O’Meara 7–8). The film ends in Dimbaza, and in the 
concluding sequences the camera lingers on the graves marked with baby 
bottles and small hand-lettered crosses, and on a line of small open graves 
extending in one shot to the horizon.
The film struck at South Africa’s secret heart.6 Because they were 
situated in remote rural areas, often unmarked on maps and difficult to 
access, resettlement villages like Dimbaza were almost unknown to the 
public at large; being out of sight, they were also out of mind, which 
was convenient to the apartheid state. But once exposed, the desolation 
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of Dimbaza became the international symbol of apartheid’s criminality 
and enormity, and the prompt for a politics that turned this hidden 
corner. The film also clearly got under the skin of the authorities. By 
the late 1970s, the beginning of industrial development in Dimbaza was 
apparent. The Ciskei homeland administration, in collaboration with 
the apartheid state, responded to local and international pressure with 
attempts to make Dimbaza, and the Ciskei bantustan in particular, a 
showcase of the homeland system. Fuelled by incentives such as cheap 
financing – subsidised loans, tax concessions and direct subsidies – and 
the attraction of a cheap and stable captive labour force, Dimbaza was 
turned into a bizarre model of decentralised industrialisation and the 
economic viability of ‘separate development’ and separate sovereignty 
(attaining putative ‘independence’ in 1981).7
Both IDAF letters and the film, as political discourses of anti-
apartheid, mark apartheid Dimbaza’s isolated place within the global 
assemblage. In so doing, they identify not only Dimbaza but apartheid 
itself as an ‘untranslatable idiom’ (Derrida 292), set apart from world 
history. In this frame, these materials (the letters and the film) can 
be read both as resisting the native subject, and as exemplifying the 
racial spatial – and, we would argue, the temporal – command of the 
sovereign, located outside the particular or what is read as the ‘unique’ 
of apartheid and within ‘the global’ of the anti-apartheid moment. Yet 
we wish to argue that the letters and the film – and the events they 
inaugurate and conserve – lay the ground from which we might extricate 
the persistence of the native subject in the postapartheid. What is read 
as primarily a process of apartheid deterritorialisation was in fact also 
a reterritorialisation. Last Grave at Dimbaza, through the response it 
provoked on the part of the apartheid government, ironically ended 
up encouraging industrialisation and super-exploitation. It enabled 
the discourse of labour to be reterritorialised in the Ciskei homeland – 
in the very place the film (and radical historiography and liberation 
politics more broadly) portrayed as its ‘graveyard’ and where it located 
its critique of global industrialisation and international capitalism and 
their complicity in shoring up apartheid capitalist accumulation and 
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force – through its displacement of the ‘worthless and the disposable’ 
(Hardt & Negri 167). The IDAF letters also increasingly give expression 
to a process of ‘hierarchical inclusion’ (167), as distinct from 
‘compartmentalisation’ (125), as the ‘letter subjects’ of anti-apartheid aid 
increasingly began to identify themselves as workers, with wages and 
prices and the factory as their pressing problems. This narrative formed 
part of an emerging ‘economic body defined by global divisions of labour 
and power’ (167), which not only new South African but also primarily 
Taiwanese, American and other multinational firms exemplified. In 
the process, the question of apartheid seems to disappear, or at least 
to dissolve back into the frames that, as we argued above, marked the 
race–class debate, which came to define apartheid and resistance. The 
remainder of this chapter seeks to return to this question through 
the idea of an ‘empire of liberation’.8
The empire of liberation
In a parallel essay, we have argued that the archive of Dimbaza authorises 
a space, one of montage and repetition that simultaneously contains 
the South African empire and an imaginary of the postapartheid (see 
Pohlandt-McCormick & Minkley). It is an imaginary of the exteriority of 
liberation (an elsewhere, a time beyond apartheid) that holds its dominant 
frame (of class and socialism) in view, but also anticipates its fold into 
what we have proposed as the ‘empire’ of this liberation, which is marked 
by what always already remains there: the conjugated subject of the 
axiomatic ‘native’.
In essence, South African empire can be read into Dimbaza through 
territory and what we have named as the deterritorialisations and 
reterritorialisations of the pre-1994 South African state. For this South 
African nation-state (and its constitution of ‘empire’), space was the 
dimension on which politics and violence were grounded and waged. 
Space dominated its racial political vision, determining the nature and 
positioning of the ‘other’. In this sense it was about geopolitics (and thus 
within empire) all along, but it was also caught within the redistributions 
of territorial sovereignty – between home and homeland. However, 
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once ‘countryside industrialisation’ and the factories of Dimbaza 
became deterritorialised objects and marked this homeland territory 
with a line of flight into class, the political imaginary was opened to the 
dimension of time over that of space. But – and here is the related fold – 
the temporality of class (and struggle) is an already overdetermined 
and dominated terrain whose trajectories are imagined as a particular 
path to socialist society, with national liberation located as the required 
advance in time, where historical progress will assure certain victory and 
where the sovereign body with the legitimacy to wage class struggle is 
the national liberation party situated in time as the vanguard of history 
(Buck-Morss). The significant fold of this vanguard is the formulation, by 
the ANC alliance, of national liberation as liberation from South Africa’s 
form of colonialism – CST.
More generally, in the context of the Soviet Union, Susan Buck-
Morss points to the ways that the discourse of time became a field for the 
exercise of sovereign power. In particular, she points to the ways that the 
spatial struggle between city and country was translated into the temporal 
discourse of class struggle, which cast the rural as ‘people from the past’ 
(38). The national question was also transposed into a discourse of time, 
as ‘backward cultures and ethnic groups came under attack as vestiges of 
an earlier era’ (39), or were understood to be hostile to revolution and to 
historical progress, and against revolutionary time, which was equated 
with industrialisation, modernisation, the urban and the party.
Read from the vantage point of Dimbaza, CST and the form and nature 
of the articulations of national liberation and class struggle in relation 
to the spatial and the temporal are significant. In effect, the theory of 
CST and its antecedents, as well as its determining formulations within 
ANC and Communist Party politics, prioritised and made class, and 
the black working class, the ‘concrete’ determinant of liberation. In so 
doing, whether through phases, stages, coincidence or a single revolution, 
achieved through armed struggle and mass struggle, it established the 
ANC–Communist Party ‘alliance’ as the sovereign body of the struggle 
and situated it in time as the vanguard of history. Its legitimacy lay in 
apparently mobilising this industrial working class on the one hand and, 
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on the other, holding the interest of this working class (where not yet 
ready or able) in trust for the future through the territory of the nation.
What this entailed in Dimbaza was that those who had been removed 
to the bantustans as unwanted people, reterritorialised as ‘surplus’ to the 
efficient workings of racial capitalism or as threats to the political stability 
of the state, such as the former political prisoner Moses Twebe (Figure 8.2) 
and others, were figured as recipients of this trust, beneficiaries of this 
vanguard, yet still located in this earlier time, essentially in the time of 
the native. After 1994, bantustan politics is seen to disappear, as much a 
ghost of the area as the ghostly industrial remains of de-industrialisation 
that accompanied ‘democracy’ (see Pohlandt-McCormick & Minkley). 
The nation-state founded in 1994, which reterritorialised the Ciskei and 
Dimbaza as part of the new South Africa, holds the promise of a different 
sovereignty – no longer ‘discarded’; its graves no longer in ‘foreign’ 
soil. Rather, in the post-1994 era, the politics of race is equally ‘seen to 
Figure 8.2. Moses Twebe (fourth from the left) in front of the Moses Twebe Great Hall, 
15 March 2007.
Photographer: Gary Minkley
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disappear’ as it ‘moves’ beyond territory itself, which has been overcome 
by national liberation. Race then, like apartheid, is stitched to space in 
these particular ways.
And yet Dimbaza cannot enter the discourse of liberation, and cannot 
constitute the field for the exercise of sovereign power. The spatial 
struggle between city and countryside is relocated, or more accurately 
retemporalised, as the ‘not-yet’, as a future held in trust. Because, what 
also always already accumulates here – in this ‘empire of liberation’ – 
is the figure of the ‘native’. This is not to suggest that what is needed in 
the postapartheid is a return to the historical role of the vanguard, or a 
resumption of the revolutionary process, to complete the not-yet. Instead, 
what is needed is a response to the provocation of what the not-yet holds: 
the spectre of race and its articulations to global apartheid, which must be, 
yet cannot be, detached from Dimbaza or from South Africa more broadly.
The social and social acts
Spectres of race continue to haunt the postapartheid present of Dimbaza. 
Here we turn to photographic and sound archives and their ‘outside’, 
brought together through research and projects concerned with 
‘liberation heritage’ and through the encounter with a collection of black 
and white photographs from Dimbaza – scratched, marked, blurred 
and haunting – recently located in Bishop David Russell’s papers. Our 
argument can be illuminated by considering two images of Moses Twebe, 
a communist member of the ANC imprisoned on Robben Island in 1963 
for underground activities, released in 1969 and deported to the misery 
of Dimbaza (see Pohlandt-McCormick & Minkley). In the photographs he 
becomes the exemplary subject of postapartheid freedom, now invoked 
as the rights-bearing sovereign citizen subject of the new South Africa, 
hypothetically beyond race (because of his opposition to racism and its 
effects), who is celebrated in the naming of Dimbaza’s new community 
centre as the Moses Twebe Great Hall. One is an image of postapartheid 
subjective certainty: Twebe is seated, alongside other elderly political 
statesmen, publicly recognised and named in the liberated space of the 
‘community’ (Figure 8.2).
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But, in the other photograph, where he stands with his family and his 
goat in front of his house, this subjective certainty slips (Figure 8.3). 
In part our reading is informed by our conversations with Twebe, his 
family and other residents of Dimbaza, in part also by the photograph 
itself: its self-staging at the corner of the house and the presence of the 
foregrounded goat, tethered to Twebe with rough rope while facing him, 
but, where the rope tangles the feet of the family, halting movement and 
progress and tying the family to a former ‘homeland’ place evoked by 
the goat. There are other signifiers – the flaking paint, single window 
and the edge of a zinc roof resonant of bantustan ‘surplus’ architecture; 
Twebe’s ill-fitting jersey; the bearing of the family; and Twebe’s own 
posture, that of a lonely, isolated, resigned man, set apart from even while 
alongside his family, literally and physically more attached to his goat 
than to the ties (here, of the looped rope) that bind him to his family. 
Narrative and visual knots, they bind Twebe ‘into the interstices of 
bigger or older apparatuses, which then undergo a mutation’, and return 
Twebe, and us, to the ‘native’ peasant, the ‘native’ worker, the ‘native’ 
Figure 8.3. Moses Twebe, his family and his goat, 15 March 2007.
Photographer: Gary Minkley
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former political prisoner – the racial subject (Deleuze xi). Liberation, 
seen through the coupling of these images, conjures the presence of an 
always native subject, permanently displaced out of sovereign time. In 
this way, liberation hinges on the colonial representational repertoires of 
the ‘native’ subject, where the spectral lines of race are retraced through 
a genealogy of the concept of anthropology, as well as of the concept of 
trusteeship and of postapartheid modernist development.
The goat in this image – tugged into the photograph at the insistence of 
Moses Twebe – provokes yet another line of flight. From the vantage point of 
Dimbaza’s margins, ‘the social’ of apartheid and the postapartheid performs, 
and is performed, in several kinds of space in which different operations 
take place: what we might call ‘other socials’. One such social space is that 
of regions, in which ‘objects are clustered together and boundaries drawn 
around each cluster. Another is the network in which distance is a function 
of the relations between the elements and difference a matter of relational 
variety’ (Mol & Law 643, emphasis added). These are the two topologies with 
which social theory is familiar and which have come to define the bantustan 
in the postapartheid. The first is old and secure (less so now because the 
bantustans have been incorporated into the new South Africa and have been 
replaced by regional definitions of progress and development), while the 
second, being newer, is still proud of its abilities to cross boundaries, just as 
Dimbaza’s distance and difference are staged in zones, corridors, nodes and 
proximities to markets, jobs and services.
However, as Mol and Law argue, there are other kinds of space, too:
Sometimes neither boundaries nor relations mark the difference between 
one place and another. Instead, sometimes boundaries come and go, allow 
leakage or disappear altogether, while relations transform themselves 
without fracture … Entities may be similar and dissimilar at different 
locations, or in the same location and may transform themselves without 
creating difference. Sometimes then, social space behaves like a fluid (643).
Space enacts a more heterogeneous social; other socials. Thus, in locating 
‘the social’ as a problem – marked by the heterogeneous and venturing 
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into other or many socials – rather than as a given, we are concerned to 
examine the ways in which the social itself no longer invokes a common 
set of assumptions about society, culture, representation or methods 
by which we write and produce history or understanding. Rather, ‘the 
social’ and ‘other socials’ are constituted and, as importantly, enacted 
categories with various itineraries, agencies, actions and actors, modes 
of performativity and effects of subjectivation that need to be explored.
Following Hannah Arendt’s conceptualisation of ‘acts’ as both ‘gov-
erning and beginning’ (177), we propose that to socially (en)act is to realise 
a rupture in the givenness of the social and to attend to the unexpected, 
unpredictable and unknown of the social. Moreover, following Engin Isin, 
social acts may also be read against habitus, practice, discipline and routine 
as the ordering qualities of how humans form and conduct the social. 
Social acts set actualisations in motion, but also a being that acts – within 
shifting forms of responsibility and answerability to changing affiliations, 
solidarities or hostilities – to ‘begin itself’ as subject. Social acts, then, 
articulate social agents both as object and as subject of history. Read as an 
act that constitutes the image, Moses Twebe’s tugging of the goat into the 
frame is an act that is not in the image but is rather located there as a trace. 
Reading this as an act (as opposed to a staging or even crafting) fractures 
the social through which that image would usually be read. In Roland 
Barthes’s terms, it goes beyond the studium (the social), beyond the punctum 
(perhaps recognising the ambiguity of Twebe’s status), to the spectrum (that 
which haunts and thereby stays with us – the fracturing and interruption or 
unsettling of the social through such an act).
Thought in this way, Moses Twebe, in summoning the goat, becomes 
the ‘being that acts’, that begins itself as itself, as a subject. To consider 
such acts is to call into question a dominant cluster of issues in social and 
political thought that we can define as problems of orders and practices, 
and how they have become objects of social thought. What does Twebe’s 
act mean? And what does it mean to consider it alongside rupture, 
disorder and deviation? Following Isin, what might it mean to consider 
it as ‘a rupture in the given’ (25)? Moses Twebe’s act of summoning the 
goat, then, as evocative of the stubbornness of the fragments of race that 
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adhere to the postapartheid social, has enabled the rupture in the given 
of that social, which in turn has enabled our ‘re: working’ of race and our 
consideration of how race – in the figure of the native, peasant, rural, 
poor – and racism endure in the developmental postapartheid state.
The Moses Twebe Great Hall is the most visible monumental, indeed 
reterritorialised, ‘object’ of the legacy of struggle, liberation and the 
inheritance of 1994. But more significantly, the hall is a monument to 
the completed time of the struggle. It is a retemporalisation as well as 
a detemporalisation, marked between Twebe himself and the Great Hall 
he becomes. It is the legacy as well as the public history not only of an 
empire but of a single simple history, that of the inheritance of struggle. 
At the same time, Twebe is one of those who, despite their proximity 
to the struggle, were forgotten after 1990; the edifice that is the Moses 
Twebe Great Hall makes a claim on him in the name of an ‘empire of 
liberation’, and in the process once again forgets the real Moses Twebe. 
In the photograph with the goat (Figure 8.3), what is suddenly emergent, 
‘what comes together in a flash with the now’ (Benjamin, The Arcades 
Project 642), forms a constellation of the subject of freedom, the native 
subject, the peasant, the worker, and the ‘ex prison politicians’.
In this constellation, Dimbaza is always the dumping ground for 
prisoner politicians; Moses Twebe becomes the hall even as the actual 
body of Moses Twebe, ragged and with its goat, always remains displaced, 
the ‘before’ and, simultaneously, the embodied ‘here’ and ‘after’ of this 
inheritance. He is the figure who accepts what is given – the hall – and 
returns to what can only remain – the ‘rural native’. Here, then, are the 
two folds that we invoke in the ‘empire of liberation’: the paradigm of 
empire, in which the responsibility of the sovereign is given effect in 
the form of the Great Hall; and the paradigm of the will or testament, 
in which liberation is bequeathed to the heirs of the hall. The empire 
seemingly returns liberation in the form of newly built material space 
yet, ironically and simultaneously, holds Twebe’s body and other veteran 
bodies of Dimbaza – the native ‘worker-peasant’ family with a goat – 
at a remove from its very empty, unoccupied and fenced structures, as 
if awaiting the ritual temporalities of Freedom Day celebrations. It is a 
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fraught act: one of erasure that becomes clear with reference to Twebe’s 
actual life and to a Dimbaza that does not ‘hold’ or inherit a politics of 
liberation in the new time of freedom. What this entails in Dimbaza is 
that Moses Twebe and others, in order to be figured as recipients of this 
trust and beneficiaries of the new empire, have to be repetitively located 
in an earlier time, essentially in the time of the native.
Image/archive/testimony
What we have tried to do is to reread the peculiarity of South Africa’s 
history of ‘internal colonialism’ or CST ‘no longer as [only] a matter of 
territory and the economy’, but instead as ‘a way of understanding the 
distinct and yet coinciding folding temporalities lived by South Africa’s 
communities as they have journeyed together, belatedly but relatively 
rapidly, towards modernity’ (Pechey 155). What coincides in Dimbaza 
‘are not two “superstructural” spheres on one “infrastructure” but rather 
so many “nows” lived alongside each other’. With Graham Pechey, 
we want to place discourse, language, image, imagination – and the 
concept of empire – at the centre of this ‘re: working’. The ‘internality’ 
of this form of colonialism can then be understood metaphorically as 
a redescription of ‘South Africa’ that bypasses the grand categories of 
the geopolitical and the world-historical in a new emphasis upon the 
dialogue that underlies all antagonism, the competing utopias that speak 
to each other inwardly even as their narrators outwardly turn laws and 
guns on each other.
While we are wary of Pechey’s ‘positive tone’, we have been intrigued by 
the concept of ‘so many “nows” liv[ing] alongside each other’ in Dimbaza 
and have tried to think through – by way of a kind of interpretative 
montage – the assemblage, the multiplicity of folds, that can be pieced 
together out of the always already fragmentary archive of image, text and 
testimony.
There is another meaning of ‘legacy’ that explains the multiplicity of 
the archive of Dimbaza. ‘Legacy’, as John Mowitt has pointed out, is also 
associated with the Latin verb lego – to choose, select, appoint, collect, 
gather, bring together, take, steal, traverse, pass through, read (aloud), 
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recite, and, coupled with lēx (‘a formal motion for a law’), to dispatch, send 
an ambassador, deputise. It is this choosing, collecting, bringing together, 
this reading aloud and passing through that constitutes the ‘archive’ 
of Dimbaza. But the way in which dispatching and deputising these 
fragments reveal them as themselves constellations without subjective 
certainty has also informed our ‘re: working’ of spatial and temporal acts 
through the concept of empire. Even the small selection of photographs 
in this chapter evokes the possibilities held within them. Benjamin 
has alerted us to the force of image and language and to the dialectical 
relationship between them and the past and present:
It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is 
present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has 
been comes together in a flash with now to form a constellation. In other 
words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of 
what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression, but image, 
suddenly emergent. Only dialectical images are genuine images (that 
is not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language.
[N2a,3] (The Arcades Project 462).
In the dialectical image, what has been within a particular epoch is always, 
simultaneously, ‘what has been from time immemorial’. As such, however, it 
is manifest, on each occasion, only to a quite specific epoch – namely, the one 
in which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular dream 
image as such. It is at this moment that the historian takes up, with regard 
to that image, the task of dream interpretation [N4, 1] … The realization of 
dream elements in the course of waking up is the canon of dialectics. It is 
paradigmatic for the thinker and binding for the historian [N4, 4].
If Benjamin’s Arcades Project ‘deals with awakening from the nineteenth 
century’ (464), the images of Dimbaza (in text, film, letters, photographs) 
urge an awakening from the somnambulant dark dreams of the long 
twentieth century (Baucom).
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In the interviews that form part of the Dimbaza archive, most of 
them recorded in the early 2000s, the political prisoners (or ‘prisoner 
politicians’, as Moses Twebe named them) reinserted and reterritorialised 
themselves into the liberation movement, as always ‘in struggle’, always 
protesting, always marking themselves as political. In this way, these 
interviews reproduce a postapartheid heroic liberation discourse. But 
the letters that are part of the IDAF collection call this into question, 
especially those written at the time of the ‘cut’, in 1991, the moment when 
national liberation seemed to have been realised. Their authors, like 
Moses Twebe, realised that they would remain displaced, would be unable 
to enter the discourse or the ‘real’ of liberation time or reconstitute for 
themselves the field for the exercise of sovereign power. ‘What do we 
do now, now we are left once more desolate and abandoned, with the 
germ of destruction among us?’9 That ‘germ of destruction’ in the form of 
tuberculosis, as Randall Packard reminded us years ago, originates in the 
political economy of racial health practices.
For those proximate to the territory of liberation but also 
reterritorialised, relocated and reinserted in the space of Dimbaza, the 
limits of historical political change were readily apparent. Ironically, 
political prisoners released in 1991 would receive more attention than 
this ‘old guard’, who had basically been banished to the periphery of South 
Africa and its politics. For them, the weighty changes of 1990 would mean 
only further marginalisation and loss, including the loss of a vital lifeline – 
IDAF – to the outside world.
It’s not that one doesn’t want to work, we used not to be employed and 
now the trouble is when you seek work you are told you are too old 
for work at the sametime [sic] too young to qualify for old age pension. 
We are truly going to suffer as we have already started now because we 
don’t know who is really going to be responsible for us i.e. EX PRISON 
POLITICIANS.10
Suffering, responsibility, anticipation, failure, future? Multiple tempor-
alities and so many uncertain nows that are held together in the dream 
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images of the ghost town of Dimbaza. Metaphorically represented as the 
seeds/germ of destruction in the last letter (in a series of 120) from MMS, 
and in the context of latter-day ANC/nationalism, there is a certain irony 
in the fact that the support of IDAF ended right at the time of direst need, 
when the enduring liberal-radical elements of a colonial empire were 
being replaced by one of liberation:
It hurts to think that we won’t be hearing from you anymore. Above all 
when now Khanyiso is becoming an invalid yesterday he was given or 
rather done T.B. Tests which showed he has a Tuberculosis germ in his 
blood and is to receive treatment for 6 months.
Oh! Carma you have no idea how we feel to part with you just at the time 
of difficulties ’cos Khanyiso is on drugs for epilepsy now its T.B.11
This letter, like many others, resonates with the possibility that one of 
the features of the postapartheid is that liberation may no longer be 
territorialised but is instead retemporalised, in the body of the subject 
of liberation, in the remaking of dependence within different structures 
of empire.
If ‘liberation’ is the absence or ending of subjection, then, in the 
moment of liberation, of the subject being made free, the externalisation, 
the-having-been-made-extensive (outside, dependent) of the subject is 
clear to the knowing returning subject who has experienced the being 
made external and dependent. As the letters and the postapartheid 
realities of Dimbaza show, liberation as the ending of subjection does not 
end externalisation or dependency. In this flash, empire and liberation 
rub up against each other, are folded into each other – raising the 
spectre of the continuation of empire relations in the time of liberation, 
a permanent future in which the subject remains forever native and 
displaced.
Image and letter, montaged together here, constitute a moment 
‘wherein what has been comes together in a flash with now to form a 
constellation’ (Benjamin, The Arcades Project 642). Something is opened 
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up between the spatiality of the South African colonial ‘empire’ and the 
temporal ‘empire’ of liberation. To return to Pechey one more time, ‘in 
South Africa colony and metropolis are co-extensive – not separated 
geographically, but (as it were) one on top of the other in the same territory’ 
(154). But, as we have tried to show, ‘empire’ – thought of as relations 
of unequal power that involve the imposition and externalisation of the 
subject (thought also as practice and meaning) – is also, at certain points in 
time, coincident and marked by temporalities that are entangled, enmeshed, 
folded into each other.
Thinking ‘empire’ as both spatial and temporal opens up the post- 
(postapartheid, postcolonial, post-empire), and calls into question 
the distancing from things past. It demands a contemplation of the 
complexity of ‘empire’ (of colonial relations of externality that continue 
to mark out and seep through the social and its infinite, tenacious, 
enduring legacies and inheritances). It summons us to the urgent task of 
understanding, imagining, approaching and rendering intelligible (and 
the present continuous is chosen deliberately here) the question, the 
problem and the ‘moral and epistemic contours’ (Scott 3) ‘of racial hate, 
humiliation [and] cruelty’ (Didi-Huberman 154) in Dimbaza’s global 
present.
The film Last Grave at Dimbaza resonates not only with the montaged 
readability of temporal and spatial connections, but also with significant 
discontinuities in respect of its stated intent. While it is perhaps easy to 
read the film – in its simple shots, omniscient narration, its articulation 
of separateness and territoriality – as an exposé, it is also pervaded by an 
unintended sense of relative apathy and the depiction of its documented 
subjects as passive victims needing empire (the global anti-apartheid) 
to save them. In a different sense, though, the film attempts to mark the 
unique, particular territory of South Africa (as both urban apartheid 
capitalist state and rural impoverished bantustan) through signposts, 
maps, journeys, movement and interiors, to signify the central role 
of black labour in producing white privilege and to open it to global 
intervention. Read positively, the film globalises apartheid, interpellating 
the complicity of an ‘empire’ of capitalist interests with apartheid (through 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
218
its multiple shots of major international companies ‘doing business’ in 
South Africa – globalisation in the 1960s and 1970s) and foreshadowing 
the overdue stirrings of a global anti-apartheid movement.
But in montaging random, non-indexical film footage and images 
from all over South Africa (East London, Langa, Durban, Johannesburg, 
Soweto, Dimbaza, to name but a few), it literally de-deterritorialises its 
own setting, loses place, loses its place, and unintentionally ‘unmarks’ 
the territory of South Africa in order to open it to the global. In effect, 
the film reterritorialises Dimbaza (effectively through its naming and in 
its ending) as not just or simply South Africa, but as in and of the global. 
For there to be the ‘last grave’, it is this kind of global externalisation, this 
making extensive of a dependency in sovereign ‘liberated’ time, that is 
required. As such, the film marks the prelude to the empire of liberation.
More compelling and occasioning further disturbances is the music. 
Composed by Philip Tabane and Malombo, the soundtrack is like a lament 
that marks the graves and desolation, and anticipates something different. 
It is a requiem, a mass for the deceased. It is also, in its dirge-like soundings 
and phrasings, a command (to political action), and a guide to direct another 
possible deterritorialisation. In some senses, it refuses to be contained in 
either the film’s appeal to American or British empire or by South African 
empire (it was smuggled overseas on a South African Airways flight, a 
symbol of South African modernity).12 In its slow sadness, though, the music 
directs a listening, and a sounding of a premature burial or laying to rest, 
and anticipates an ongoing soundtrack to the empire of liberation. There is 
no last grave under the sign of apartheid in Dimbaza, and the funeral is the 
defining temporality enacted in its postapartheid social.
When Last Grave at Dimbaza was rescreened on South African 
television as part of the so-called Unbanned series in 1995, the film was 
introduced and framed both by one of its producers, Nana Mahomo, 
and by the cultural commentator Sandile Dikeni, and self-consciously 
retemporalised, not into the postapartheid discourse of reconciliation, 
which was the intent of the Unbanned series, but as part of ‘the search 
for truth about South Africa, [and] the past [that] isn’t dead, it isn’t 
even past’.
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Interpretative montage: Imagination and history
In ‘re: working’ ‘empire’ and ‘liberation’ through the metaphor and the 
archive of Dimbaza, we have returned to trying to think that which 
haunts the ‘perilous critical moment’ of the postapartheid. No matter 
how prodigious the archive, in the face of the violence contained 
in it, what remains of Dimbaza is fragmentary and illusive, flawed 
and disjunctive, ghostly and brittle. The fragment, or the ‘vestige’, as 
Georges Didi-Huberman reminds us, presupposes destruction at 
the same time as resisting or surviving destruction. Race was always 
enfolded into the class struggle to which the mimeograph machine was 
set. What has become legible for us in the postapartheid is not that 
discovery or capture motivated the burial of the machine, but rather 
‘the question of race’ or, more particularly, the ‘spectre of race’. Abiding 
by Dimbaza allows us to think the meaning of this spectre through the 
montage of the mimeograph’s burial here. The tracings of the act of its 
burial – read as a performed repression of a reproductive machine – 
name what the undercurrents of the tropes of race and class were 
working to guarantee: the reproduction of a particular kind of subject. 
Read imaginatively back to this performed act, it is not the vanguard, 
but the rearguard for the reproduction of formations of race within the 
empire of liberation.
To sift through the debris and the ruins that remain (of history, of the 
archive) is to create a type of (interpretative) montage that folds into and 
over each other the haunting memories, the testimony, the letters, the 
images of Dimbaza. It is a montage that, like Tabane and Malombo’s dirge 
or lament, moves slowly, repeats concepts, accumulates wrongs, accretes 
meaning, syncopates doubt and redemption, and thereby addresses itself 
to the ‘ethics of the relation created … between the image [text, concepts] 
[and imagination] and history’ (Didi-Huberman 125).
Montage is valuable only when it doesn’t hasten to conclude or to close: 
it is valuable when it opens up our apprehension of history and makes it 
more complex, not when it falsely schematizes; when it gives us access to 
the singularities of time and hence to its essential multiplicity (121).
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Benjamin argued that when an era ends, ‘history decays into images, 
not into stories’ (The Arcades Project 476). As Buck-Morss has noted, 
‘Without the narration of continuous progress, the images of the past 
resemble night dreams, the “first mark” of which, Freud tells us, is their 
emancipation from “the spatial and temporal order of events”’ (68). 
What might the night dreams of Dimbaza resemble, as its spatial (South 
African empire) and temporal (empire of liberation) orders break 
down? The images, burning in the David Russell archive, discarded for 
their lack of indexicality, become both prophetic and dream images. 
As such, they refuse the conjugated ‘empire’ subjects of apartheid 
and liberation, and show absence from the ‘not all there is to see’ that 
they provoke (Didi-Huberman 124). To paraphrase Didi-Huberman, 
‘Any act of the image that is snatched from the impossible description 
of a reality becomes a haunting memory, a scourge of imagining, a 
proliferation of figures – of resemblances and differences – around the 
same vortex of time’ (125, original emphasis). And to return to Buck-
Morss, such images are ‘complex webs of memory and desire wherein 
past experience is rescued, and perhaps, redeemed’ (68). However, as 
she continues,
Only partial interpretations of these images are possible, and in a critical 
light. But they may be helpful if they illuminate patches of the past 
that seem to have a charge of energy about them precisely because the 
dominant narrative does not connect them seamlessly to the present. 
The historical particulars might then be free to enter into different 
constellations of meaning … To be engaged in the historical task of 
surprising rather than explaining the present – more avant-garde than 
vanguard in its temporality – may prove at the end of the century to be 
politically worth our while (69).
‘Where we perceive a chain of events,’ Benjamin’s angel of history ‘sees 
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front 
of his feet’ (‘Über den Begriff der Geschichte’ IX). The storm that we 
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call progress ‘has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the 
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into 
the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before 
him grows skyward’. Is there an angel of history in Dimbaza? If so, she 
is a very little girl, a child, angel, ghost of the township or bantustan, by 
montaged implication left alone on a road that fades into the distance, 
as shown in the concluding images of Last Grave at Dimbaza. Unlike 
Benjamin’s angel, this little girl, dressed in a white cardigan, hesitates 
and turns away – and we with her – from (or is it towards?) the empty 
graves ‘dug in preparation for the next month’s toll’,13 from the forgotten 
printing press buried on the banks of the Liesbeek River – its dreams 
of a non-racial social withheld – and from the past and present dream 
world of promises, doubts and betrayals. But the dirt at her (and our) 
feet is made up of the debris – the rearguard – of race and a future held 
in trust.
NOTES
1. ‘Diagrams’ or ‘maps’ for Gilles Deleuze, ‘fragments, regions and levels’ for 
Michel Foucault, that, following Georges Didi-Huberman, invite a resonant 
montaged readability of temporal discontinuity and of imaginatively putting 
the multiple and the disintegrated in motion, isolating nothing, showing the 
hiatuses and the analogies, the indeterminations and the overdeterminations.
2. ‘The South African Question’ (1928 Resolution adopted by the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International), Appendix to Lerumo.
3. John Mowitt uses the term ‘re: working’, ‘re, colon, space, working, … as a 
novel way to translate Bertolt Brecht’s concept of umfunktionierung. More 
typically, this term is translated either as re-functioning or repurposing, 
perhaps even reconstructing, all perfectly reasonable choices except for 
the fact that they fail to capture an important theoretical, even political 
resonance of the term. Specifically, they drop the reflexivity that mattered 
to Brecht, a reflexivity that allowed him to suggest that “re: working” 
radio had to be as much about radio as about work itself. In effect, radio 
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implicates the labor of our reflection about it in the effort to recast its 
purpose’ (Mowitt 6).
4. We are reminded here of Slavoj Žižek’s joke, in The Plague of Fantasies, 
about the man who leaves the work camp each day and has his wheelbarrow 
checked to make sure he is not stealing anything, but he is in fact stealing 
wheelbarrows.
5. Since 1992, the IDAF Collection has been part of the University of the 
Western Cape’s Robben Island Mayibuye Archives, at UWC, Bellville, South 
Africa.
6. As did, similarly, Cosmas Desmond’s The Discarded People, which drew the 
world’s attention to forced removals and ‘separate development resettlement’ 
and inspired the making of the film.
7. After the political transformation of South Africa in 1990, de-industrialisation 
in turn transformed it into a ghost town; invisible, peripheral and forgotten. 
What remains visible of Dimbaza, marked by the repetition of the empty 
rusting skeletons of its factories and warehouses, is the hypocrisy of apartheid 
and the hollowness of liberation promises.
8. We might think of these new relations and strategies that ensue from 
the disruption to and within these sites of contestation and the circuits/
networks of institutional practices that make up a territory, as a form of 
‘reterritorialisation’ of empire or, read slightly differently, as a positive 
form of deterritorialisation, a line of flight that leads to ‘reterritorialization 
in an entirely new assemblage’ – the ‘empire of liberation’ ( Jacobs 267; 
Patton 143).
9. Letter, MMS 1991, IDAF/Mayibuye.
10. Letter, MMS 1991, IDAF/Mayibuye.
11. Letter, MMS 1991, IDAF/Mayibuye.
12. ‘Mahomo’s film statement was clearly not intended for use within South 
Africa. His intention was to influence foreign decision makers in Britain and 
the United States, to shift policy from the National Security Study Memorandum 
39 (NSSM 39) mentality, adopted by the Nixon administration in February 
1970’ (O’Meara 8).
13. Voiceover from Last Grave at Dimbaza.
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CHAPTER 9
THE PRINCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENCY: ETHICS 
AND COMMUNITY AT THE EDGE OF THE SOCIAL
Maurits van Bever Donker
Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing 
else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us (Deleuze 149).
Community works. This is not to suggest that community should be 
taken as a given or, indeed, as that at which we must arrive, as that whose 
construction presents a redemptive hope for our present. Rather, it is at 
play, always, whether as a differential that produces racial formations 
(such as the invocation of ‘the community’ at the centre of apartheid 
legislation)1 or as a constitutive limit enabling the thinking of what 
might come after apartheid. In other words, it is already operative, in 
each instance perhaps, as a function of enclosure for identity or as an 
unstable edge that flirts with an expression of the new. This is to suggest 
that limits, markers of the edge of community, in turn function not only 
as boundaries or curtailments, but also as openings, unfolding on their 
motile edges towards the new: the opening of a terrain not enclosed 
within the particularity of the membrane that the limit implies and, 
I suggest, on which a postapartheid subjectivity might arrive. This 
subjectivity, this possible subjectivity, is the living, mutating ground from 
which a ‘community of the touch’, to use a turn of phrase from Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s ‘The Inoperative Community’, might emerge: this touch does 
not penetrate; it knows nothing of being enclosed in a common skin but 
rather plays on the surface, abiding in a proximity that touches, always. It 
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is this question of the subject, a sense of subjectivity at its own edge as the 
constitutive limit for community, which this chapter explores.
It is, however, not simply an abstract question. The question of 
community and the social is threaded with the persistence of what can be 
understood as apartheid’s remainders as these cut into the potentialities 
of life in our present. Indeed, it seems that an urgent demand of the 
present moment in South Africa is for life to be practised, or at least for 
such a practice to be learned, in the wake of apartheid.2 These remainders, 
the persistence of the limit qua limit and its enclosure of subjectivities 
within reified expressions of race, ask of us that we think the social in 
a more conceptual and yet rigorously lived sense. More particularly, I 
contend that it is through an attempt at thinking the social in this way 
that it becomes possible to make sense of the demand that life in the 
postapartheid remains to be learned.
In this chapter I examine this problem in three stages. In the first, I 
construct a sense of community as a concept that hinges on what Maurice 
Blanchot names, reading Georges Bataille, as ‘the principle of insufficiency’ 
(5). Through reading Blanchot’s The Unavowable Community, I suggest 
that the productive edge of community is operative precisely at that point 
where the subject is not enclosed within subjective certainty. Locating 
this edge as a gift, in the second stage of this chapter I bring this into 
relation with Claude Levi-Strauss’s reading of community as it functions 
in the Oedipus myth. In particular, it is in the character of Antigone 
that I begin to texture the principle of insufficiency in relation to the 
weight of everyday life: the constitutive struggle between autochthony 
and copulation. It is through positing a principle of insufficiency as an 
organising concept for the self and the social that I suggest a productive 
and ethical edge is opened for thinking. In the final stage I press this edge 
further through reading Phaswane Mpe’s intervention on the formation 
of this concept in his novel, Welcome to Our Hillbrow. As such, my reading 
presses Mpe’s intervention beyond that of a work of mourning, or elegy, 
or indeed of a reinscription of humanism from an African perspective, 
as important as all of these are.3 Rather, I suggest that Welcome to Our 
Hillbrow elicits a particular reading from its reader, a reading that sets to 
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work on the very terrain that structures the terms for a work of mourning 
or an expression of humanism.
While Blanchot is brilliant in his reading of the lines of community 
and its relation to the self, and Levi-Strauss’s reading of the role of 
emergence in the Oedipus myth is instrumental for a refiguring of the 
problem of indigeneity as this comes to bear on the social, it is, I argue, in 
Mpe’s intervention that a sense of the ethical adequate to the concept of 
community and to ‘lived experience’ is formulated. This is not to suggest 
a simple progression between these texts, or that Mpe’s novel should be 
reduced to the interpretative framework of the former. Rather, in bringing 
these into relation with each other I construct a particular weave that 
enables a sense of the ethical, in line with the epigraph to this chapter, as 
being ‘adequate to that which happens to us’, an ethical and philosophical 
point of view that Mpe’s intervention produces in relation to the problem 
of lived experience in postapartheid South Africa. In short, his novel ‘re-
works’, in a Benjaminian sense, the social and ethics so as to offer itself as 
a practice for the learning of life, of learning to learn, on the terrain of the 
motile edge of community.4
On the edge of community
In The Unavowable Community, Blanchot produces a sense of the concept 
of community that can be read as resistant to the disciplinary strictures 
of the state or religion – in other words, as resistant to its figuring in the 
light of a redemptive notion. As Blanchot phrases it, community is always 
painted, in the narratives of history, on the background of disaster and is, 
as such, always turned towards the possibility of a new humanity. Stated 
differently, political community is always offered as a means through 
which to overcome, or at least to come to terms with, a particular trauma; 
a coming to terms that requires, ultimately, a new sense of the human 
to be effective. This formulation clearly resonates across many attempts 
to think the transition into the postapartheid, and indeed into what is 
now understood as the problematic of global apartheid, particularly 
through a consideration of the connections between ethics, politics and 
community.5 What is striking in this formulation is the insistence on the 
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creation of the new, a refusal to deliver the concept of community into 
such a straightforwardly redemptive narrative, where community is that 
which either redeems us or is redeemed through our return to it. Rather, 
Blanchot wants to preserve the concept of community from the tendency 
for it to be folded into ‘the state’, and the expressions of the subject and its 
attendant communities that constitute its terrain. As he argues in his later 
discussion of Marguerite Duras’s The Malady of Death, community and, 
by extension, the indefinable category of ‘the people … are not the State, 
not any more than they are the society in person, with its functions, its 
laws, its determinations, its exigencies which constitute its most proper 
finality’ (33). The productivity of the concept of community needs to 
be pressed beyond the confines of a political programme. The key, for 
Blanchot, is located in the task of thinking what he calls ‘the absence 
of community’ (3), to think how the unworking of community might, 
ultimately, be integral to how it works. This, it seems, extends beyond 
community as such, touching rather on the sense of the subject.
For Blanchot, thinking this absence requires more than an 
understanding of absence as lack, as though community is that which 
must be produced so as to make the social whole. Instead, resisting this 
quasi-Freudian sense through which the subject and community come 
to be constituted through a lack, Blanchot orients his development of 
the concept through Bataille’s insistence that there is ‘the principle of 
insufficiency at the root of all being’ (4). Insufficiency, in this instance, 
does not imply that being can be understood as an attempt to attain 
sufficiency. Rather than a principle that seeks to bring itself to completion 
(that is, to satisfy itself), Blanchot argues that for Bataille insufficiency 
‘cannot be derived from a model of sufficiency [as it searches for] the 
excess of a lack that grows ever deeper even as it fills itself up’ (8). This 
can perhaps be most easily grasped through the example of the face-
to-face encounter. Blanchot argues, in a formulation that discloses his 
proximity to Emmanuel Levinas, that the individual can only ever know 
itself as an individual in the moment of an encounter with an other.6 This 
is to say that an ‘I’ only ever recognises itself as an ‘I’ in the recognition 
of an other’s recognition of this. In short, we are only ourselves among 
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other selves. This, it seems, immediately voids the claim to subjective 
certainty, as the recognition of this is only ever located in a contest 
between others. Although Hegel produces a similar conundrum in the 
assertion of subjective certainty, for him the struggle is to assert the ‘I’ 
as mine, and thereby to silence the disquieting effect of the insufficiency 
that echoes at the root of all being.7 It is in that contest that being takes 
place, which is to say that the ‘I’ can never assert its individuality as an 
individuality as such. In Blanchot’s formulation, ‘a being is either alone or 
knows itself to be alone only when it is not’ (5).
While the principle of insufficiency names the condition whereby, for 
the subject, being can only take place in the contest with others, this is 
not equivalent to the assertion of a fusional multiplicity, as though being 
is simply a holding in common.8 What distinguishes it from a fusional 
multiplicity, which Blanchot likens to an existence as a herd, is that 
insufficiency actually does result in individuation, even if it is only an 
individuation that is already impossible even as it takes place. As he says 
of Bataille’s sense of insufficiency: ‘It is however not as easy as all that to 
understand’ (8).
If this development of the principle of insufficiency is correct, then 
its most clear instance can be located in the moment in which an ‘I’ 
witnesses the death of an other who is, for it, the principle of its own 
recognition as an ‘I’. To state this plainly: it is in the death of the other that 
my awareness of myself as individual also dies. Only an ‘I’ can witness 
the other’s death, but this ‘I’, which has been brought into consciousness 
through that other, precisely in that moment of that other’s death, can no 
longer witness that death in relation to this I. This is, perhaps, the starkest 
example of insufficiency, where being takes place, and, in a dramatic shift 
away from the political uses of community that Blanchot tries to unsettle, 
it constitutes the disaster on which the concept of community is painted. 
This concept, in order to be adequate to the principle of insufficiency, 
needs to acquire a sense of absence.
Produced in the limit-experience of the encounter with an other that 
is the most adequate expression of being (it is its principle), absence is 
precisely that to which the concept of community must become adequate. 
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Community, however, as its name implies, is worked out in collections of 
persons or groups. Holding onto this difficulty whereby absence would 
seem to directly contradict community, and recalling the tendency for 
absence similarly to be located in the production of a master signifier 
through lack, Blanchot offers a reading of a society associated with 
Bataille named ‘Acéphale’ – literally, ‘headless’. In it, Blanchot reads the 
possibility of an offer of the impossible ‘gift’ of community (13). To be 
clear, the principle of insufficiency, as that to which community must 
be adequate, implies both that community must be resistant to the 
production of a sense of subjective certainty and, consequently, that it 
must resist its production through a programme, as this latter assumes 
the former as its condition of possibility. Acéphale was to be established 
as a community through the willing sacrifice of a victim, who was to 
be sacrificed in the simultaneous suicide of the performer of the ritual. 
This ritual – which never occurred – would have refused the possibility 
of either figure in the community being established with the subjective 
certainty of the agent, or as sovereign, as a figure whose absence unifies 
the community into One. It is this unity through the sacrifice of the 
figure which becomes sovereign that structures the quasi-Freudian sense 
of community which finds its repetition in the centrality of the Oedipus 
myth in psychoanalysis. While this ritual, as a principle, would be adequate 
to the sense of insufficiency through its refusal of the subjective certainty 
of the self, it would fail precisely through its role as a ritual: it would 
be a work, a programme, designed to produce community and, as such, 
would violate the very conditions necessary for a successful expression 
of community.
Blanchot, however, reads this failure as a gift, as the condition of 
possibility of the new. Rather than producing a community structured 
around the death of the father, what is produced in the failure of Acéphale 
is the gift of ‘infinite abandonment’ to insufficiency, the unworking 
work of community (16). This is not, however, a gift that can be grasped 
through its retention in some form of ‘intimate’ ‘inner experience’ that 
could potentially accommodate the absence of the other (16). Rather, 
what most clearly emerges from Bataille’s sense of insufficiency is that 
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the self emerges as such only in the movement to the outside that is 
produced in the moment of encounter with an other. This is to say that 
that which is most intimate, namely the knowledge of the insufficiency 
that is primarily one’s own but that one can never adequately know except 
in the death of the other, which both reveals it and makes it impossible, 
is always located in the site where being takes place. While it is clear that 
this ‘ecstasy’ always ‘runs the risk’ of being marked as ‘the individual’ – a 
risk that is most often realised – Blanchot suggests that it is precisely this 
movement to the outside that enables a different thinking of community, 
one offered in ‘the paradoxical form of the book’ (17).9 Paradoxical, 
precisely, as it always works in multiple directions.
Writing, as a form of communication rather than an act of 
communion, not only mimics the movement towards the outside that 
is co-constitutive with the principle of being, but in fact operates as 
precisely such a movement. It is in reading, understood as a form of 
literary community, a community produced through what Nancy names 
as ‘touch’, that the communication of writing is grasped, as Blanchot 
phrases it: ‘Reading – the unworking labour of the work – is not absent 
from [the friendship of the encounter with the other], though it belongs 
at times to the vertigo of drunkenness’ (22, emphasis added). What this 
metaphor of drunken vertigo offers is the sense in which the friend, in its 
moment of enunciation (the friend reads the text), ‘absents itself’ much 
like a drunk friend who passes out, ensuring that communication does 
not slide into communion (25). The touch that occurs in the moment of 
reading (which is an entirely passive work in the sense that it does not 
produce a text) holds out the potential through which an adequate sense 
of the subject and of community might emerge: a touch of the absent 
and yet destined-to-be-repeated communication of the writer and the 
reader. It is in this realisation that Blanchot locates a sense of community 
as ‘unavowable’ – it cannot be declared, or claimed, in advance (46). In 
contrast with a sense of community that comes to be associated with the 
language of autochthony, with ‘earth’, ‘blood’ and ‘race’, in other words 
with homogeneity, Blanchot offers a sense of community ‘gathered 
around a choice’, which both makes it possible and immediately denies 
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its possibility (46), a choice not unlike Antigone’s affirmation of the right 
to bury her brother. In the absence of the potential to build community 
through a sovereign act of the will, what such an elective community 
might offer is the capacity to think new concepts in relation to the always 
present and yet already absent community of the touch.
Between autochthony and copulation
Perhaps one of the clearest articulations of the potentialities of such 
an ‘elective community’ can be found in Antigone, the first play by the 
Greek playwright Sophocles that deals with questions surrounding the 
myth of Oedipus. As is well known, the character of Antigone constitutes 
the central node through which the problematic of justice is expressed 
in relation to the state, the law, gender and deity. Stated differently, 
Antigone presents the very sense of community that Blanchot resists as a 
problem for thought and that I intimated above as a limit for the thinking 
of the postapartheid. It is for this reason, especially Antigone’s explicit 
foregrounding of the tension between these two different concepts of 
community, as well as the centrality of the Oedipus myth in Western 
thought and the manner in which its terms haunt Welcome to Our Hillbrow, 
that I seek to both abide by and trouble a reading of this myth offered by 
Lévi-Strauss.
Inasmuch as Antigone’s role in the myth as a monster (of a peculiar 
type due to incest) enables her to function in the manner that she does, it 
is worth elucidating the role of the monster with some care, especially as 
this figure repeats, persistently, in Mpe’s troubling of community. There 
are two conventional monsters in the myth: the Dragon and the Sphinx. 
The Dragon is the first to appear and is that which would prevent the 
founding of Thebes (the slaughtering of Cadmus’ men) and, consequently, 
is killed by Cadmus. It is, however, from the cultivation of the Dragon’s 
teeth that the Spartoi emerge from the ground and assist in the city’s 
founding. Quite clearly, as Lévi-Strauss argues, the Dragon symbolises an 
autochthonous sense of becoming: the founders of the city emerge from 
the earth, a sense of becoming that is similarly signalled by the Sphinx 
as a chthonic creature. However, both these creatures are killed by men. 
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As such, Lévi-Strauss argues that their structural role in the myth is to 
signal the ‘denial of the autochthonous origin of man’ (215). It is in the 
names of men that Lévi-Strauss suggests the opposite function to these 
creatures is to be located, as the names of Oedipus (swollen foot), his 
father Laios (left-sided) and his grandfather Labdacos (lame), all indicate 
difficulty with walking or lameness. Their names, he suggests, indicate a 
persistence of the ‘autochthonous origin of man’, to the extent that this 
difficulty in walking marks them as ‘born from the earth’ (216). Walking, 
quite literally, is a function of standing upright, of becoming bipedal and 
extending oneself away from the earth. These characters slaughter the 
most evident expressions of autochthonous origin, and yet carry in their 
names the very unravelling of that act of separation.
The tension between these two functions is reinforced, according 
to Lévi-Strauss, through a resonant pair of functions, namely the 
‘overvaluing of blood relations’ (that is, community as constituted 
through family) and the ‘undervaluing’ of the same that is evidenced, 
on the one hand, in the search for Europa, Oedipus’ marriage to Jacosta 
and the burial of Polynices and, on the other, by the killing of Laios and 
the mutual killing of the brothers Polynices and Eteocles (214–215). 
As such, Lévi-Strauss contends that it is the scaffolding of this tension 
(a tension that he suggests similarly structures the Freudian iteration 
of the myth) that forms the function of myth more generally. Myth, it 
would seem, operates as a stage on which the tension between these two 
understandings of community and the social can be held. To support the 
claim that it is the question of emergence, particularly as it pertains to 
emergence from the one (autochthony) or the two (copulation; that is, 
being as emerging from community and enclosed within its skin), that 
is held in the structure of myth, Lévi-Strauss turns to a series of myths 
from the Americas to highlight, through a discussion of cultivation and its 
relation to autochthony, how the same structure can be located in them.
That this question of emergence has to do with the question of the 
subjective certainty of Man becomes apparent through the Sphinx’s riddle. 
It is not simply due to the fact that the answer to the riddle is ‘man’, but 
rather to a sketching of a trajectory in relation to the earth. The Sphinx 
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asks, ‘What has four legs in the morning, two legs in the afternoon, and 
three legs in the evening?’ On this trajectory, one that Oedipus affirms 
through his answer, Man emerges in close proximity to earth, distances 
itself from earth and then, ultimately, enlists the assistance of a prosthetic 
so as to resist the return to earth through the failure of its body. Myth, as 
a narrative form, might be read as fulfilling such a role of prosthetic to the 
extent that it resists a resolution of the problem. The struggle that defines 
Man, it seems, is a struggle to stand and remain standing, to enforce some 
form of separation from autochthony. It is interesting how this question 
comes to be troubled in the character of Antigone.10
While Lévi-Strauss argues that Antigone is an integral element in the 
myth only when it comes to the question of the ‘overvaluation’ of blood 
(which he reads as resonant with the question of autochthony), I suggest 
that, in reading, Antigone – particularly through her name, which can be 
read as signifying opposition to birth – becomes available as a singularity 
that exceeds the demands of the Symbolic Order of the Law, the demand 
of institutionalised difference.11 To make this argument, it is necessary 
to read Antigone, to grapple with her character, at the level of the name, 
action and existence. Antigone’s name, which Lévi-Strauss chooses not 
to read, situates her as being against her blood, opposed to the marker 
of her birth. However, in a reading that can be taken as contesting this, 
Paul Allen Miller argues through his detailed analysis of the opening lines 
of the play, which he describes as ‘a text that constantly escapes itself’ 
(5), that it is Antigone’s desire for the singularity of ‘same-wombedness 
[the term with which she addresses her sister Ismene in the opening line] 
that is at the heart of the Oedipal family romance’ (4). This desire, which 
he reads as an affirmation of birth as it is an invocation of the mother, 
comes to be expressed in Antigone’s desire to be united with her brother 
in death through flouting the law of the tyrant. In this formulation 
Antigone’s actions work against her name in a very similar manner to 
how the action of Oedipus with regard to the Sphinx works against the 
operation of his name. However, Antigone’s claim to same-wombedness, 
a claim that positions her as a monster due to the implicit affirmation 
of incest, also enables her to respond to the attempt to resolve the 
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dislocation inherent in the myth (the dislocation brought about by the 
tension between autochthony and copulation). In this reading Creon (the 
tyrant who is also her uncle, the brother of Jacosta) signifies the realm of 
the Symbolic Order of the Third, of the institutionalisation of difference, 
while Antigone signifies a desire for sameness, of immanence, that resists 
the injunction of this Third.
Antigone emerges in this moment as a potential mediator in the 
struggle that lies at the heart of the myth.12 However, Antigone is 
significantly unlike Creon, who first attempts to secure the return of 
Oedipus and, failing this, following the battle between Polynices and 
Eteocles, issues a decree that was designed to situate the sovereign 
as the source of right in Thebes (that is, to resolve the problem of 
emergence through subsuming it within societal structure, a reduction 
of the social to One). Instead, Antigone responds to the event of her 
brother’s death through maintaining the disjuncture that structures the 
myth. To phrase this a little more pointedly so as to draw it in line with 
the understanding of ethics that emerges in my reading of Blanchot, 
Antigone’s freedom is articulated in her attempt at communication, 
which would entrench a particular understanding of the condition of 
Man as universal as it is materialised through the lived experience of her 
actions. What is entrenched, I suggest, is the principle of insufficiency 
as the root of being: the irresolvable tension between autochthony 
and copulation. The resistance to the Symbolic Order of the Law that 
is signified by Antigone enables a glimpse of the ‘embrace of Being’ 
(Miller 12), perceived in a flash as she articulates the impossibility of 
not choosing death so as to bury her brother. This choice is not simply 
one of blood over society, understood as the State; rather, Antigone 
accepts the authority of Creon to put her to death for flouting his 
decree even as she declares it to be unjust in relation to the law of the 
gods. As such, Antigone affirms both senses of right, obeying both as 
sources of authority even as she rejects the expression of Creon’s own 
affirmation of his authority (which would resolve the tension between 
these two laws). Critically, her ‘action’ in this moment is articulated 
as a double passivity: she fulfils her responsibility to the death of her 
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brother as well as to Creon. Her capacity to produce such a statement 
of justice as an expression of the ethical – I think particularly of her 
refusal of Creon’s edict in lines 391–409, and the subsequent perception 
of its consequences in lines 730–736 and 788–796 (see Sophocles) – is, 
however, dependent on her particular monstrosity: Antigone’s desire 
for her brother, expressed in the metaphor of same-wombedness and 
her consequent actions and statements, recalls precisely that which 
Creon’s decree sought to repress, namely the disjuncture that is held in 
the structure of the myth, the problem of Man as it comes to be worked 
out in the actions of Oedipus and his sons. Antigone, then, can be read 
as a nodal point, one produced through her action, which is revealed 
immediately also as a passivity, an unworking work, at which the myth 
of Oedipus – and any resolution of it through repression or the law 
and the attendant socius brought into existence through this – begins 
to unravel itself, to shift towards a potential understanding of the social 
through its remains: the unavowable community, realised here in death.
Of scripts and insufficiency
If abiding by Blanchot’s reading of Bataille and Duras enables a sense of 
community that might be adequate to a notion of the subject indelibly 
marked by insufficiency rather than certainty or lack, it is in the brief 
reading of the Oedipus myth that the ethical potential of this sense of 
community is produced for thinking. At stake here is not simply an 
attempt to dismiss a quasi-Freudian concept of community as carrying 
a redemptive potential for the postapartheid. Rather, as will become 
clear in my reading of Mpe’s Welcome to Our Hillbrow, the refiguring 
of community and subjectivity that I am unfolding here is reworked in 
Mpe’s novel so as to take account of the weight of lived experience. As I 
begin to show in the remainder of this chapter, such a practice of reading 
hinges on a sense of the ethical as an attempt to adequately respond to the 
principle of being as insufficiency. I suggest in my reading of the concept 
of community in Welcome to Our Hillbrow that it might enable us to posit 
an adequate sense of the ethical, one that asks us ‘not to be unworthy of 
that which happens to us’; in other words, to posit a sense of the ethical 
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that is capable of abiding by insufficiency into the midst of the dominant 
concerns that mark the postapartheid.
It has, however, become commonplace to read Mpe’s novel as a ‘work of 
mourning’, as a literary instance in which community might be redeemed 
through attending to the loss of being African in the world (whether this 
is understood through the lens of slavery, colonialism or apartheid) and, 
in the case of Neville Hoad’s reading, for example, maintaining this as a 
constitutive lost object into our present: melancholia, in this case, as an 
ethical relation.13 While this figuring of Mpe’s novel enables Hoad to read 
it as producing an ‘insurgent and rooted, yet open, cosmopolitanism’ 
(113), his reading does not take account of what, precisely, is mourned 
(neither does it bother to theorise cosmopolitanism, treating this 
rather as a simple good). It is not death, nor is it an African sense of 
cosmopolitanism, but rather the hoped-for potential of what could have 
been if the community of writing, one adequate to ‘not owning life’, 
adequate, in other words, to insufficiency as the principle of being, had 
been constitutive of lived experience. It is, I will argue below, this failure 
of exiting the script of autochthony that is worked out throughout the 
pages of Mpe’s novel.
Welcome to Our Hillbrow is striking both for its use of narrative voice 
and for the manner in which it works through indigeneity (the question 
of autochthony and copulation) as a problematic that must be reckoned 
with. The majority of the novel, what we might call its first part – which 
circles the character of Refentše and his suicide through narrating the 
different strands that intertwine around this event – unfolds through an 
omniscient narrator that is not easily locatable within the contours of the 
narrative. The narrator is not, however, disinterested in the unfolding 
of the novel, occupying rather the place of a companion to Refentše 
(the main character in the novel), who is himself also removed from the 
story that is told. While it is tempting to locate the narrator as a voice 
emerging from the television set that, in its own way, narrates elements 
of the story from its vantage point in heaven, it is perhaps most accurate 
to speculate, given the centrality of writing in the novel, that the narrator 
emerges from the stories that the characters propose to write now that 
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they are dead. While the narrator is rigorously maintained as a voice from 
nowhere in the first part of the novel, there are three moments in which 
the narrative voice slips from one that is almost extradiegetic to one that 
is explicitly placed inside the narrative. In these instances, which all have 
to do with the insufficiency of existence and a particular monstrosity 
(through being marked as foreign, as impoverished or as unfaithful to 
an ideal), the narrator joins with Refentše through the use of the plural 
pronoun ‘we’ (8, 67) and the possessive ‘our’ (23). The effect of this 
slippage is to render the narrator as omniscient but not pure – it loses its 
sovereignty in the realisation that the narrator is itself complicit with the 
story that is told. In the final two chapters of the novel, where the reader 
discovers Refilwe’s impending death from Aids, the narrative voice again 
shifts, this time towards that of a straightforward third-person narrator 
that addresses, for the most part, the reader directly. The force of this 
shift is to place the reader suddenly in the position of a character in the 
novel, as spoken to, and has to do with the ethical potential of the concept 
of community that is developed in it.
So as to adequately address the ethical potential of the novel, it is 
necessary to first offer a reading of two themes that thread it, namely, that 
of autochthony and that of writing. After the epigraph, which prepares the 
reader for a battle that will take place through words, a battle that carries 
weight for our present, the novel immediately offers what it calls ‘Hillbrow: 
the Map’. This map, which is presented in relation to the particularities of 
Hillbrow but which can be read as a map for the entire novel, is constituted 
through tracking Refentše’s first movements through Hillbrow on his 
way to register for a degree at the University of the Witwatersrand. What 
emerges in this chapter is a sense of life as constituted through a question 
of ‘routes’ and ‘roots’ (2). In other words, it has to do with the way life is 
negotiated as well as from where it is negotiated, or, to phrase it in the 
terms of my reading of the Oedipus myth, it has to do with a distinction 
between autochthony and copulation. This distinction will come to 
structure the entire novel, and is expressed in the disagreements Refentše 
has with his cousin over xenophobia, crime, disease and the responsibility 
of those who name themselves as South Africans, and is perhaps most 
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starkly articulated in a relationship that Refentše develops with a local 
‘beggar’. While Refentše’s cousin simply ignores the elderly man as ‘a 
beggar’, Refentše decides to return his greeting, a decision that will be 
repeated continuously for five years as he walks past the old man on his 
way to and from the university. This interaction between Refentše and 
the beggar is read by Hoad as an exemplary instance, particularly in the 
moment of that character’s death, of the ‘shared vulnerability’ (121) that 
marks all humans in the novel. It is this that Hoad reads as carrying the 
potential of an African universalism, a humanism that enables a sense of a 
rooted cosmopolitanism as the ethical weight of Mpe’s novel.14 I suggest, 
however, that what is at stake in this decision to greet is an orientation in 
existence away from the sufficiency of the self (which almost everyone in 
the novel fights for) and towards a responsibility to the other, an orientation 
that leads Refentše to the desire to write on the problems of ‘our Hillbrow’ 
(Hoad 30). Critically, as the reader rapidly realises through the unfolding 
of the novel, Refentše is not capable of simply walking, or writing, his way 
out of the script that produces him. This lack of the capacity to simply 
walk away is reinforced through the becoming absent of punctuation in 
the final passages of all the chapters – an absence that can be read as a 
textual performance of the inescapable flux in which all the narratives and 
characters in the novel are, to some extent, lodged.
This script from which it is not easy to escape is that of autochthony 
or, rather, indigeneity and its concomitant claims to a moral order of 
purity, and it is marked through a disjuncture between not knowing and 
the certainty of knowing too well. While the narrator consistently troubles 
the certainty of knowledge in which the characters of the novel act – 
instructing them in how they would have acted if they had known more 
– the voices of ‘the community’, initially that of Refentše’s home village 
of Tiragalong but, as the novel progresses, also Hillbrow, Alexandra, 
South Africa and London, always speak from a perspective of absolute 
certainty. However, given the broader perspective that the narrator brings 
to the events on which these voices speak, the often repeated phrases of 
‘everyone knows’ (44), ‘it is known’ (82), ‘as [the local people] well knew’ 
(54), come to take on a measure of irony in that they mark precisely the 
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limit at which this emplotment of events should fail. Yet, as the narration 
of Refilwe’s response to Refentše’s death makes clear, these emplotments 
are what persist in the social precisely because they conform, as ‘valid 
testimony’, to the scripts along which the social is produced. This is not 
a scripting that is unique either to the postapartheid or to the encounters 
between the rural and the urban. Rather, as the narrator explicitly points 
out, these are held in common with apartheid rationality, where people 
were fixed in place through land (bantustans) and ‘any criticism of 
Apartheid thinking became a threat to public morals; where love across 
racial boundaries became mental instability …’ (57). The manner in which 
the narrator does not finish the comparison but rather trails off into an 
ellipsis draws attention to the resonance that these formulations have with 
the emplotments that affirm autochthony as the basis of morality – it is not 
necessary to specify the remainder of the list; it functions here as an echo. 
This scripting is also, through the movements of Refilwe, expanded into a 
global phenomenon, what we today refer to perhaps as ‘global apartheid’, 
which is premised both on race and, as Refilwe discovers upon her entry to 
the United Kingdom, on a perceived rootedness to a political perspective 
or agenda, a perspective described as ‘white civilisation’, a civilisation that 
includes South Africa as an emblem of liberalism.
It is precisely because it is not possible simply to walk out of a script, not 
even through hard work, that Refentše decides to begin to write. However, 
what emerges in this moment is not a revolutionary, or even an adequate, 
text in relation to that which constitutes the contours of community in 
postapartheid South Africa, but, rather, insufficiency, since ‘to have these 
answers would be to know the secrets of life itself’ (61). This knowledge, 
which the narrator suggests would amount to ‘owning life’, reducing it to a 
calculable One, is precisely what Refentše is unable to achieve:
I do not own life, you often said when you tried to laugh your difficulties 
away.
Many people could not see that you were not merely throwing jokes 
around. You did not own life when you were alive. Now that you are 
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alive in a different realm, you know for sure that you do not own life. You 
have watched God and Devil, gods and Ancestors, wondering whether 
they owned it, this thing called life (67).
This question of owning life, with the implication that such ownership 
would grant a semblance of control over life, to specify its outcomes (the 
passage occurs in the midst of Refentše being told that he is not able to 
intervene in the world of the living), is not necessarily posed as an instance 
of regret. Whereas ownership, the transformation of life into an object 
that is yours, enables a programmatic relation to life, the lack of ownership 
requires that the subject, in this case Refentše, must respond adequately 
to the life that takes place. In other words, the lack of ownership asks for 
an ethical relationship defined by not being unworthy of what happens 
to us: a demand to resist the reduction of life to an object, to something 
defined through autochthony.
As a gesture towards the ethical, then, the short story that Refentše 
writes in the novel, a story that mimics the novel into which it is laid, 
actually fails: Refentše commits suicide. His suicide, the reader learns 
by (in a sense) listening in on the narrator’s speech to Refentše, has 
more to do with his own sense of shame and guilt than with the act of 
infidelity performed by Lerato and Sammy (Refentše comes home one 
afternoon to find his girlfriend, Lerato, and his best friend, Sammy, 
in the midst of an intimate sexual encounter). In the months after his 
death, the facts of his act have, through the careful work of Refilwe, 
become produced along the lines of a morality tale: if you have sexual 
relations with a ‘makwerekwere’ (a derogatory term for a foreigner), then 
you too will plummet to your death. This tale is not limited to sexual 
relations, as through it Refentše’s mother is accused of witchcraft and 
subsequently murdered, and Lerato also takes her own life, as a result 
of the emplotments that seek to apportion blame anywhere outside 
Tiragalong, outside the zone of autochthonous belonging. The reader, 
of course, knows that this emplotment of events is entirely specious, as 
Lerato is, as a matter of empirical reality in the novel, a descendant of a 
man from Tiragalong, Tshepo’s father, and thus an element of the exact 
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expression of the social that considers her an outsider. In addition to 
this empirical objection is the sense of life that Refentše tries to produce 
through his short story – a sense of life not reducible to its stamping into 
a reified sense of the self as sovereign. Even with such an intention, the 
narrator is clear that failing in the demand of the ethical has real effects 
for which the subject is always responsible: the narrator names Refentše 
as ‘a killer’, not because of his suicide, but because that event provided the 
kernel around which the other stories were spun, stories that resulted in 
the death of his mother and Lerato, as well as the madness of Sammy.
Despite her role in manufacturing the stories about Refentše’s death, 
it is the character of Refilwe that undergoes the most dramatic shift in 
the novel. Hers is a movement away from the subjective certainty ordered 
on a sense of autochthony (that is, the sovereign self, what Creon tries to 
protect as a possibility in the Oedipus myth) and towards an understanding 
of the self as rooted in insufficiency – an insufficiency that is made real to 
her through the death of Refentše and the continued effect of his writing. 
Through reading Refentše’s fiction, Refilwe comes to realise the severely 
limited and unethical expression of existence that marks her life; she 
comes to understand the ethical weight of her actions:
It was because of these frustrations, because she had come to value so 
greatly the importance of literary honesty and risk-taking, that Refilwe 
appreciated Refentše’s story so much … She had read the story many times, 
and each time it made her weep anew. Partly because of the memories it 
brought of Refentše. And partly because it made her see herself and her 
own prejudices in a different light (95–96).
The transition that is marked in this passage, from an identity premised 
on place (autochthony) to a sense of the self derivative from a series of 
encounters with the other, is not sufficient to enable Refilwe to walk 
out of the script that has produced her. Although Refilwe does leave 
South Africa to study at Oxford Brookes University and, while studying 
abroad, meets and falls in love with a Nigerian man, her existence in the 
United Kingdom is an ambiguous one, for her South African identity as 
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a marker of liberalism guarantees her the treatment of a ‘white’ person as 
she moves through passport control and, later, through society, while all 
other Africans are made to wait and are examined for markers of disease. 
This ambiguity is accentuated when Refilwe is diagnosed, along with her 
lover, as having contracted Aids.
The disease did not come, as Tiragalong would expect, from her 
Nigerian lover, just as it also, in his case, did not originate with Refilwe. 
In both cases they had been living with the disease for over ten years, 
which, for Refilwe, means that she contracted the disease while she 
was still a student in her home village of Tiragalong. This medical fact 
does not, however, result in Refilwe escaping the emplotment that 
works to reify the autochthonous claims to morality that structure 
the social in Tiragalong, Johannesburg and the world: these ‘gods and 
devils of Tiragalong’, the narrator informs the reader, relentlessly 
transform Refilwe’s lived experience, where she wastes away into ‘the 
scarecrow figure of Refentše’s fiction’, into a morality tale (112, 120). 
This emplotment is presented, in these final pages of the novel, as an 
expression of welcoming that seeks to affirm that to which the one being 
welcomed arrives, rather than as openness to the other’s arrival. As the 
returnee, Refilwe recognises and understands the emplotments that take 
place even as she grasps through the instruction of the narrator that she 
too is ‘a Hillbrowan. An Alexandran. A Johannesburger. An Oxfordian. 
A Lekwerekwere, just like those you once held in such contempt’ (123). 
Refilwe attains this status as an expansion of the grounds for her 
ethical existence, an existence premised on the insufficiency of being 
structured on the contingency of encounter, while from the perspective 
of Tiragalong she attains this status as she is now marked by the disease 
of the other. It is owing to the extent of this disjuncture that Refilwe 
realises that she, too, will die within the emplotments of Tiragalong, and 
that no amount of reasoned argumentation in itself will order her escape 
from these scripts.
In the wake of this narrative of emplotment through a reduction to 
homogeneity, to the claim to autochthony that structures the world, 
the reader is brought to the final page of the novel where its ethical 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
244
injunction becomes plain. The narrator, who is both in the story and 
separate from it, and who is instrumental in the development of a sense 
of the self marked by insufficiency and the ethical expressions that this 
might give rise to in contradiction with the social order of homogeneity 
and its attendant morality, speaks from a non-place in the novel. On 
the final page, as Refilwe dies, the narrator reflects on ‘our continuing 
existence’ in the zone that it names as ‘heaven’, which it argues is
located in the memory and consciousness [which, throughout the novel, 
is synonymous with ‘script’] who live with us and after us. It is the archive 
that those we left behind keep visiting and revisiting; digging this out, 
suppressing or burying that. Continually reconfiguring the stories of our 
lives, as if they alone held the real and true version. Just as you, Refilwe, 
tried to reconfigure the story of Refentše; just as Tiragalong now is going 
to do the same to you. Heaven can also be Hell, depending on the nature 
of our continuing existence in the memory and consciousness of the 
living (124).
The novel ends by welcoming Refilwe to ‘our heaven’, to the site of 
continued existence in the modes through which those who persist beyond 
the novel (that is, its readers) respond to the emplotments encountered 
through the characters. As such, the reader is placed in the position of 
Refilwe after she read Refentše’s fiction. Confronted with the modes 
through which our consciousness, as an expression of the postapartheid 
as a condition is produced along the lines of its scripts, and confronted 
with the possibility of an ethics that could perhaps be adequate to a sense 
of the self premised on insufficiency, the narrator poses a question for the 
reader: in what way will the reader respond to the remains of the social, 
to this heaven? However, the overall force of Welcome to Our Hillbrow 
does not carry a utopic resolution of this question: every instance of the 
realisation of an ethics falls short precisely on the script that it attempts 
to evade. The edge of community, it would seem, falls back on its limit, 
enclosing a terrain rather than opening it up to its outside. However, 
its offer functions in a similar mode to that of the impossible ritual that 
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establishes Acéphale as a potential community adequate to insufficiency, 
or of the passive obedience that leads Antigone to her death: in its failure 
it maintains an openness to a future. It is this openness, coupled with 
an insistence on the weightiness of lived experience, which is offered for 
thinking in Mpe’s novel. Indeed, in his consideration of this problematic, 
it is in the decidedly unstable configuration of writing that an expression 
of community adequate to this weight and structured on the principle of 
insufficiency might be realised. However, the expression of community 
as always enclosed within its own limit – in its own skin, so to speak 
– consistently resurfaces as a claim that seeks to undo the potentiality 
of this community of the touch found in writing. Regardless of whether 
the difficulty is resolved materially or ideally, through bodily flesh 
or through philosophical thought, the attending concept stumbles on 
the tension of this claim. This limit, however, is also an abiding by the 
openness of the touch, a duration in which a difference might yet still 
be produced. As Mpe’s Welcome to Our Hillbrow makes clear in its re-
working of the principle of insufficiency as this slices through the script 
of autochthony, the weight of lived experience demands that such an 
opening be consistently produced, even in its failure, as a possible opening 
onto the future.
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NOTES
1. See the central role that community plays in the recognition of racial categories 
in Section 2 of the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950).
2. On the question of a practice of life that remains to be learned, see Jacques 
Derrida and Gayatri C. Spivak.
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3. For influential readings of Mpe’s novel along these lines, see Neville Hoad 
and Rob Gaylard.
4. For Walter Benjamin’s understanding of the work of re-working, see his 
‘Theory of Distraction’.
5. I think particularly of Sam Durrant’s Postcolonial Narrative and the Work 
of  Mourning and Mark Sanders’s Ambiguities of Witnessing. For a reading 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that ‘troubles’ Sanders’s 
rendering of it through drawing attention to the weight of the TRCs 
genealogical precursors in both colonialism and apartheid, see Adam Sitze.
6. This sense of insufficiency is very similar to that of ‘need’ in the thinking of 
Levinas, especially in his early essay On Escape.
7. For a thorough discussion of Hegel’s recognition of this problem and his 
attempts to work around it through a consideration of Aesthetics, see Paul de 
Man and Jacques Derrida.
8. As Frantz Fanon phrases it in his introduction to Black Skin, White Masks, 
investment in a sense of ‘fusional multiplicity’ deserves the diagnosis of ‘idiocy’ 
as it maintains the very structure from which it is necessary to escape (xi).
9. For a discussion of how this risk generally comes to be resolved through an 
assertion of particular individuality, see Jacques Lacan.
10. The Theban Plays have received an immense amount of attention, which I do 
not have the space to replicate here. Perhaps one of the most sustained 
discussions of the problem of ethics as it pertains to the relation between two 
rights is offered by Hegel through his reading of ‘Antigone’ in his Phenomenology 
of Spirit, particularly in his discussion of the unity of self-consciousness and 
the self in its relation to ‘the ethical order’ and the realisation of morality.
11. See ‘Antigone’ in Patrick Hanks, Kate Hardcastle and Flavia Hodges, where 
it is argued that the two terms that constitute her name, namely ‘anti’ 
(meaning ‘opposed’) and ‘gen’ or ‘gon’ (meaning ‘birth’), signify opposition or 
contrariness to birth.
12. Although the figure of the mediator forms a central component in the 
structure of myths originating in the Americas, it is not mentioned by Lévi-
Strauss in relation to Oedipus.
13. On Welcome to Our Hillbrow as a work of mourning, see Sam Durrant’s ‘The 
Invention of Mourning’, as well as Hoad, especially pp. 114, 123 and 125. Hoad’s 
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intervention is useful both in terms of how it figures Welcome to Our Hillbrow 
in relation to a potential queer politics and its situating of the novel within the 
broader contours of South African literature. For the former, however, I would 
suggest that its potentiality can be pressed further through attending to the 
disembodiment that structures many of the descriptions of sex acts, not as a 
marker of alienation but rather as a refusal of the markers of autochthony. For the 
latter, it is still the case that the intricacies of this intertextuality remain to be read.
14. For a reading of Mpe as producing a plea for a reconstituted African sense of 
humanism in the midst of a dystopian postapartheid, see Rob Gaylard.
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CHAPTER 10
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE ‘BECOMING 
TECHNICAL OF THE HUMAN’
Premesh Lalu
The pursuit of learning is to increase day after day
The pursuit of Tao is to decrease day after day
It is to decrease and further decrease
Until one reaches the point of taking no action
No action is undertaken,
And yet nothing is left undone (Little, The Warrior Within 117).
Given all that has been written and done in memory of the student 
movements in South Africa, it is surprising that we have not had 
an adequate account of the drives and desires that animated an 
unprecedented movement of school students over a period of six 
months in 1985. In an effort to address the omission, the historian Colin 
Bundy argues that the students were driven by a sense of ‘immediatism’ 
expressed in what he charmingly calls a combination of street sociology 
and pavement politics. The resort to charm, however, encounters its 
limit in the political calculation surrounding what came to be known 
as the Trojan Horse Massacre in which three students were killed in 
Athlone, Cape Town, on 15 October 1985, and in a similar event staged 
by the state the following day in nearby Crossroads where two young 
people died.
In several scholarly works and documentary films, not to mention 
memorials, poems and works of art, the Trojan Horse incident has lent 
itself to ideological prescription rather than attentiveness to what was at 
REMAINS OF THE SOCIAL
250
work in the student movement that triggered the state killings in 1985. As 
a result, we have an event that is returned again and again to the realms of 
ideology or is memorialised in a way that re-enacts a habituated memory 
of attachment to war and violence – as if these were the only games in 
town to play.
The scene of the Trojan Horse incident, and the prehistory of that tragic 
occurrence, are what preoccupied the Cape Town writer Richard Rive in 
his novel Emergency Continued (1990). The intensity of Rive’s novel has 
recently been recalled by Adam Sitze in his essay titled ‘Between Study and 
Revolt: Further Notes on Emergency Continued ’. Sitze nudges the reader to 
ask what we are to do with the idea of ‘school’ – and scholē – which seems 
to have been a specific site of both indecision and intensification under the 
conditions of the permanent emergency of apartheid. This question is of 
particular significance in an age when deschooling had increasingly become 
the modality of neoliberalism with the availability of the internet, distance 
learning and MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses). If ‘nothing was left 
undone’ in the process of six months of protest and street fighting in 1985, 
might the lessons of that struggle be drawn on today to harness a modality 
of schooling that offers us a way of life and not a means of subjection?
In what follows, I locate the notion of the school along the contours 
of technogenesis, as that which is made rather than received as a means 
to an end. Placed in a field of technogenesis, the school under apartheid 
functioned both as a prohibition on learning and an apparatus that lent 
itself to a memory of the future – by which I mean a tertiary memory, 
following Bernard Stiegler, something akin to the industrialisation of 
memory. More precisely, tertiary memory advances Edmund Husserl’s 
concept of retention and protention through a shift in the history of the 
exteriorisation of technics:
The twentieth century is the century of the industrialisation, the 
conservation and the transmission – that is, the selection – of memory. 
This industrialisation becomes concretised in the generalisation of the 
production of industrial temporal objects (phonograms, films, radio 
and television programmes, etc.), with the consequences to be drawn 
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE ‘BECOMING TECHNICAL OF THE HUMAN’
251
concerning the fact that millions, hundreds of millions of consciousnesses 
are every day the consciousnesses, at the same time, of the same temporal 
objects (see Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus 106).
For Stiegler, the industrialisation of memory lends itself to a problem 
of de-individuation at one level, and the becoming technical of the 
human at another.1 The question is one of how we might retrieve spirit 
from the inevitable surrender of memory to technology. In asking for 
a reconsideration of the cinematic qualities of consciousness, Stiegler 
invites an inquiry into another version of the becoming technical of the 
human, one that supplements the loss of memory with the re-enchantment 
of the world. Here, in the double bind of de-individuation resulting from 
the surrender of memory and the becoming technical of the human, we 
may discover a possibility of renewing our understanding of a technology 
of the school and the renewal of the understanding of schooling that was 
revealed most powerfully in the student movement of 1985.2
Several recorded accounts provide us with the outline of the event. 
In mid-1985, students of the schools of Athlone, together with several 
other schools spread over the Cape Peninsula, decided to suspend their 
studies in protest against the declaration of a state of emergency by 
the apartheid government on 21 July in 36 magisterial districts in the 
Eastern Cape and present-day Gauteng. This ‘schools boycott’, as it came 
to be known, would spread across the length and breadth of the Cape 
Flats, resulting in militant uprisings against the state and pitched battles 
against the army and police force. On the surface, the name given to this 
uprising has seldom been subjected to scrutiny. Variously referred to 
as a schools boycott or as a mass movement, the student generation of 
1985 soon realised that their lives were being overtaken by history at an 
incalculable speed. What generated this movement among students was 
perhaps less their enthusiasm for a specific ideological position and more 
a sense of freedom in which memory was redirected towards a desire to 
think ahead, to generate something new and different from the wretched 
script of apartheid, rather than glance backwards over the shoulder, in 
the direction of the threat of the police (see Figure 10.1). In the friction 
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between these two competing emphases, the evaluation of whether 
nothing indeed was left undone remains.
During the state of emergency, the school effectively became a zone 
of suspension. It resembled an interval, not too dissimilar to the interval 
associated with the language of cinematography, which Trinh T. Minh-ha 
develops in her study Cinema Interval. Minh-ha argues that the Russian 
film-maker Dziga Vertov, especially through his elaboration of the idea 
of cine-seeing, saved cinematography from the ‘frightful venom of habit’ 
(vii). Vertov’s technique failed in the context of Soviet society, where it 
first made itself known, perhaps because he ultimately ceded ground to the 
more romantic vision of Sergei Eisenstein. (Neither would have their films 
shown in the commercial cinemas of Athlone, although Eisenstein was a 
Figure 10.1. Juliette Franciscus (glancing over her shoulder), Karen Britten, Sean 
Stockenstroom, Belgravia High students on the corner of Thornton and Kromboom 
roads, Athlone, 1985.
Photographer: David Hartman
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favourite of those frequenting Leftist film societies on the Cape Flats.) 
What matters for my reading are two aspects of Vertov’s theorisation of 
cinematography that help us make sense of the performance of students 
and the script of apartheid in Athlone in 1985. Something in Vertov’s 
vision may allow us a different way of conceiving the student movement 
and, with it, the work of schooling (or, as he might have preferred to call 
it, retooling).
Minh-ha’s reading of Vertov’s manifesto Kinoks: A Revolution presses 
home the point that ‘intervals are what cine-images, cine-documents 
or cine-poems are built upon, that is: “upon a movement between 
the pieces, the frames, upon the proportions of these pieces between 
themselves, upon the transitions from one visual impulse to the one 
following it” ’ (iv). The first point of interest is how Vertov rearranges 
relations through the device of the camera, producing the interval as 
the most productive instance of cinema. As Minh-ha notes, ‘in his “hall 
of intervals” where “frames of truth” are minutely edited, all is a matter 
of relations: temporal, spatial, rhythmic relations; relations, as he 
specified, of planes, of recording speed, of light or shade, or of movement 
within the frame … cinematography is in itself a multiplicity of cinema 
intervals’ (iv). In his determination to retheorise cinematography, 
Vertov may well have revealed a process of the technical becoming of 
the human. Here the fabric of the everyday is woven into the visual 
machine, so that film’s uniqueness lies in its immediacy and proximity 
to the present.
What is crucial is not that Vertov sought to approximate journalism 
or history or reality TV to produce what Paul Virilio might call a post-
Bergsonian sense of ‘virtual reality’. As Carloss James Chamberlin notes 
in his punningly titled essay ‘Dziga Vertov: The Idiot’, Vertov may have 
given us not only a theory of cinematography, but also an education about 
aesthetic education, or bios and techné:
How does a nation of backward hick farmers become the industrialized 
fulfilment of Marxist prophecy? What dynamic element can make this 
transformation happen: Factories, Tractors, Machines?
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It is thus with the people – the hot fiery blast of socialism and the wind of 
a thousand slogans hurls away their tsarist trinkets and entertainments, 
their religion, their selfishness, and their vodka – and re-tools them into 
supermen, Shock Workers, Machine-Men and Machine-Women of Steel. 
That is the real object of the word Stalinism and the Five Year Plan. The 
steelification – the Stalinization – of the human being.
The interval, I suggest, is a space for redirecting this seemingly fateful 
destiny, not only by dislodging technology as a means, but finding in it the 
very circumstance for an education about aesthetic education. If cinema 
had the kind of consequence that I attribute to it and its development in 
Athlone, it should be read not as a means to an end, but as a phase – an 
interval – in the technogenesis that gave us the memory of the student 
movement and the meaning of schooling. To return to the scene of 
Athlone with Vertov is to ask for a fresh attentiveness to both the human 
and the technology that awakened the students in 1985.
While many would attribute the upsurge of student protests in the 
1980s to the economic plight that awaited black youth under apartheid, 
in which they faced a future of being transformed into ‘hewers of 
wood and drawers of water’, a biblical phrase that recurred in a range 
of propagandist pamphlets of the time (see SADET 880), there was 
something else that was latent in their agency. We may speak of this 
latency as thought, but that would not be helpful, simply because it 
dialectically pits thought against action, in which thought is eventually 
negated. Neither was it the repressive atmosphere of corporal 
punishment and authoritarianism omnipresent in local schools that 
explains the upsurge in Athlone. Nor was it a simple act of solidarity 
with the despair facing students elsewhere in South Africa, subject to a 
state of emergency. What drove the students to action was precisely that 
upon which they acted, namely, schooling.
Perhaps a better way to think about the generative force unleashed by 
students is through the notion of a memory of the future, a formulation 
with which I hope to rename the activity upon which thousands 
of students embarked in 1985. To this end, I ask for a shift in the 
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designation of the upsurge of 1985, from terms such as ‘schools boycott’ 
and ‘mass movement’, towards something that disaggregates the relation 
between student and movement in the co-constituting couplet ‘student 
movement’. Such a move seeks to place the commonplace understanding 
of the students as violent and militant against an agency that may be 
read as seemingly more passive, as thoughtful, one which lay at the very 
erosion of the interval in the speed at which the events unfolded.
What we now call an event is symptomatically described by a name 
that Athlone shares with the Greeks. In 1985, a large ‘horse and trailer’ 
belonging to the South African Railways carried death to the streets of 
Athlone. Policemen and soldiers hidden in wooden crates on the back of 
an enormous railway truck enacted what notoriously became known as 
the Trojan Horse Massacre. The name ‘Trojan Horse’ resounded through 
the streets of Athlone, as if the burden for an explanation for the massacre 
was lifted by the name given to the atrocity. But that cannot be.
How did this event come to be named in terms of a memory of war 
between the Trojans and Greeks, handed down to us by Homer through 
his wonderfully long and meandering Iliad? What if we discover that this 
is the name that the South African state had in mind all along? What if the 
Trojans, the students who faced the hail of bullets, had through no fault 
of their own not yet arrived at the lesson dealing with Homer’s Iliad, and 
the scene of war that gave rise to the name given to their own massacre? 
To anticipate my argument briefly, I suggest that these questions belong 
neither to history nor to art. Rather, the questions need to be entrusted 
to a blind and illiterate poet, Homer perhaps, to offer us a name for the 
memory of the future that will endure into the future.
To begin the journey of renaming, I want to turn to the scene of the 
bioscope (the popular local name for the cinema) – which teemed with 
life, long before the physical structures which housed worlds hitherto 
unseen were turned into a grammar of despair and consumption housing 
bottlestores, banks and supermarkets in the wake of apartheid. I suggest 
that the bioscope may offer us a point of entry into the scene I wish to 
assign to the memory of the future. Films such as Spartacus (1960), The 
Trojan Horse (1961), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (1966) and Enter the 
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Dragon (1973)3 helped to filter the world of apartheid by placing tactics 
of battle in a field of slave rebellion, ancient warfare, fortune-hunting 
and martial arts, respectively. The Trojan Horse may have been invented 
by the Greeks through epic poetry, and Rome may have put down the 
rebellion of the slave army of Spartacus; Enter the Dragon may have 
uncannily affirmed subalternity, and The Good, the Bad and the Ugly may 
have called into question the limits of binary thinking. We cannot know 
for sure. What we can say is that in Athlone, the mythic, the legendary and 
the heroic – or the good, the bad and the ugly – were initially threaded 
through the moving image of the bioscope.
The institution of the bioscope was internally segmented at the levels 
of competition between bioscopes, film genres and the censor board. 
More than a history of experience, the bioscopes of Athlone reveal the 
mode of technogenesis offsetting the technologies of population control 
instituted in the name of apartheid. In Athlone alone, within the space of 
a kilometre, there were four cinemas – the Empire (700 seats, established 
by Basil Rubin), the Athlone (500 seats, established by the Moosa family), 
the Regent (700 seats, established by a Mr Stark) and the Kismet (1 323 
seats, established by S.J. Patel, but, because of Group Areas legislation, 
placed under the nomineeship of a manager from the designated ‘coloured’ 
group). Of these, the Kismet was announced at the time of its opening 
in 1958 as a luxury cinema complex and was supplied, as were cinemas 
on the Cape Flats more generally, with films by the major distribution 
networks of African Consolidated Films in Cape Town and Hollywood 
Films in Johannesburg.
The first level of segmentation could be tracked in the competition 
between cinemas in Athlone, often spurred on by film distributors and 
their mechanisms of costing films. The second involved segmentation 
at the level of genre, often driving interest and taste. In the 1960s, 
the films that attracted audiences were those belonging to the genre 
known as ‘spectacles’. These films – about Hercules (Italy, 1958, with 
Steve Reeves), Samson and Delilah (USA, 1949), the Maciste series (Italy, 
1960s), Spartacus (USA, 1960, directed by Stanley Kubrick and starring 
Kirk Douglas and Jean Simmons) and The Trojan Horse (Italy, 1961, with 
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Steve Reeves and Juliette Mayniel; see Figure 10.2) – ‘glorified Greek 
and Roman heroes’ and starred mostly ‘bodybuilders’, who became the 
poster boys of Athlone. By the mid-1960s, the spaghetti westerns had 
emerged as the most watched films, alongside the ‘tearjerker’ genre – 
for which cinema owners supplied free tissues to audiences. The latter 
included films such as All Mine to Give (1957), The Bread Seller (1960) 
and Madame X (1966). Tarzan’s Greatest Adventure (1959) with Gordon 
Scott as the eponymous hero and From Russia with Love (1963) with Sean 
Connery in the lead role also had considerable appeal for audiences. 
This was followed in the early 1970s by kung-fu films from China, 
representing the high point of cinema viewing in Cape Town. The 
introduction of Chinese cinema was also the point at which a third level 
of segmentation occurred.
From the perspective of the censor board, Chinese films were deemed 
to be ‘aspiring to communism’ (Patel interview), and as a result the 
bioscopes were increasingly subjected to police raids and harassment. 
H. Ming, a distributor who was allowed to import a batch of ‘films 
Figure 10.2. Trojan Horse Massacre memorial, Thornton Road, Athlone.
Photographer: Paul Grendon
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solely designated for the local Chinese community’ (Patel interview), 
cleverly subtitled about 15 films for circulation on the Cape Flats. 
The first Chinese films, The Hero (1972) and King of the Boxers (1973), 
with Jimmy Wang Yu, proved to be highly successful (that is, lucrative 
and popular). Jimmy Wang Yu paved the way for the arrival of The Big 
Boss (1971), Way of the Dragon (1972), Enter the Dragon (1973) and The 
Game of Death (1978), which brought Bruce Lee to the life and times of 
Athlone.
Film showings were organised around the ‘double feature’, a screening 
consisting of two films. These ran daily and were mostly sold out on 
Saturdays and Fridays – which included a midnight show. The Saturday 
five o’clock performance proved most popular, with ‘young lovers dressed 
to the nines’ and ‘tucked away in the corner seats’ (Patel interview). At the 
Kismet, as with other cinemas, there were up to 100 permanent advanced 
seat reservations at any given time. On any Saturday, some 8 000 people 
circulated through the cinemas of Athlone – mostly residents from Langa, 
Gugulethu, Manenberg, Belgravia, Kewtown, Silvertown, Bridgetown, 
Hazendal, Crawford and Athlone – often defying censor board regulations 
and racial restrictions then governing cinemas in South Africa.
Apartheid had the final say in the segmentation of the institution of 
the bioscope. Audiences were demarcated and restricted through three 
categories of censorship – A: films deemed fit for everybody; B: restricted 
to ages 4–12 (films deemed fit for whites); C: restricted to ages 4–12 (films 
not deemed fit for ‘Bantu’). To abide by the censorship laws effectively 
meant that a film categorised as ‘B’ could be seen by a ‘coloured’ youth of 
13 but not by an adult classified under apartheid as ‘Bantu’. The regulations 
were more regularly enforced by cinema owners in Athlone after 1968, 
following the showing of I Want to Live! (1958, with Susan Hayward 
and directed by Robert Wise). This film centred on the story of Barbara 
Graham – said to be the ‘wildest of the jazzed up generation’ and ‘driven 
by a thousand desires’ – who had been sentenced to death in the USA 
for murder. The film, which carried a ‘C’ censor board rating, was due to 
be shown after A Train for Durango (1968). Just prior to the interval, the 
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police raided the cinema and expelled half of the audience – those who 
were perceived to be ‘Bantu’, for whom the film carried a prohibition.
What these levels of segmentation reveal is the extent to which the 
duration of the bioscope was marked by interruptions and intervals. 
Read alongside Vertov’s theory of cinematography in which the human is 
folded into a technical apparatus – much like Charlie Chaplin in Modern 
Times – we may discern the way the bioscope constituted a ‘fabric of 
relationships woven in the vision machine’ (iv), where it functioned 
as an emotional prosthesis for the memory of street fighting for years 
to come.
The bioscope screen was a surface that conveyed an expansive 
globality. Across the Cape Flats, the image thus enlarged helped to 
counter the limits that Stephen Spender conveyed in his 1964 poem titled 
‘An Elementary School Classroom in a Slum’ – a poem which was widely 
taught to a generation of students on the Cape Flats.
Far far from gusty waves, these children’s faces.
Like rootless weeds, the hair torn round their pallor.
The tall girl with her weighed-down head. The paper-
seeming boy with rat’s eyes. The stunted unlucky heir
Of twisted bones, reciting a father’s gnarled disease,
His lesson from his desk. At back of the dim class
One unnoted, mild and young: his eyes live in a dream,
Of squirrels’ game, in tree room, other than this.
On sour cream walls, donations. Shakespeare’s head
Cloudless at dawn, civilized dome riding all cities.
Belled, flowery, Tyrolese valley. Open-handed map
Awarding the world its world. And yet, for these
Children, these windows, not this world, are world,
Where all their future’s painted with a fog,
A narrow street sealed in with a lead sky,
Far far from rivers, capes, and stars of words.
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Surely, Shakespeare is wicked, and the map a bad example
With ships and sun and love tempting them to steal—
For lives that slyly turn in their cramped holes
From fog to endless night? On their slag heap, these children
Wear skins peeped through by bones, and spectacles of steel
With mended glass, like bottle bits on stones.
Tyrol is wicked; map’s promising a fable:
All of their time and space are foggy slum,
So blot their maps with slums as big as doom.
Unless, governor, teacher, inspector, visitor,
This map becomes their window and these windows
That open on their lives like catacombs,
Break, O break open, till they break the town
And show the children to green fields, and make their world
Run azure on gold sands, and let their tongues
Run naked into books, the white and green leaves open
The history theirs whose language is the sun.
A direct comment, with avowedly socialist sympathies, on the temporality 
of the slum in a world mediated through the demands of high culture, 
Spender’s poem exceeds a politics of identification or even representation 
of those who ‘wear skins peeped through by bones’. Its object is discernibly 
schooling. Like Jorge Luis Borges’s map of the world that is the size of the 
world (in his short story ‘On Exactitude in Science’), Spender derides a 
schooling that destroys dreams and kills desire. As the map awards ‘the 
world its world’, Spender invites us to consider conflicting durations of 
memory, between that which opens onto a world already unavailable, and 
a world where attention and play are commanded by books, in a language 
crafted to create something other than habituated spaces of bourgeois 
civility.
The poem was taught at many schools in Athlone as a form of protest 
against an increasingly regimented schooling system. A generation of 
intellectual teachers formed in the Teachers’ League of South Africa 
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE ‘BECOMING TECHNICAL OF THE HUMAN’
261
and the United Democratic Front, railed courageously against apartheid 
schooling (see Rassool). Art teachers would frequently bemoan the 
inspectorate from the Department of Education, warning against their 
scurrilous attempts to stifle all creativity. Music teachers might rehash 
the lyrics of a Woodie Guthrie song, replacing the names of American 
landmarks with a South African landscape rendered barren by the 
desertification of apartheid:
This land is your land, this land is my land,
From the Great Limpopo, to Robben Island.
In other classrooms, the teaching of George Orwell’s Animal Farm as a 
text of radical history was pitted against surreptitious intent on the 
part of educational authorities to educate students about the perils of 
communism. And elsewhere there were further cautionary tales about 
the dangers of a society of control. In a context where the world was 
normatively raced, sexed and classed, such instances of discernment 
produced an interval in which there was a change of direction.
Yet despite these attempts, the infrastructure of the school persisted, 
with intercoms placed to listen into classrooms and deliver sermons and 
daily prayers from on high, and lines drawn across schoolyards to marshal 
students into a general discipline of the cane. In this milieu, the bioscope 
functioned as an antidote to a geography that was all but uninhabitable. 
To borrow liberally from Paul Virilio, in Athlone the bioscope offered 
a substitute horizon to the geographies of apartheid. One consequence 
of this was a massive alteration of the visual field – to one that could 
accommodate Bernardo Bertolucci and Stanley Kubrick as well as Clint 
Eastwood, Bruce Lee and James Coburn. More importantly, the bioscope 
provided an interval that disturbed the binaries of global and local, inside 
and outside, home and the world.
Globality was also conveyed through a technological mechanism of 
the bioscope that introduced a measure of speed to the everyday, giving 
rise to a field of potential attraction, collision and orbit, of potential 
centripetal and centrifugal movements. Languages, accents, race and 
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ethnicity, identification and misidentification, all lent themselves to a 
feeling of ‘walking as controlled falling’ (Massumi 14). The motion picture 
presented itself as a form of rhythm in which movement produced the 
very assemblages and gestures that exceeded apartheid’s technology of 
subjection. In a place where private transport was a middle-class luxury, 
the bioscope offered a ride.
Whatever the conditions of precarity, Athlone was at the very least 
marked by a series of intervals. In this sense, neither popular culture nor 
the dyad of space and time is adequate for understanding its texture. 
Mostly, Athlone was a constellation of varying speeds in which the logic 
of apartheid’s regimes of time could no longer be contained by a culture 
industry.
If anything, the bioscope in Athlone was a space where intervals 
mattered, functioning even as a model for apprehending the distributions 
of the sensible of the everyday. Mostly organised around the double feature, 
the showings themselves were interrupted by a brief interlude between 
the two films. The double feature often pitted film genres against each 
other, so it was not unlikely that viewers might see a spaghetti western 
hinged by the interval with a kung-fu film. The bioscope was not all about 
time: it was also about the interval, the enduring possibility of a second 
take after the first had run its credits. In all the ways that the interval was 
orchestrated, in the space of the ‘everything else’, lay a complex interlude 
in the subsuming of life into the drudgery of apartheid. The bioscope lived 
inside memory, as a prosthesis of memory of spaces not yet inhabited.
Following Stiegler and Vertov, let us think about the interval of the 
bioscope as a particular mode of grammatisation, one that placed a 
resource and rhythm at the very heart of the constitution of the political 
subject of apartheid. As a process of grammatisation, Athlone offers 
us a familiar regime of labour, that of ‘hewers of wood and drawers of 
water’. Rather than pursuing the bioscope as instrument of effect, or a 
scene of leisure or even popular culture, it may be more useful to think 
of its composition in terms of a certain relation of time and technics 
into which the subject of apartheid was folded. In this configuration, 
the figure of the human – otherwise raced, classed and gendered – was 
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a script of excess in which movement was crafted synchronously with 
the speed mobilised by light falling upon moving images. Twenty-four 
frames per second initially to be exact, cast through 35mm projectors, 
accomplished greater foresight than the memories contained in fading 
photographs of the forced removals which had brought people to the 
Cape Flats. Besides offering a ride, the bioscope offered a memory of 
the future. Rather than functioning in a hierarchy of the senses, film and 
photograph complemented each other in recreating form and style as 
constitutive elements of a life in the shadows.
But movement, as we know all too well, also produces collisions and 
accidents. If the Soweto Uprising of 1976 marks such a collision, it is 
to the extent that this major student revolt converged with the collision 
between the time of the bioscope and the technics of television in South 
Africa. Television arrived in this country in May 1976, with 25 frames 
per second as opposed to the familiar 24 frames per second, on the eve 
of the Soweto student protests. Some of the earliest images broadcast on 
public national television were of the confrontations between students 
and police in Soweto. What gradually disappeared in the process of the 
displacement of the bioscope by the televisual was precisely the interval. 
We should consider here specifically how the bioscope gave us the interval 
as an opportunity to change directions. By contrast, the televisual, with 
its programmed format, abolished the time interval in the visual field, 
only to dilate the image of space.
This is a conception that follows in the tracks of Virilio’s Information 
Bomb, which worries at the question of the hyperconcentration of 
telecommunications that gave us globalisation. For Virilio, the extreme 
reduction of distances ensues from a temporal compression of transport and 
transmission and the spread of telesurveillance. In short, late apartheid, unlike 
late colonialism with its administrative apparatus and indirect rule, could be 
said to resemble a techno-scientific development with a hyperconcentration 
of telecommunications, at the expense of the travel afforded in the interval 
in which the bioscope functioned. For the youth of the Cape Flats, this 
amounted to a double displacement: both home and, in its second iteration, 
a space lost to the compression of time. A history of transport on the Cape 
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Flats soon reveals the anxiety that this sense of entrapment produced. This 
was a drive with the sense of desire entirely eroded.
To be more precise, what the shift from bioscope to television 
symbolised was an inability to change direction. Suddenly, Bruce Lee was 
replaced by the Brady Bunch. And, with it, all the passions that charged 
the interval, from animated flying kicks to the projection of antiracial 
solidarities, seem to have waned. Nostalgia for the bioscope would 
return only to mark the memorials of apartheid’s atrocities. But in that 
brief moment, a shift was imaginable in the movement of the body, in its 
rhythms, flows and change of direction.
Nothing could epitomise this more than the sheer excitement that 
filled the air when in Way of the Dragon (1972) Bruce Lee met Chuck 
Norris in the Colosseum in Rome. This specific scene is as crucial in 
terms of discerning the filmic qualities of Athlone as it is for a general 
study of the field of techne in the age of globalisation. Paul Bowman writes 
about the scene in a way that rephrases what I am hoping to suggest by the 
productivity of the interval that bioscope occasioned:
The most famous illustration of Lee’s ideal of broken rhythm is reputedly 
seen in Way of the Dragon. In this fight, Lee is at first formal and 
predictable; hence his equally formal opponent is able to fare well against 
him. Upon realizing this limitation, Lee’s character switches to a more 
anarchic, fluid and unpredictable style, one which Miller argues was 
heavily indebted to Lee’s attempts to emulate the movements of boxer 
Muhammad Ali. Lee’s new style then breaks through his opponent’s 
formal movements and rhythms. This scene is widely held to constitute 
a Jeet Kune Do lesson which illustrates the need to ‘be like water’ and to 
use ‘broken rhythm’ (21).
The scene would recall a pervasive mythology surrounding Lee’s untimely 
death, as it also marked a racial identification that was increasingly taking 
hold under apartheid. He was, it was repeatedly and disdainfully claimed, 
killed by Chuck Norris in the end, a foreboding prophecy of what awaited 
Athlone. If the televisual field put the drive into overdrive, it would do 
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so by clipping a desire that extended well beyond the law that called it 
into being in the first place. And, with it, the technical becoming of the 
human was rescripted by the design of apartheid, in the form of a mode of 
transport laden with armed security and railway police hidden in crates 
on its carriage.
In their bid to redirect education from the dangerous course of its 
death drive, the students of Athlone undertook to reintroduce a mode of 
education intended to disable the authoritarian impulse, cynical reason 
and punitive function of apartheid education. It also sought to reorient 
the meaning of education.
All of this came to a head as the very movement unleashed by the 
students in July 1985 resulted in a tussle over the political imprint of the 
movement, and in the decision by the House of Representatives (the separate 
chamber for ‘coloureds’ in the apartheid Parliament) and the Department 
of Education and Training to close schools. In response to a spirited call 
for the reopening of schools by a group calling themselves the Concerned 
Teachers Association, which in all probability was issued jointly by teachers 
and students, thousands of parents, teachers and students across the Cape 
Flats heeded the call to defy the closure of schools.4 In the resultant siege, it 
became clear that the students faced a state that had mobilised the army and 
not only the police.5 The redirection of education attempted by the students 
of 1985 encountered its limit in the shift from police to military power. The 
closure of schools by Carter Ebrahim, education minister in the House of 
Representatives, was an attempt to draw students into the streets, into open 
confrontation.6 The ambush that was laid for 15 October 1985, and that 
became known as the Trojan Horse Massacre, had a long gestation.
What now marks the massacre as an event relates to the speed of the 
circulation of the image, one that immediately dissolved the interval in 
which the student movement could be thought of as primarily a question 
of schooling. In its aftermath, violence coded the Athlone movement, not 
only that of the state but also of the students. The speed that accelerated 
the drive for a standoff with the state was idiomatically expressed in 
terms of journalism. The struggle was no longer focused on the school in 
a discourse of revolt and study that Sitze has concisely identified in his 
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reading of Rive’s Emergency Continued. Caught in the impasse between 
study and revolt, the struggles of 1985 petered out into a stasis that 
signalled not only an impasse, but civil war. Stasis was a condition, to 
borrow from Stiegler, of the proletarianisation of politics, in which the 
very question of the subject and of knowledge was short-circuited. In 
the catastrophe of the senses, something of the order of the police was 
reinforced as the condition of politics.
In this way, the state undercut a shift from schooling as ideological 
function to schooling as a desire to learn, putting to an end the connection 
of individuation to the process of transindividuation that had been struck 
up in the student movement. School was a technology of power from 
which one could only free oneself through a technogenesis of school, 
not through a counter-hegemonic or countercultural standpoint. In this, 
the relation between individuation and transindividuation would prove 
crucial. Transindividuation owes its emergence to the philosophy of 
Gilbert Simondon and, more recently, to Stiegler. By transindividuation, 
Simondon and Stiegler mean the process of co-constitution of individual 
and group psyches, in which the individual is always also a phase 
inserted into a longer process. Drawing on Freud, Stiegler combines this 
understanding of transindividuation with concepts of desire and technics, 
in which both function not only at the level of individual sexuality, but 
also as collective psyche. In an environment of schooling where Orwell’s 
Animal Farm was meant to be read as a warning against the perils of 
communism, and where Chinua Achebe’s Arrow of God was withdrawn 
by an overzealous education department for containing a sexually explicit 
scene, the interval for re-exploring the seam that bound individuation 
and transindividuation was short-circuited by the Trojan Horse 
Massacre. More succinctly, the Trojan Horse Massacre short-circuited the 
technogenesis of schooling that was under way in the student movement. 
Schooling as a site of struggle was returned to the problem of its function 
as an ideological state apparatus, leaving behind a memory with no future.
A CBS film crew happened to be filming in Thornton Road on the day 
of the shootings. Chris Everson, Greg Shaw and John Rubython filmed 
the unfolding events in Athlone (Weaver interview). Describing  the 
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE ‘BECOMING TECHNICAL OF THE HUMAN’
267
footage as explosive, they called the journalist Tony Weaver, who set to 
work on selecting three frames from the footage for an article on what he 
called the Trojan Horse Massacre for the Cape Times the following day. 
In the meantime, the CBS journalists chartered a plane to Nairobi and 
transmitted the footage to New York. Broadcast on television around the 
world, the Trojan Horse Massacre became a placeholder for a movement, 
the potential of which was lost to the immediacy and urgency demanded 
by the act of state violence. The entire story of the Trojan Horse had been 
given over to the question of communication, through boxes, in which the 
televisual was synchronised by the death carried in a railway truck turned 
into a war machine, not unlike the gift of the Greeks.
Much has been said and written about the Trojan Horse Massacre and 
its memorialisation (see Marschall).7 Perhaps, not enough has been said 
and written to release us from the trappings of the speed of the operation 
that would change the course of history on which the students had 
embarked. But in all the ways the Trojan Horse has been memorialised, 
what is not clear is the extent to which the killings resulted in a process of 
disindividuation – a process where the very psychic apparatus fell upon a 
scene of drives disconnected from desire. The idea of schooling that had 
been problematised in the student movement had resulted in a fetishisation 
of school as ideological state apparatus, leaving no language for a memory 
of the future that the desire for schooling kindled among students in 1985.
The memorial that marks the site of the Trojan Horse killings, erected 
by an African National Congress-led City of Cape Town and replacing 
the more modest artistic marker by Tyrone Appollis (see Kros; see also 
Rassool & Van Bever Donker), recalls something of the compunction to 
mark time that was lost to compression. It has been roundly criticised 
for overemphasising the role of the perpetrators of state violence – a 
claim now supported by the loss of the plates depicting the stories of the 
mothers of three youth who were killed, told in their own handwriting. 
In the lukewarm reception of the memorial, perhaps there lurks a reason: 
the way in which it repeats the story of a drive without a hint of desire, of 
nostalgia for a dilated space, but not the interval that may have offered a 
different direction for the idea of schooling. The image, notwithstanding 
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the criticism, is a familiar one for Athlone. It replays the motif of the war-
film posters that once adorned the edifice of the bioscopes of Athlone. 
If this appears as an interpretative leap at first, it is only because the 
Trojan Horse memorial returns us to the stasis that once dominated 
the compression of time we have come to know as Athlone, and that is 
recalled not only as a memory of the past, but a memory of that which 
must be repeated – namely, war.
This is a mode of technogenesis of which we may need to remain 
fearful. For the human thus folded into the machine is only ever a 
technical becoming of the human who is a compression of movement, of 
uncontrollable speed and undulating sadness. This at least is how we may 
read Willie Bester’s unsettling sculpture, Trojan Horse III (Figure 10.3), 
as a cautionary tale of precisely that operation which folds the 
human into technology, making technics a part of the figuring of the 
Figure 10.3. Willie Bester (b.1956), Trojan Horse III, 2007.
Courtesy of the artist and Julian Jans/Bowman Sculpture
© Willie Bester
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industrialisation of memory. Like the Greeks who folded the human into 
a war machine, Bester’s work warns against the practice of a memory of 
the past that is the condition of teletechnics, with surveillance, threat, 
control, mobility and death rolled into an indistinguishable scene of 
unending battle.
Returning to the interval, consider an event four years after the Trojan 
Horse killings, in which student activists Coline Williams and Robert 
(Robbie) Waterwitch were killed in an ambush orchestrated by the state 
security apparatus. As the record indicates, they were killed in July 1989 
while attempting to plant explosives at the magistrate’s court in the 
central business district of Athlone. The story of their deaths has become 
legendary on the Cape Flats, not least because death was brought about by 
the same means of dirty tricks and surreptitious ambush that had delivered 
the Trojan Horse to the streets of Athlone and Crossroads. As the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was to suggest in one interpretation, the 
deaths of Robbie Waterwitch and Coline Williams resulted from a zero-
timed explosive device, issued by the covert state apparatus through the 
agency of a security police informer who had infiltrated an underground 
resistance cell. The aim of this act of infiltration was to ensure that the two 
operatives were killed.
In their memory, the space outside the magistrate’s court today carries 
a statue of Robbie and Coline as they have been popularly inscribed into 
a public imaginary. Coline glances suspiciously over her shoulder, as if to 
recognise the scene of interpellation. Robbie walks confidently abreast of 
her (Figure 10.4).
In descriptions of their fateful deaths, the magistrate’s court has 
notoriously become the target of their attention, like a scene from Franz 
Kafka’s ‘Vor dem Gesetz’ (Before the Law), where the law reveals itself 
as the very condition for violence. It may be read as a cautionary tale 
about never being complacent before the law. Yet, in a broader optic, 
the space of the memorial brings into view the bioscope that was 
once immediately ahead, across the street from where the sculpture 
is placed today. The building now houses the government department 
of communication and information. Once it was home to the Kismet 
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bioscope, a name that, when translated, gives us recourse to that which 
remains to be said about the spectre of death in Athlone. It is a word 
that has its beginnings in Arabic (root qasama, meaning ‘to divide’), that 
developed into qisma (meaning ‘division’, ‘portion’ or ‘lot’) and, with the 
rise of the Ottoman Empire, entered Turkish as kismet (meaning ‘fate’ or 
‘destiny’). From here it was deposited into Hindi and Urdu, retaining its 
Turkish inflection, before travelling to Athlone where it simply came to 
mean ‘the bioscope’.
That at least is what is left of the memory of the future, a scene of 
desire that shares in the fate of reschooling and, in the process, retooling. 
The student movement of 1985 was nothing of the order of a schools’ 
boycott. It was a desire for a return to an interval, in a space of intensity 
in which compression of time diluted and dilated space, giving students a 
mode of communication with little prospect of advance, let alone retreat. 
What the bioscope shared with the school was a different conception 
Figures 10.4 and 10.5. Sculpture in memory of Coline Williams and Robert Waterwitch, 
Athlone.
Photographer: Paul Grendon
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of the interval: one that promised a non-sectarian future in place of the 
difference marked out by the interval of apartheid.
NOTES
1. This is a greatly truncated rendering of a systematic elaboration that 
deserves to be read at length (see Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of 
Epimetheus 106).
2. Heidi Grunebaum addresses precisely this problem in her consideration of 
how the memory of Robert Waterwitch and Coline Williams often erodes 
lives beyond the event of their untimely deaths at the hands of the apartheid 
security forces.
3. Black audiences were initially barred from viewing Sergio Leone’s ‘Man 
with No Name’ series, which includes The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. It was 
only after resubmission to the censor boards in the 1970s that viewing was 
permitted (Patel interview).
4. Pamphlet by Concerned Teachers Association, Robert van Niekerk, private 
collection.
5. Basil Swart, submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2 June 1997, 
www.justice.gov.za/trc/special%5Ctrojan/swart.htm. Accessed 23 August 2016.
6. The most outlandish report on this comes from the New York Times – see 
Alan Cowell.
7. With the recent removal of the bronze plaques containing the narratives of 
the mothers of those killed, we may have to reconsider the idea of vernacular 
expressions that Sabine Marschall identifies in her suggestive essay. See also 
the paper by Gary Minkley and Phindi Mnyaka.
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Figure 8.1. Winter in Tembisa (ca 1991).
Photographer: Santu Mofokeng
Medium Gelatin silver print 
Yale University Art Gallery 
Gift of Mary Jo and Ted P. Shen, B.A. 1966, M.A. (HON) 2001.
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Figure 8.2. Moses Twebe (fourth from the left) in front of the Moses Twebe Great Hall, 
15 March 2007.
Photographer: Gary Minkley
Figure 8.3. Moses Twebe, his family and his goat, 15 March 2007.
Photographer: Gary Minkley
Figure 10.1. Juliette Franciscus (glancing over her shoulder), Karen Britten, Sean 
Stockenstroom, Belgravia High students on the corner of Thornton and Kromboom 
roads, 1985.
Photographer: David Hartman
Figure 10.2. Trojan Horse Massacre memorial, Thornton Road, Athlone.
Photographer: Paul Grendon
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Figure 10.3. Willie Bester (b.1956), Trojan Horse III, 2007.
Mixed media sculpture 
Courtesy of the artist and Julian Jans/Bowman Sculpture. 
© Willie Bester
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